The Problem With Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics

[r3volution 3.0]

One is guilty of performative contradiction when one makes a statement which contradicts a necessary condition for making that statement. For instance, “I am dead” is a performative contradiction, because being alive is a necessary condition for speaking. Likewise, “I am not using my body” is a performative contradiction, because using one's body is a necessary condition for speaking.

In his Argumentation Ethics, Hoppe purports to justify the self-ownership principle by showing that any statement which denies the self-ownership principle is a performative contradiction. Thus he argues that “I do not own myself” is a performative contradiction, because self-ownership is a necessary condition for speaking. Herein lies the error. The ABILITY to control one's body (to move one's vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc) is a necessary condition for speaking; it does not follow that the RIGHT to control one's body (i.e. self-ownership) is necessary. Hoppe simply conflates the two concepts, control and ownership, as if they were identical. This is a species of is-ought fallacy, where Hoppe jumps from the “is” of control to the “ought” of ownership. It is a non sequitur.

This error was recognized a long time ago by prominent libertarians. Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan, for instance, wrote a lengthy criticism of Argumentation Ethics back in 2006, which addressed a number of problems including the conflation of control and ownership (which, since it's sufficient to defeat Argumentation Ethics, is the only one I'm addressing in this thread). Several Hoppeans have since responded in an attempt to defend Argumentation Ethics. Below I analyze one such response.

The third critique of Callahan and Murphy is probably the most complex and challenging. For providing it a satisfactory answer, it is crucial to follow attentively all its steps. In a nutshell, the critique maintains that Hoppe’s argument “confuses temporary control with rightful ownership” (Callahan and Murphy 2006, 64). Indeed there is clear distinction that all philosophers agree upon between sitting on a chair and being its owner. “One is not necessarily the rightful owner of a piece of property even if control of it is necessary in a debate over its ownership” (Callahan and Murphy 2006, 60, original emphasis). Starting from the distinction “control” versus “ownership,” Callahan and Murphy criticize Hoppe’s argument on several aspects. They immediately deduce from this distinction that self-ownership does not overlap the effective control of a body.

...Summing up this critique, Hoppe’s argument seems to be caught between Scylla and Charybdis of ethics. Either the concepts use and ownership are conflated or it is admitted that self-ownership is not a necessary condition for argumentation. Each of these alternatives would defeat Hoppe’s argument by performative contradiction.

In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate use with ownership.

The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership” simply overlap...

The argument presented above is that Hoppe isn't mistakenly equating use and ownership, because, with respect to the body, use and ownership really are the same thing. Now let's see how the author goes about trying to prove that claim.

If one can loose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can never lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land, the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by canceling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e., by transforming her into a zombie or robot.

There are two senses in which a body can be controlled; (a) one can will one's own body into motion or (b) another person can exert physical control over one's body, as by grabbing it, shoving it, etc. The author fails to make this distinction, and thus he errors. The self-ownership principle regulates the second kind of control (i.e. it prohibits others from grabbing, shoving, etc one's body without one's permission). It does not concern the other type of control, i.e. one's exclusive ability to will one's body into motion. Hypothetically, if one lost ownership of one's body, that would would mean that others would have the right to grab it, shove, it etc without one's permission, not that one would lose the ability to will one's own body into motion.

In addition to conflating these two kinds of control, the author's defense of Hoppe's conflation of control and ownership consists in repeating it almost verbatim. Nowhere does he explain why control and ownership are identical; he simply asserts that they are. Well, they simply aren't. To control something is not to have the right to control something. The author recognizes that this is true in general (as with chairs one sits on, e.g.), but asserts without explanation that it somehow doesn't apply in the case of the body.

For all these reasons, his argument is entirely unpersuasive. What's especially odd about it is that, if it were true that self-control just is self-ownership somehow, why even bother with performative contradiction? The justification for libertarian ethics could simply read "I alone can will my body into motion [clearly a true statement, which everyone in the world would grant], therefore I own my body." Perhaps the reason for bringing in performative contradiction is that that prior statement is so obviously a non sequitur that it wouldn't pass the laugh test if put in the spotlight; whereas, when it's only the unstated premise of a larger, seemingly more sophisticated argument, people might not notice the problem.

In any event, there the problem is, and that's why Argumentation Ethics fails. On a final note - and this should go without saying, though I'll say it anyway - I agree with Hoppe's conclusion (i.e. I am in favor of self-ownership); it's only the reasoning he uses to reach that conclusion that I'm criticizing.

[Sola_Fide]

I agree with those critiques.

Also, there is a simple reason that argumentation ethics fails before it even starts: It could be the case that self-ownership is assumed in all of our interactions, but this assumption does not rise past the "is/ought" fallacy. Arguments from the nature of things cannot yield prescriptions on how one ought to live.

You cannot say "all things being equal, in a state of nature, men ought not harm each other's person or property". "Ought" cannot be derived from "is". The premise of that argument is DESCRIPTIVE, while the conclusion is PRESCRIPTIVE. It does not follow that just because nature is a certain way, men must behave a certain way.

Argumentation ethics is still a variant of a natural law argument, and natural law arguments are not sufficient for ethics.

[Sola_Fide]

Herein lies the error. The ABILITY to control one's body (to move one's vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc) is a necessary condition for speaking; it does not follow that the RIGHT to control one's body (i.e. self-ownership) is necessary. Hoppe simply conflates the two concepts, control and ownership, as if they were identical. This is a species of is-ought fallacy, where Hoppe jumps from the “is” of control to the “ought” of ownership. It is a non sequitur.

Exactly.

[timosman]

There are two senses in which a body can be controlled; (a) one can will one's own body into motion or (b) another person can exert physical control over one's body, as by grabbing it, shoving it, etc. The author fails to make this distinction, and thus he errors.

Had to stop here. How often does (b) happen? What about (c) - same as (b) but the control is exerted by non-physical means - e.g. money: I will use your body(or brain although it does not happen as often anymore) for 8 hours a day in exchange for a certain amount of FRNs?

[r3volution 3.0]

Had to stop here. How often does (b) happen?

All the time

It's no doubt happening to somebody on Earth right now, and has been happening to somebody every second of every day for eons.

Why does it's frequency matter though?

What about (c) - same as (b) but the control is exerted by non-physical means - e.g. money: I will use your body(or brain although it does not happen as often anymore) for 8 hours a day in exchange for a certain amount of FRNs?

That too happens all the time, of course, though it's not relevant to the self-ownership principle, which is concerned only with aggression.

[oyarde]

I have used a lot of Hoppes No 9 .

[r3volution 3.0]

argumentation ethics fails before it even starts..."Ought" cannot be derived from "is". The premise of that argument is DESCRIPTIVE, while the conclusion is PRESCRIPTIVE. It does not follow that just because nature is a certain way, men must behave a certain way.

Yep, and once a person understands this, every purported "objective proof" of ethics can be dismissed out of hand, regardless of the specific content of the argument (though it can be useful to dig into the details to persuade other people, which is what I had in mind here, since AE is still popular within the libertarian community), in the same way that one could dismiss out of hand any alleged proof that triangles can have a number of sides other than 3; it fails as a matter of pure deductive reasoning.

Argumentation ethics is still a variant of a natural law argument, and natural law arguments are not sufficient for ethics.

Yep, Rothbard's Natural Law justification of self-ownership fails on essentially the same grounds.

[Sola_Fide]

Yep, and once a person understands this, every purported "objective proof" of ethics can be dismissed out of hand.

Oh, not every one.

[r3volution 3.0]

Oh, not every one.

No?

Which 'objective proof' of ethics do you think succeeds?

[Occam's Banana]

I pretty much agree with what's been said to this point, except for the following statement:

[...] one could dismiss out of hand any alleged proof that triangles can have a number of sides other than 3; it fails as a matter of pure deductive reasoning.

Triangles have three sides solely as a matter of (commonly understood and tacitly agreed-upon) definition, not as a matter of deductive reasoning. Thus, assertion of definitional fiat is strictly sufficient; in matters of definition, proofs are not required. (Indeed, proofs of defintions are not even possible, since definitions are one of the elements out of which proofs are posteriorly constructed.)

One may define a "triangle" in any manner one pleases - such as "any simple enclosed geometric figure having five or more sides." While this would certainly be an unconventional usage (and, quite probably, pointlessly contrarian), it is not of itself deductively invalid or rationally illegitimate.

Hence, the statement quoted above is incorrect - definitions are not susceptible of being proved or disproved. (The quoted statement's intended meaning could be correctly expressed by invoking a deduction rather than a definition - as follows, for example: "one could dismiss out of hand any alleged proof that the sum of the interior angles of a planar triangle is other than 180 degrees; it fails as a matter of pure deductive reasoning.")

This may seem like a trivial quibble, especially where such a non-controversial concept as "triangle" is concerned. But regarding other more contentious concepts (such as "anarchy" or "minarchy," for example), it is important to maintain the distinction in order to avoid obtuse and obstructive games of "duelling dictionaries" (and the alleged but bogus "proofs" arising therefrom). Unless one is arguing about something like etymology or colloquial usage, rote citations of dictionary entries have no place in rational argumentation.

[osan]

I have used a lot of Hoppes No 9 .

I did too, until I discovered boiling water.

[osan]

One is guilty of performative contradiction when one makes a statement which contradicts a necessary condition for making that statement. For instance, “I am dead” is a performative contradiction, because being alive is a necessary condition for speaking. Likewise, “I am not using my body” is a performative contradiction, because using one's body is a necessary condition for speaking.

You have fallen into the usual linguistic trap, thus committing an error yourownself. "I'm dead" and "we're dead" are daily uttered by teenagers who have been, or are about to be caught at some no-good they have committed. The idiomatic use of "dead" leads them to no contradiction.

A man in a speeding car, just having gone out of control and into a 2000' deep canyon thinks, "I am dead", the sense being that he is but seconds away from dying, makes no contradiction.

A person lying in a hospice bed, a second or two prior to the onset of his physical death thinks the same to himself and is not in self-contradiction.

Another decides that he is spiritually dead, his saying "I am dead" is not contradictory.

My point here is that you have forgotten the devilish nature of language. In so doing, you have neglected to address certain conditions necessary to a proper philosophical discourse. We all do this, so it is not my purpose to excoriate and shame, but to make aware. It may not be a big deal here at RPF, but in other circles it can become a huge deal. Courts of law, for instance, or those circumstances where something of significant value is at stake.

Had this been a trial for your freedom and I the prosecutor, this exposition in your defense would already be in serious trouble. So once again I emphasize the tricky aspects of language and how important it is to take them into proper account when visiting the rabbit hole.



The third critique of Callahan and Murphy is probably the most complex and challenging. For providing it a satisfactory answer, it is crucial to follow attentively all its steps. In a nutshell, the critique maintains that Hoppe’s argument “confuses temporary control with rightful ownership” (Callahan and Murphy 2006, 64).



"Momentary" would be more appropriate here, as it refers to the conditions at the moment in question regardless of whether they be permanent or temporary.

The argument presented above is that Hoppe isn't mistakenly equating use and ownership, because, with respect to the body, use and ownership really are the same thing. Now let's see how the author goes about trying to prove that claim.

In practical terms, I would tend to agree with Hoppe, but would also agree that as stated, he was sloppy. Sloppiness is badness where philosophical discourse is concerned.


If one can loose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can never lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land, the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by canceling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e., by transforming her into a zombie or robot.


The structure of these sentences is $#@!. I can barely make out what the writer is saying. Is the use of "her" improper, or is there missing context? I find it ever so irritating when stoopid people use "she" and "her" in place of the proper third-person English pronoun "he" and "him". Credibility takes a big hit from where I stand on such matters.

My peeve aside, the bolded text predicates on the definition of ownership, which is not given in the specific cases discussed. Is control ownership? I say no, but that raises a deeper issue: does ownership matter when things come down to brass tacks? I would contend that when circumstance is such that third parties enjoy full- or sufficient control over a give object or other resource without an ostensible owner having recourse, "ownership" becomes an irrelevancy in point of practical fact.

It is clear that at the end of the day, might makes real, rightly or otherwise. Even in the "normal" world, all property rights find their respect largely due to the threat of force, whether that of the owner standing on his porch with an M16, or the sheriffs armed and ready to ensure the sanctity of the owner's status as owner. Force undergirds ownership rights at all times.

There are two senses in which a body can be controlled; (a) one can will one's own body into motion or (b) another person can exert physical control over one's body, as by grabbing it, shoving it, etc. The author fails to make this distinction, and thus he errors. The self-ownership principle regulates the second kind of control (i.e. it prohibits others from grabbing, shoving, etc one's body without one's permission). It does not concern the other type of control, i.e. one's exclusive ability to will one's body into motion. Hypothetically, if one lost ownership of one's body, that would would mean that others would have the right to grab it, shove, it etc without one's permission, not that one would lose the ability to will one's own body into motion.

Your argument at least one glaring omission that should jump at you. Remember that guy in the car going into the canyon? Turned out he lived, but is now comatose. He is incapable of voluntarily controlling any aspect of his body. Is he still the owner? Proper philosophical discourse demands precision, including mention of that which will be intentionally left out for concision's sake, or that of any other reason. Otherwise, people like me will pick at you endlessly, prompting you to hire costly hitmen and exposing you to possible criminal charges. Really, it becomes quite the mess.

In addition to conflating these two kinds of control, the author's defense of Hoppe's conflation of control and ownership consists in repeating it almost verbatim. Nowhere does he explain why control and ownership are identical; he simply asserts that they are. Well, they simply aren't. To control something is not to have the right to control something. The author recognizes that this is true in general (as with chairs one sits on, e.g.), but asserts without explanation that it somehow doesn't apply in the case of the body.

Agreed. I steal your car. I control it. Does it follow that I own it? Depends on the broader context, to pick the nit. But all else equal, no I do not. That is why I am called "thief".

In any event, there the problem is, and that's why Argumentation Ethics fails. On a final note - and this should go without saying, though I'll say it anyway - I agree with Hoppe's conclusion (i.e. I am in favor of self-ownership); it's only the reasoning he uses to reach that conclusion that I'm criticizing

So then you find Hoppe's argument to be true, but not cogent.

Fair enough.

[Superfluous Man]

All attempts to start from a blank slate and build up a system of truth using reason alone are doomed.

We have two choices: adopt Christianity as the starting point as a precondition for understanding the truth, or adopt some other starting point and doom yourself to believe falsehood.

[Occam's Banana]

All attempts to start from a blank slate and build up a system of truth using reason alone are doomed.

This is correct.

Reason cannot proceed without something upon which to operate - that "something" being, at absolute minimum, a collection of definitions and axioms (i.e., initial premises) the truth of which must be assumed. If they were not assumed to be true, they would not be axioms, and would have to be derived from previously established definitions and axioms (and other proofs derived from such).

We have two choices: adopt Christianity as the starting point as a precondition for understanding the truth, or adopt some other starting point and doom yourself to believe falsehood.

This, however, begs the question.

The adoption of Christianity as a collection of starting axioms necessarily assumes the truth of those particular axioms. But the same applies with respect to the adoption of any other collection of starting axioms. The truth of one's starting axioms - whatever they might be, "Christian" or otherwise - is always necessarily assumed (else they would not be axiomatic).

The axioms of neither Christianity nor of any other moral system can be "proven," because the assumption of their truth is necessarily prior to any proofs. Hence, your statement carries dispositive weight only if one already accepts the Christian "starting point" as being true; it is entirely without such weight if one does not. Thus, your statement is a circular begging of the question

[Sola_Fide]

This is correct.

Reason cannot proceed without something upon which to operate - that "something" being, at absolute minimum, a collection of definitions and axioms (i.e., initial premises) the truth of which must be assumed. If they were not assumed to be true, they would not be axioms, and would have to be derived from previously established definitions and axioms (and other proofs derived from such).



This, however, begs the question.

The adoption of Christianity as a collection of starting axioms necessarily assumes the truth of those particular axioms. But the same applies with respect to the adoption of any other collection of starting axioms. The truth of one's starting axioms - whatever they might be, "Christian" or otherwise - is always necessarily assumed (else they would not be axiomatic).

The axioms of neither Christianity nor of any other moral system can be "proven," because the assumption of their truth is necessarily prior to any proofs. Hence, your statement carries dispositive weight only if one already accepts the Christian "starting point" as being true; it is entirely without such weight if one does not. Thus, your statement is a circular begging of the question

All worldviews, at their starting point, take axioms as true in order to reason. Every worldview does this, so that in and of itself is no argument against Christianity.

[wizardwatson]

This is correct.

Reason cannot proceed without something upon which to operate - that "something" being, at absolute minimum, a collection of definitions and axioms (i.e., initial premises) the truth of which must be assumed. If they were not assumed to be true, they would not be axioms, and would have to be derived from previously established definitions and axioms (and other proofs derived from such).



This, however, begs the question.

The adoption of Christianity as a collection of starting axioms necessarily assumes the truth of those particular axioms. But the same applies with respect to the adoption of any other collection of starting axioms. The truth of one's starting axioms - whatever they might be, "Christian" or otherwise - is always necessarily assumed (else they would not be axiomatic).

The axioms of neither Christianity nor of any other moral system can be "proven," because the assumption of their truth is necessarily prior to any proofs. Hence, your statement carries dispositive weight only if one already accepts the Christian "starting point" as being true; it is entirely without such weight if one does not. Thus, your statement is a circular begging of the question

Truth is not something proven but established. Man seeks proof because he is unable to establish it. There is a chasm, even now, that you see as requiring man to "accept" this starting point. But the truth of Christianity isn't based on man's acceptance but on God's establishing it. And the difficulty in comprehending this truth comes not so much from the fact that God isn't doing a very good job, but from the fact that we are currently on a point in the timeline where God's absence rather than His presence is more obvious.

[Occam's Banana]

All worldviews, at their starting point, take axioms as true in order to reason. Every worldview does this, [...]

Yes. I agree. That's exactly what I was getting at.

[...] so that in and of itself is no argument against Christianity.

Again, I agree. I never said that it was an argument against Christianity. It clearly is not.

But by exactly the same token (and contrary to SM's statement, which I was critiquing), the Christian's assertion of the truth of his axioms is "in and of itself" no argument against other "worldviews" ...

[osan]

All attempts to start from a blank slate and build up a system of truth using reason alone are doomed.

Equivalent assertion: There exist no valid systems of truth outside that of Christianity.

I don't suppose it would help to point out just how hopelessly flawed is the claim.

We have two choices: adopt Christianity as the starting point as a precondition for understanding the truth, or adopt some other starting point and doom yourself to believe falsehood.

False dichotomy. Science - proper science, that is - disproves the assertion by virtue of the predictive powers of certain models of truth. Statistical models are but one of endless examples of this. Relativity theory, within the limits of its applicability, gave rise to many predictions that proved true. Theories and models of genetics do the same, as well as do those of kinematics, thermodynamics, computer science, chemistry, and so on down a rather long and conclusive line.

Furthermore, my short but sweet treatise on Proper Human Relations further demonstrates that "God", as painted by any given religious world view, is not perforce required in order to arrive at truth, particularly that of the practical sort. I do, in fact, assert that this fact does not nullify "God" in any general way. It does, in fact, demonstrate the benevolent side of "God" in that we have been given all the tools necessary for arriving upon truth without having to rely upon third-party sources. This demonstrates to me God's humility and largesse, as he stands aside and allows Creation to unfold of its own nature. Given that some people are running about willy-nilly, sawing the heads off other people, I would say God has plenty of self control because I might put that $#@! to ends in no time flat.

I will repeat the basis here for the umpteenth time, beginning with the Cardinal Postulate:

All men are equally endowed with life.

If you accept this as true, the rest of the entire system of fundamental human truth follows directly, completely, intuitively, and apodictically thence.

If you do not, there follows a line of questions that must be answered that is thorny, produces no satisfactory responses, and leads to a recursive loop of functionally equivalent questions and answers, thereby disproving the validity of rejection.

It is a short, sweet, and fun trap to set for the unwary and a good learning experience for them... assuming they are open to reason and possess some minimal level of private integrity.

[Sola_Fide]

Yes. I agree. That's exactly what I was getting at.



Again, I agree. I never said that it was an argument against Christianity. It clearly is not.

But by exactly the same token (and contrary to SM's statement, which I was critiquing), the Christian's assertion of the truth of his axioms is "in and of itself" no argument against other "worldviews" ...

But you said it was circular reasoning and question begging. If you want to call taking axioms as true in order to reason "circular reasoning", fine, but that is no detriment to Christianity, because every worldview does the same thing.

[Occam's Banana]

Truth is not something proven but established. [...]

I said nothing about truth being something proven.

In fact, I carefully and deliberately worded my statements just to avoid doing so.

I spoke only of one's necessary assumption of the truth of one's initial premises.

I even explicitly stated that the truth of such premises could not be proven (by virtue of their having been adopted axiomatically).

[wizardwatson]

I said nothing about truth being something proven.

In fact, I carefully and deliberately worded my statements just to avoid doing so.

I spoke only of one's necessary assumption of the truth of one's initial premises.

I even explicitly stated that the truth of such premises could not be proven (by virtue of their having been adopted axiomatically).

Well, I was just trying to show contrast between accepting vs. establishing truth. You were a springboard, wasn't really contending with anything you said.

[Sola_Fide]

OB,

As for your assertion that the claims of Christianity are equally as meaningless as any other, I disagree. Staying with the theme of the OP, wouldn't one criteria for an ethical system that could sustain freedom be that it doesn't suffer from the is/ought fallacy? Christianity doesn't. I argue that Christianity has a self contained ethical system that provides the only ethical defense of private property.

[Occam's Banana]

But you said it was circular reasoning and question begging.

No, I said SM's statement (regarding the "doom[ed ...] falsehood" of non-Christian systems) was circular and question-begging.

It is a circular begging of the question because SM's assertion depends upon the assumed truth of the assertion itself.

That is the very definition of "circular reasoning" and "begging the question" ...

If you want to call taking axioms as true in order to reason "circular reasoning", fine, [...]

I did not identify the "taking of axioms as true in order to reason" as "circular reasoning."

I identified SM's assertion of the "doom[ed ...] falsehood" of non-Christian axioms as circular.

[...] but that is no detriment to Christianity, because every worldview does the same thing.

Yes. I've said that. But that has nothing to do with my criticism of SM's statement ...

[Sola_Fide]

No, I said SM's statement (regarding the "doom[ed ...] falsehood" of non-Christian systems) was circular and question-begging.

It is a circular begging of the question because SM's assertion depends upon the assumed truth of the assertion itself.

That is the very definition of "circular reasoning" and "begging the question" ...



I did not identify the "taking of axioms as true in order to reason" as "circular reasoning."

I identified SM's assertion of the "doom[ed ...] falsehood" of non-Christian axioms as circular.



Yes. I've said that. But that has nothing to do with my criticism of SM's statement ...

Oh I see. My apologies.

[osan]

This is correct.

Reason cannot proceed without something upon which to operate - that "something" being, at absolute minimum, a collection of definitions and axioms (i.e., initial premises) the truth of which must be assumed. If they were not assumed to be true, they would not be axioms, and would have to be derived from previously established definitions and axioms (and other proofs derived from such).

I may differ with you a bit on this in that I do not separate postulates from reason. They become part of reason itself in the given context. "Reason alone" is something of meaningless in that sense. Can we say in the practical world that it exists outside of postulates? How could it? Reason roots in language and language roots in definitions which by its own definition is little more than an assumption, or postulate.

It's all connected very incestuously and IMO attempting this sort of reductionism is pointless. At the very least, one should be aware of the general nature of these things prior to engaging in this brand of chicken choking.

The adoption of Christianity as a collection of starting axioms necessarily assumes the truth of those particular axioms.

Yes, and I would posit that those assumptions are not perforce axiomatic, nor are they postulates. For the purpose here, I narrow "postulate" as an "atomic" assertion, which is to say it is irreducible, or as nearly so as is practically sound. For example, the Cardinal Postulate: All men are equally endowed with life. Is this further reducible? In practical terms I would say it is not. In a trek down the rabbit hole of metaphysics, it may be... but to what end would we go there? Would doing so give rise to some world-shattering revelation that would set our lives upon a new path for the sheer and brutal force of it? Not likely.

The Cardinal Postulate is what I would call "safely fundamental". For example, it makes no assertion as to by what virtue we are endowed with life. It simply recognizes that dust becomes life by some means and that the result is, in se, equal across all instances.

[Occam's Banana]

OB,

As for your assertion that the claims of Christianity are equally as meaningless as any other, I disagree. [...]

Where have I asserted that the claims of Christianity are meaningless (let alone that they "are equally as meaningless as any other")?

I have asserted only that the foundational premises of Christianity, rather than being proven, are necessarily assumed to be true by Christians - and that the same applies with respect to the foundational premises of "any other" worldview by adherents of that worldview. There is nothing in any of this that attributes "meaninglessness" to anything.

[Sola_Fide]

Where have I asserted that the claims of Christianity are meaningless (let alone that they "are equally as meaningless as any other")?

I have asserted only that the foundational premises of Christianity, rather than being proven, are necessarily assumed to be true by Christians - and that the same applies with respect to the foundational premises of "any other" worldview by adherents of that worldview. There is nothing in any of this that attributes "meaninglessness" to anything.

Can one claim be valid and another claim be invalid?

[Occam's Banana]

Can one claim be valid and another claim be invalid?

I'm unclear about what you are referring to by "one claim" and "another claim" here.
Are you using "claim" in a general, non-specific sense - or are you referring to "one" and "another" particular claims?

Also, I don't know what you mean by "valid" and "invalid" in this context. Logical validity (or invalidity) is a characteristic of the deductive derivation of conclusions from given premises; it is not a characteristic of the given premises themselves. IOW: Premises (axiomatic or otherwise) cannot be said to be "valid" or "invalid" - only conclusions derived from those premises may be so described.

[Sola_Fide]

I'm unclear about what you are referring to by "one claim" and "another claim" here.
Are you using "claim" in a general, non-specific sense - or are you referring to "one" and "another" particular claims?

Also, I don't know what you mean by "valid" and "invalid" in this context. Logical validity (or invalidity) is a characteristic of the deductive derivation of conclusions from given premises; it is not a characteristic of the given premises themselves. IOW: Premises (axiomatic or otherwise) cannot be said to be "valid" or "invalid" - only conclusions derived from those premises may be so described.

Okay. Can one worldview be satisfying logically, while another not be satisfying logically?

[r3volution 3.0]

One is guilty of performative contradiction when one makes a statement which contradicts a necessary condition for making that statement. For instance, “I am dead” is a performative contradiction, because being alive is a necessary condition for speaking. Likewise, “I am not using my body” is a performative contradiction, because using one's body is a necessary condition for speaking.

You have fallen into the usual linguistic trap, thus committing an error yourownself. "I'm dead" and "we're dead" are daily uttered by teenagers who have been, or are about to be caught at some no-good they have committed. The idiomatic use of "dead" leads them to no contradiction.

A man in a speeding car, just having gone out of control and into a 2000' deep canyon thinks, "I am dead", the sense being that he is but seconds away from dying, makes no contradiction.

A person lying in a hospice bed, a second or two prior to the onset of his physical death thinks the same to himself and is not in self-contradiction.

Another decides that he is spiritually dead, his saying "I am dead" is not contradictory.

My point here is that you have forgotten the devilish nature of language. In so doing, you have neglected to address certain conditions necessary to a proper philosophical discourse. We all do this, so it is not my purpose to excoriate and shame, but to make aware.

Yes, I appreciate that "I am dead" is only a performative contradiction when taken literally.

But that doesn't have any bearing on Hoppe's argument, nor my critique of it, so I'm not sure what your point is...

It looks like you don't understand the argument in the OP.