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Thread: Marsh v. Alabama - Private companies can NOT censor free speech

  1. #1

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  3. #2
    Marsh v. Alabama concerned a company owned town some Jehovah's Witnesses wanted to hand out pamphlets. The town tried to say it was private property and they were not allowed on it.

    One view:

    YouTube Isn’t a Company Town (Duh)–Prager University v. Google

    March 27, 2018 · by Eric Goldman · in Content Regulation, Derivative Liability, Licensing/Contracts, Marketing, Virtual Worlds

    Prager University produces videos designed to convert teenagers into conservatives. It has posted over 250 videos to YouTube. YouTube has placed some of those videos into “restricted mode,” which blocks the videos’ availability to YouTube users who voluntarily operate in that mode. Prager University claimed that YouTube censored its videos due to anti-conservative discrimination. Actually, YouTube routinely places videos from major producers of all stripes into restricted mode, so Prager University’s discrimination claim rings hollow.

    In a highly publicized case, Prager University sued YouTube to override YouTube’s editorial classification decision. Though this case could have been resolved on YouTube’s Constitutionally protected free speech/free press rights or Section 230, Judge Koh says Prager University fails to make its prima facie case.

    YouTube as Company Town. Prager University argued that YouTube was a state actor, which would have the legal consequence of subjecting YouTube’s handling of user content to First Amendment limitations. Arguing that private Internet services are state actors is a venerable one; many virtual world academics made this argument a decade ago, for the same reason as Prager University–they sought a legal tool allowing virtual world participants to override the service’s editorial discretion (indeed, I wrote a counter-narrative to the state action argument back in 2005). Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the argument was completely devoid of merit then, and it remains devoid of merit now.

    The court first rejects the general claim that YouTube performs traditional government functions:

    Plaintiff does not point to any persuasive authority to support the notion that Defendants, by creating a “video-sharing website” and subsequently restricting access to certain videos that are uploaded on that website have somehow engaged in one of the “very few” functions that were traditionally “exclusively reserved to the State.”
    The court then rejects Prager University’s more specific argument that YouTube is like a company town like Marsh v. Alabama:

    Marsh does not compel the conclusion that Defendants are state actors that must comport with the requirements of the First Amendment when regulating access to videos on YouTube. Unlike the private corporation in Marsh, Defendants do not own all the property and control all aspects and municipal functions of an entire town. Far from it, Defendants merely regulate content that is uploaded on a video-sharing website that they created as part of a private enterprise.
    The court acknowledges that Marsh contains broader language that might help Prager University, but the court does a detailed analysis explaining how subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence overturned the broader language.

    The court also rejects the currently-chic argument that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina restricts Internet services’ editorial discretion. The Packingham opinion had several broad statements about the social importance of social media, but the court correctly reads Packingham as limiting state restrictions on access to social media, not social media providers’ discretion:

    Packingham did not, and had no occasion to, address whether private social media corporations like YouTube are state actors that must regulate the content of their websites according to the strictures of the First Amendment.
    The court summarizes its conclusion:

    Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants have engaged in one of the “very few” public functions that were traditionally “exclusively reserved to the State.” Defendants do not appear to be at all like, for example, a private corporation that governs and operates all municipal functions for an entire town, or one that has been given control over a previously public sidewalk or park, or one that has effectively been delegated the task of holding and administering public elections. Instead, Defendants are private entities who created their own video-sharing social media website and make decisions about whether and how to regulate content that has been uploaded on that website….The Court likewise declines to find that Defendants in the instant case are state actors that must regulate the content on their privately created website in accordance with the strictures of the First Amendment.
    Cites to Howard v. AOL, Nyabwa v. Facebook, Shulman v. Facebook, Kinderstart v. Google, Langdon v. Google. and Cyber Promotions v. AOL. The court also could have (but didn’t) cited Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entertainment.

    This is a district court ruling, so it’s not the final word on whether online services can be treated like company towns. Still, the court’s analysis is cogent, well-cited, and persuasive. I’m sure it won’t kill the online-services-are-company-towns meme because it’s too irresistible to plaintiffs, but those who continue to advance the arguments will increasingly look like judicial activists.

    False Advertising. Prager University also tried to cite YouTube’s words against it via Lanham Act false advertising claims. This fails too.

    Prager University argued that putting its videos in restricted mode falsely implied the videos were “inappropriate.” The court says that any message communicated by YouTube via the restricted mode characterization wasn’t really commercial (“Plaintiff alleges no facts that remotely suggest that Defendants restricted access to Plaintiff’s videos for any ‘promotional purpose'”) and didn’t have sufficient consumer reach to qualify as advertising.

    Prager University also cited various statements in YouTube’s policies and guidelines, but the court says those don’t count as advertising; “Defendants’ policies and guidelines are more akin to instruction manuals for physical products.” Also, any injury Prager University wasn’t attributable to YouTube’s statements but instead to YouTube’s technical configuration of the restricted mode.

    Prager University also cited various public statements by YouTube about how it enables everyone’s voices to be heard (and similar remarks). The court dismisses all of those statements as puffery because the statements aren’t quantifiable. Also, like the prior point, the court says that any injury is due to YouTube’s technical configuration, not the statements.

    Finally, Prager University cited various statements in YouTube’s TOSes, such as YouTube “help you grow,” “discover what works best for you,” and “giv[e] you tools, insights and best practices for using your voice and videos,” which caused Prager University to choose to transact with YouTube. The court responds that these statements fall “well short” of false advertising because they are puffery. Also, Prager University lacks Lanham Act standing for these claims because it’s claiming to be a consumer of YouTube, not a competitor or other market participant in the relevant standing zone.

    Implications. The court dismisses the case with leave to amend and releases jurisdiction over the state court claims. This means Prager University could try again in federal court and potentially appeal to the Ninth Circuit, or it could give up some claims and switch the battle back to state court. (It could alternatively give up entirely, but I doubt that). I’ll be interested to see what they choose.
    Last edited by Zippyjuan; 09-26-2018 at 08:17 PM.
    Donald Trump: 'What you're seeing and what you're reading is not what's happening'

    "Truth isn't truth"- Rudy Giuliani

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  4. #3
    Defendants do not own all the property and control all aspects and municipal functions of an entire town. Far from it, Defendants merely regulate content that is uploaded on a video-sharing website that they created as part of a private enterprise.
    FedBook most certainly claims ownership rights of everything posted on their platform.

    $#@!ter CEO claims that their platform is "the public square".

    Jack Dorsey Says Twitter Is a Public Square More than 5 Times

    5 Sep 2018281
    Speaking before Senators and Representatives today, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey repeatedly referred to his platform as a “public square” while simultaneously arguing that he has the right to remove lawful content protected by the First Amendment from it.
    Dorsey testified at two congressional committees today; the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Energy and Commerce committee. At both sessions, Dorsey continually referred to Twitter as either a “public square” or a “digital public square.”

    The Twitter CEO’s wording is significant — according to U.S. law, speech and expression in the public square are protected by the First Amendment, regardless of whether the public squares are under private ownership.

    The precedent was set in Marsh v. Alabama, a 1946 supreme court ruling which found that a Jehovah’s Witness who attempted to distribute religious materials in a company town that was entirely owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Co. could not be arrested on the grounds that she was trespassing on private property. The court concluded that since the company owned the entire town (including the sidewalks), it constituted a public square under private ownership and that the Jehovah’s Witness’ right to free speech in the public square took priority over the company’s right to remove trespassers.

    If Twitter is a public square under private ownership, it is obliged to protect the First Amendment rights of its users. Dorsey’s entire project of controlling “conversational health” and banning constitutionally protected speech on his platform would be a violation of the First Amendment. Dorsey would have no option but to relinquish the power of blocking and filtering users for lawful speech, and instead return that power to users via optional filters.

  5. #4
    Another view.

    I found one footnote interesting:

    See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect labor unions from distributing leaflets in a private parking lot because other means of communication were available to the unions); see also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect protesters at a private shopping mall because the mall’s accessibility to the public does not automatically trigger First Amendment protection).
    The article:

    Facebook, Censorship, and the First Amendment

    Posted on November 22, 2016 by Micha Nandaraj Gallo
    Recently, over 70 civil rights groups wrote to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, demanding transparency in the company’s censorship of user posts. Complaints about Facebook’s censorship arose earlier this year when Gizmodo reported that Facebook’s “trending news” section was intentionally manipulated to hide stories of interest to conservative readers. In response to these allegations, the Senate Commerce Committee sent Zuckerberg a letter requesting an explanation of Facebook’s practices in populating its “trending news” section. The Committee identified Facebook as “an increasingly important source of news for many Americans and people around the world.” Indeed, a recent study by Pew Research Center reported that 44% of American adults obtains news from Facebook.

    Concerns about Facebook’s censorship continue to mount. In the last six months alone Facebook has faced complaints for removing users’ posts, disabling journalists’ accounts, and taking down users’ livestreams of protests and police encounters. The looming question is what rights, if any, Facebook users can expect with respect to their online speech.

    Free speech, a hallmark of American values, is protected from government censorship under the First Amendment. As a private entity, however, Facebook’s censorship does not readily fit within the confines of traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. The closest Congress has come to offering users protection from private entities on the internet is enacting § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). In reality, § 230 protects online intermediaries from incurring liability from their users’ content, and only tangentially protects users. But, through the CDA, intentionally or unintentionally, Congress effectively removed one of the largest incentives for censorship on the internet by distinguishing an intermediary’s speech from that of its users. Disincentivizing censorship, however, does not amount to banning it. Therefore, § 230 cannot fully resolve the issue of speech rights for Facebook users. Which returns us to the original question – what rights can Facebook users expect? Or, more aptly, what rights should Facebook users expect?

    At present, no federal court has extended the First Amendment to cover user activity on Facebook. But scholars are beginning to consider such an extension. One forthcoming article by Professor Jonathan Peters posits that the state action doctrine, which confines the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability to government action, can be adapted to encompass certain private actors in the digital era. Professor Peters proposes a balancing test that would examine the rights of property owners against those of property users based on the attributes of the online space. Applying a balancing test, rather than a blanket rule regarding free speech on the internet, allows courts to conduct fact-specific inquiries that distinguish between websites. For instance, a court would be able to distinguish between a website like Amazon, which allows user comment as a tangential feature to its primary commercial services, and a website like Facebook, which primarily focuses on facilitating user interactions and the exchange of ideas. Professor Peters acknowledges that the state action doctrine as it is understood today would not allow the First Amendment to apply to private entities like Facebook. However, he notes that “a state action theory that fails to protect free speech [principles] in digital spaces is problematic…in light of the nation’s history of protecting discourse in the space where it actually occurs.”

    Protecting discourse “where it actually occurs” is a central theme of case law that developed the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine. The public forum doctrine regulates forums that are held out for the public’s use for speech purposes. The public forum doctrine was first extended to a private entity in Marsh v. Alabama.[1] In Marsh, the Court articulated features that private property must exhibit to be regulable under the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine.[2] Marsh addressed a criminal trespass statute that prevented the plaintiff from distributing religious materials in a company town.[3] The Court in Marsh expressly held that the company’s property interests in the town were not sufficient to deny citizens’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.[4] Since Marsh, courts have analyzed whether other private forums can be treated as public spaces.[5] The takeaway from these cases is that private entities are regulable in extremely limited circumstances, where either (i) a state constitutions’ First Amendment equivalent protects such speech[6] or (ii) a company town is involved.[7] A recent article on this topic advocates for an extension of the Marsh doctrine to regulate Facebook. [8] The author analyzes Facebook as a global community, which meets the spirit if not the exact letter of Marsh.

    Facebook continues to expand its services, further cementing itself into users’ everyday lives. Accordingly, it is becoming more plausible that the Marsh framework could be applied to protect Facebook users’ free speech rights. Regardless of whether Marsh can be expanded to cover Facebook users’ speech or whether the state action doctrine is adapted to the digital era, it seems inevitable that Facebook users’ speech rights will be addressed by courts soon. Hopefully courts will recognize the importance of First Amendment protection in this context, especially as Facebook and other social media websites continue to grow as major social and political outlets for speech in America.

    Indeed, a recent study by Pew Research Center reported that 44% of American adults obtains news from Facebook.
    Maybe sometimes.
    Last edited by Zippyjuan; 09-26-2018 at 06:58 PM.
    Donald Trump: 'What you're seeing and what you're reading is not what's happening'

    "Truth isn't truth"- Rudy Giuliani

    "China has total respect for Donald Trump and for Donald Trump's very, very large brain," - Donald Trump.

    I am Zippy and I approve of this post. But you don't have to.

  6. #5
    The better alternative is to just let Facebook die like a errant seed in a bad environment.
    No - No - No - No

  7. #6
    Is the CIA allowed to tell corporation who to censor?
    As of 2013 it is legal.

    Cut the bull$#@!. This censoring is not the act of corporations trying to raise their profits. They are getting their arms twisted by the deep state, and all the foreign influences of the deep state.

    It's not treason. They are trying to silence the right, they are trying to disarm the right. That is what war is.

  8. #7
    For those not familiar with the case:

    A woman wanted to hand out Jehovah's Witness pamphlets in town near the Post Office. A company claimed the owned the entire town and she could not do so on their property. The court said they could not since the town was open to the public who are entitled to free speech.


    1. A state can not, consistently with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose criminal punishment on a person for distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town contrary to regulations of the town's management, where the town and its shopping district are freely accessible to and freely used by the public in general, even though the punishment is attempted under a state statute making it a crime for anyone to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. Pp. 502, 505. [p502]

    2. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses a town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. P. 507.

    3. People living in company-owned towns are free citizens of their State and country, just as residents of municipalities, and there is no more reason for depriving them of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen. P. 508.

    APPEAL from the affirmance of a conviction for violation of a state statute challenged as invalid under the Federal Constitution. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari,


    BLACK, J., Opinion of the Court

    MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In this case, we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that, it has all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant, and a "business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block, and [p503] the United States uses one of the places as a post office, from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which cannot be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and, according to all indications, the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block, and, upon arrival, a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short, the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general, and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.

    Appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, came onto the sidewalk we have just described, stood near the post office, and undertook to distribute religious literature. In the stores the corporation had posted a notice which read as follows:

    This Is Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.

    Appellant was warned that she could not distribute the literature without a permit, and told that no permit would be issued to her. She protested that the company rule could not be constitutionally applied so as to prohibit her from distributing religious writings. When she was asked to leave the sidewalk and Chickasaw, she declined. The deputy sheriff arrested her, and she was charged in the state court with violating Title [p504] 14, § 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code, which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. Appellant contended that to construe the state statute as applicable to her activities would abridge her right to freedom of press and religion contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This contention was rejected, and she was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute, as applied, was constitutional because the title to the sidewalk was in the corporation and because the public use of the sidewalk had not been such as to give rise to a presumption under Alabama law of its irrevocable dedication to the public. 21 So.2d 558. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari, 246 Ala. 539, 21 So.2d 564, and the case is here on appeal under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344(a).

    Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private, but to a municipal, corporation, and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance, rather than a ruling by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company town, it would have been clear that appellant's conviction must be reversed. Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, and others which have followed that case, [n1] neither a State nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will. We have also held that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets cannot be justified on the ground that the [p505] municipality holds legal title to them. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413. And we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could not, without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of literature. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146, 147. From these decisions, it is clear that, had the people of Chickasaw owned all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners together could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to pass an ordinance completely barring the distribution of religious literature. Our question then narrows down to this: can those people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the town? For it is the State's contention that the mere fact that all the property interests in the town are held by a single company is enough to give that company power, enforceable by a state statute, to abridge these freedoms.

    We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the question. [n2] The State urges, in effect, that [p506] the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 802, n. 8. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public, and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation. [n3] And, though the issue is not directly analogous to the one before us, we do want to point out by way of illustration that such regulation may not result in an operation of these facilities, even by privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes with and discriminates against interstate commerce. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, supra, 234 U.S. at 326, and cases cited, pp. 328-329; cf. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177. Had the corporation here owned the segment of the four-lane highway which runs parallel to the "business block" and operated the same under a state franchise, doubtless no one would have seriously contended that the corporation's property interest in the highway gave it power to obstruct through traffic or to discriminate against interstate commerce. See [p507] County Commissioners v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 205, 208; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., supra, 199 U.S. at 294; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 21 How. 112, 125. And even had there been no express franchise, but mere acquiescence by the State in the corporation's use of its property as a segment of the four-lane highway, operation of all the highway, including the segment owned by the corporation, would still have been performance of a public function, and discrimination would certainly have been illegal. [n4]

    We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relationship between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a "business block" in the town, and a street and sidewalk on that business block. Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. As we [p508] have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town. The "business block" serves as the community shopping center, and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

    Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. [n5] These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens, they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens, they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed, their information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth [p509] Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen. [n6]

    When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. [n7] As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free men," and we must in all cases "weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the . . . reasons . . . in support of the regulation . . . of the rights." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161. In our view, the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place were held by others than the public is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand. The case is reversed, [p510] and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
    Donald Trump: 'What you're seeing and what you're reading is not what's happening'

    "Truth isn't truth"- Rudy Giuliani

    "China has total respect for Donald Trump and for Donald Trump's very, very large brain," - Donald Trump.

    I am Zippy and I approve of this post. But you don't have to.

  9. #8
    I disagree with this, found in the majority opinion:
    Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.
    Perhaps not, but it should.
    * Enforce Border Security – America should be guarding her own borders and enforcing her own laws instead of policing the world and implementing UN mandates.

    * No Amnesty - The Obama Administration’s endorsement of so-called “Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” granting amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants, will only encourage more law-breaking.

    * Abolish the Welfare State – Taxpayers cannot continue to pay the high costs to sustain this powerful incentive for illegal immigration. As Milton Friedman famously said, you can’t have open borders and a welfare state.

    * End Birthright Citizenship – As long as illegal immigrants know their children born here will be granted U.S. citizenship, we’ll never be able to control our immigration problem.

    Reprinted from [Nov. 29, 2011]

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  11. #9
    There needs to be an Internet Bill of Rights.
    My website:

    "No one is useless in this world who lightens the burdens of another.” ~ Charles Dickens

  12. #10

  13. #11
    Quote Originally Posted by Grandmastersexsay View Post
    Ron should be ashamed to see private property rights attacked by so many on a forum bearing his name.
    How naive do you have to be to claim there is no difference between an individual and a corporation which controls majority of the social media space?

  14. #12
    Statist tools gonna censor.

    Don't need a weather man to know which way the wind blows

  15. #13
    Quote Originally Posted by timosman View Post
    How naive do you have to be to claim there is no difference between an individual and a corporation which controls majority of the social media space?
    You are still arguing against private property rights. It doesn't matter if it's an individual or corporation. You are being short sighted and hypocritical to argue against property rights just because you don't like who owns the property.

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