The Court explained that the legislature enacted ORS 433.441 to 433.452 to give the Governor the option of declaring a public health emergency as an alternative to declaring a state of emergency under ORS chapter 401. ORS 433.441(1) authorizes the Governor to proclaim a state of public health emergency. Such a proclamation gives rise to lesser emergency powers than a declaration of a state of emergency pursuant to ORS
401.165 and is subject to the 28-day time limit under ORS 433.441(5). But, by its terms, that time limit applies only to "[a] proclamation of a state of public health emergency." Moreover, the Court explained, related statutes and the legislative history of the time limit show that the legislature did not intend the time limit to affect the duration of, or the Governor's powers during, a state of emergency declared pursuant to ORS 401.165. Therefore, the Court held, the circuit court had erred in concluding that the Governor's executive orders were subject to the time limit under ORS 433.441(5).
In addition, the Court confirmed that the circuit court had correctly rejected plaintiffs' alternative theory for invalidating the Governor's executive orders -- that the state of emergency that had been declared necessarily was subject to the time limit on a "catastrophic disaster" declared under Article X-A of the Oregon Constitution. Finally, the Court noted that it would not address issues pertaining to plaintiffs' constitutionally protected religious freedoms. It explained that plaintiffs had requested the preliminary injunction based on their claim that the Governor's orders had expired -- as evidenced by the fact that they sought to enjoin all of the orders, not just those that they identified as affecting their religious liberties -- and that was the claim on which the circuit court granted the preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the Court determined that the circuit court had erred when it granted the requested preliminary injunction on the theory that the Governor's executive orders were subject to the statutory time limit set out in ORS 433.411(5). In light of that error, the Court concluded that the preliminary injunction must be vacated, and it ordered the immediate issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to that effect.
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