Originally Posted by
Invisible Man
Did they expand the meaning of "sex"? Or did they argue as follows?
The law must permit a woman to do everything it permits a man to do and vice versa.
The law permits a man to marry a woman and a woman to marry a man.
Therefore, the law must permit a woman to marry a woman and a man to marry a man.
That's not really redefining sex so much as expanding what equal protection under the law must entail in ways that the framers of the 14th Amendment surely didn't mean.
Wrong. This isn't about whether the law must permit a man to do everything a woman can do or vise vesa but rather must private companies, based on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, allow hire gay employees. Regardless of whether you think such discrimination is okay or not, this required a change of the meaning of the word "sex" in the statute. It's even admitted in the language of the opinion.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17-1618
(1) The parties concede that the term “sex” in 1964 referred to the biological distinctions between male and female. And “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of,’ ” University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, 350. That term incorporates the but-for causation standard, id., at 346, 360, which, for Title VII, means that a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment action. The term “discriminate” meant “[t]o make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared with others).” Webster’s New International Dictionary 745. In so-called “disparate treatment” cases, this Court has held that the difference in treatment based on sex must be intentional. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 986. And the statute’s repeated use of the term “individual” means that the focus is on “[a] particular being as distinguished from a class.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, at 1267. Pp. 4–9.
(2) These terms generate the following rule: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It makes no difference if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision or that the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. A statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee. Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally penalizes an employee for being homosexual or transgender also violates Title VII. There is no escaping the role intent plays: Just as sex is necessarily a but-for cause when an employer discriminates against homosexual or transgender employees, an employer who discriminates on these grounds inescapably intends to rely on sex in its decisionmaking. Pp. 9–12.
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