(157)That as to these missile-launchers, Abdul RUZIBIZA stated that while he was at the R.P.F. headquarters in Mulindi he learned that the SAMs, which had come from the Ugandan arsenal in the beginning of January 1994, had been introduced into the C.N.D. in Kigali hidden on board a Mercedes truck transporting firewood; and, he added, that he had heard talk about a training program in Uganda in January 1993 for R.P.A. personnel, which included enlisted men Eric HAKIZIMANA, Stevens TWAGIRA and Andrews NYAVUMBA, all members of the ‘Missiles Section’ under the command of Lt. Alphonse KAYUMBA and his adjutant Lt. Franck NZIZA; and
(158)That, in discussing the final stage of the operation, he went on to state that, knowing the approximate time of arrival of the President’s flight and identifying the Falcon 50 by its characteristic engine noise, Eric HAKIZIMANA fired the first missile, which missed the target, and that it was the second missile fired by Franck NZIZA that hit the plane and caused it to explode in flight; and he added that at the end of this operation the hit-team fled, leaving the two empty missile-launcher tubes behind; and
(159)That furthermore, Abdul RUZIBIZA learned that around 5:30 pm, Lt-Col. Charles KAYONGA received a call from Paul KAGAME alerting him to the return of the President’s plane and that he must not miss this operation, and that at the moment of the attack, Charles KAYONGA, who was posted on the top floor of the C.N.D., saw the plane explode; and
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(281)Considering that the R.P.F.’s possession of Soviet-made SAM 14 and 16 ‘IGLA’ missiles is not only attested to by a number of witnesses who are former members of the R.P.F. or soldiers in the R.P.A., such as Christophe HAKIZABERA, Jean-Pierre MUGABE, Sixbert MUSANGAMFURA, Denis KAGIRANEZA and Abdul RUZIBIZA, who specified that the members of the ‘missile section’ were trained in Uganda or by Evariste MUSONI, but also by elements of the investigation into the Ugandan military arsenal; and
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(314)That Belgian Crpl. Johnny BOREUX, who took part in escorting the R.P.F. battalion to its encampment in the C.N.D. on 28 December 1993, stated in his testimony of 15 December 1996 in Brussels, that he noted that the system put in place ‘permitted [R.P.A.] soldiers in civilian clothes to infiltrate KIGALI and commit attacks’; and
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(320)That it is also important to remember that Abdul RUZIBIZA, a former Captain in the R.P.A., and a member of the ‘Network Commando’, specified that the two missiles used in the attack were brought onto the grounds of the C.N.D. during the month of March 1994; and
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(361)That this evaluation was confirmed in the testimony, on 18 December 2003, of Balthazar NDENGEYINKA, former R.P.A. Colonel, who stated in a face-to-face discussions with Col. Charles MUHIRE, then Chief of the Operations Bureau of the R.P.A. General Staff, MUHIRE acknowledged that ‘they’ (R.P.F.) had shot down the presidents’ plane and that the meeting which the President attended in DAR-ES-SALAAM was, in fact, nothing more than a pretext to get him out of Rwanda, that his return into KIGALI had been purposely postponed so as to force a night flight and that the hour of Falcon 50’s take-off from the airport in DAR-ES-SALAAM was communicated by telephone to the general headquarters of the R.P.A. in Mulundi; and
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(435)That the final order to shoot down the President’s plane was given by Paul KAGAME, himself, during a meeting held in Mulindi on 31 March 1994, with the planning and the operational phase being entrusted to Col. James KABAREBE, who was specifically charged with the formation of a team specialized in the use of surface-to-air missiles furnished by Uganda; and
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