Embarrassing. He is not, and he literally stated the opposite carte blanche. I mean; you have nothing to object to given his statement that Ought-statements cannot be derived from is-statements. They belong to different logical realms.
Hopefully this helps:
Separate natures of justification and acting
“We now address further the question of whether the APoA [a priori of argumentation] and its grounding of the NAP and property theory are part of “ethics” in a normative sense or can be considered a purely descriptive account that can be placed within praxeology as an “is” science. Hoppe’s “normative” formulations of the APoA as applied to the NAP are a priori “is” statements made with regard to certain “norms.” However, these particular norms are inescapable implications of propositional discourse itself. These a priori “normative” statements are therefore not in the form of the “ought” statements commonly associated with the “normative” sphere of ethics. Rather, they delimit the sphere of “is”-level conceptual possibility.
That Hoppe’s formulations take the form of “is” statements regarding justifiable norms explains both the magnitude of this innovation and the challenge of interpreting these arguments with conventional categories. A primary Hoppean APoA “is” statement is that the NAP can be justified in propositional discourse, while any conceivable contradictory alternative to the NAP cannot be justified without performative contradiction. This gains additional significance because propositional discourse is the only method through which justification can be accomplished. Therefore, if one wants to justify a norm with regard to the issues addressed by property rights, there is only one possibility, the NAP. Hoppe writes:
- The praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.” The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and © then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement. The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights. (2006, 345)
In claiming that the is/ought gap has been “transcended” in Rothbard’s words, there remains a risk of overstatement, to assuming that an “ought” has actually been derived from an “is.” While it may nearly appear that it has, this is not claimed. What has been done, in my view, is subtler. Praxeology has delimited a sphere of possibility for the category of justification with regard to property norms. With no recourse to “oughts,” praxeology arrives at a somewhat surprising conclusion: there is only one set of norms at the level of property theory that are compatible with the requirements of justification itself—and these are the NAP-based norms.
Praxeology has thus done most of the work when it comes to property theory, leaving ethics itself, understood as an “ought” discipline, with a simple yea-or-nay task—to respect the NAP or not to in action. Only one additional step is required to conclude that the sole property norm that CAN be justified, also IS justified based on additional criteria. Among them, Hoppe argues that the NAP is universalizable, prevents conflicts, can in theory be applied without contradiction from the beginning of mankind onward, and promotes wealth, peace, social harmony, well-being, and character development.
It is important in this context to separate justification as such from any particular act of either following or not following a justified norm. Action implies ends aimed at and requires a choice of ends. Ethics is concerned with choosing ends—some rather than others. Yet justifiability, and possibly also justification itself, can exist independently from any particular action or choice. As Hoppe writes, “There is and remains a difference between establishing a truth claim and instilling a desire to act upon the truth—with ‘ought’ or without it” (2006, 408).
A clearer distinction can be drawn using the action categories of ends and means themselves. When we consider ends, we speak of the goals or objectives of action, what is sought. This is the realm of teleology, one that can include “oughts.” When we consider means, however, we turn to the realm of causality, that is, cause and effect in a descriptive, empirical sense. Ends are not only chosen, but must involve choice: “This or that?” Whether to actually respect the NAP or violate it in action will always be a specific choice by an acting person. However, this is an entirely separate matter from justifiability and justification.”
— Konrad Graf
What do you not understand?
Ownership — exclusive right to control. It has everything to do with it. FYI — You can communicate without using one's vocal cords. Besides the point though.
The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “this is my body”? For this a twofold requirement exists.
- On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”).
- On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been “objectified” in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.
As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified.
It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).
— Informal translation from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Manuscriptum Verlag, 2005, pp. 98-100; originally published in 1985).
Not an "ethical" (ought) claim at all. Crystal clear you have literally no proper understanding of what APoA is.
What about following no property norm at all?
“To begin with, this is a self-contradictory “norm of following no norm.” It is a proposed norm, and thus fails as impossible merely by being stated. Hoppe also makes clear that every alternative to the NAP implies some property norm. The difference among possible property norms is the specific criteria for who shall be deemed to justifiably control what. All variants of statism claim that “the people” own certain resources described as “public” via the state, but since this is impossible, it masks the fact that specific people actually control these various resources, only in a less just, less efficient and more arbitrary way than under the NAP, a way dominated by “political” skills rather than skills in employing scarce resources so as to better satisfy demand (Hoppe 2010, Chapter 3).
In sum, this interpretation of the Hoppean APoA alters what “ought” ethics faces in the realm of property theory. Instead of facing a thorny question of which property norms are justified, ethics itself is faced only with the question of whether a person should follow the only justifiable norms with regard to property. The APoA establishes that there is no justifiable alternative to the NAP and therefore little choice to be made with regard to it except, as Ayn Rand would say, the choice to either acknowledge it or to mentally evade it. The APoA at once does not violate the is/ought gap problem and simultaneously does show that “is” possibility criteria can dramatically inform and delimit what can be justified, particularly when it comes to property norms.
Categories such as ethics and law, normative and descriptive, have evolved to denote fields of interest and investigation. Reality and its understanding must take priority. Resort to field classifications and thought aids such as “branches” of knowledge must always serve this end, not vice versa. It is not our conclusions that must be modified in light of existing field classifications, but our field classifications that, if necessary, must bend to the emerging contours of our understanding of reality.
None of the foregoing should leave the impression that the normative field of ethics in relation to ends is unimportant or uncomplicated at levels beyond basic property norms. In Part IV, we shall return to the relationship between property norms, law, rules, and ethics to examine the role of ethics within an action framework and in relation to law. I will argue that the above division between the “is” and “ought” elements of the APoA-based NAP remains in place and takes on additional importance at higher levels.”
— Konrad Graf
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