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Thread: The reception of Molyneaux's Art of the Argument

  1. #61

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    It doesn't. As I already explained, Hoppe is conflating control and ownership (is and ought).
    Embarrassing. He is not, and he literally stated the opposite carte blanche. I mean; you have nothing to object to given his statement that Ought-statements cannot be derived from is-statements. They belong to different logical realms.

    Hopefully this helps:

    Separate natures of justification and acting

    “We now address further the question of whether the APoA [a priori of argumentation] and its grounding of the NAP and property theory are part of “ethics” in a normative sense or can be considered a purely descriptive account that can be placed within praxeology as an “is” science. Hoppe’s “normative” formulations of the APoA as applied to the NAP are a priori “is” statements made with regard to certain “norms.” However, these particular norms are inescapable implications of propositional discourse itself. These a priori “normative” statements are therefore not in the form of the “ought” statements commonly associated with the “normative” sphere of ethics. Rather, they delimit the sphere of “is”-level conceptual possibility.

    That Hoppe’s formulations take the form of “is” statements regarding justifiable norms explains both the magnitude of this innovation and the challenge of interpreting these arguments with conventional categories. A primary Hoppean APoA “is” statement is that the NAP can be justified in propositional discourse, while any conceivable contradictory alternative to the NAP cannot be justified without performative contradiction. This gains additional significance because propositional discourse is the only method through which justification can be accomplished. Therefore, if one wants to justify a norm with regard to the issues addressed by property rights, there is only one possibility, the NAP. Hoppe writes:

    • The praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.” The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and © then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement. The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights. (2006, 345)


    In claiming that the is/ought gap has been “transcended” in Rothbard’s words, there remains a risk of overstatement, to assuming that an “ought” has actually been derived from an “is.” While it may nearly appear that it has, this is not claimed. What has been done, in my view, is subtler. Praxeology has delimited a sphere of possibility for the category of justification with regard to property norms. With no recourse to “oughts,” praxeology arrives at a somewhat surprising conclusion: there is only one set of norms at the level of property theory that are compatible with the requirements of justification itself—and these are the NAP-based norms.

    Praxeology has thus done most of the work when it comes to property theory, leaving ethics itself, understood as an “ought” discipline, with a simple yea-or-nay task—to respect the NAP or not to in action. Only one additional step is required to conclude that the sole property norm that CAN be justified, also IS justified based on additional criteria. Among them, Hoppe argues that the NAP is universalizable, prevents conflicts, can in theory be applied without contradiction from the beginning of mankind onward, and promotes wealth, peace, social harmony, well-being, and character development.

    It is important in this context to separate justification as such from any particular act of either following or not following a justified norm. Action implies ends aimed at and requires a choice of ends. Ethics is concerned with choosing ends—some rather than others. Yet justifiability, and possibly also justification itself, can exist independently from any particular action or choice. As Hoppe writes, “There is and remains a difference between establishing a truth claim and instilling a desire to act upon the truth—with ‘ought’ or without it” (2006, 408).

    A clearer distinction can be drawn using the action categories of ends and means themselves. When we consider ends, we speak of the goals or objectives of action, what is sought. This is the realm of teleology, one that can include “oughts.” When we consider means, however, we turn to the realm of causality, that is, cause and effect in a descriptive, empirical sense. Ends are not only chosen, but must involve choice: “This or that?” Whether to actually respect the NAP or violate it in action will always be a specific choice by an acting person. However, this is an entirely separate matter from justifiability and justification.”
    Konrad Graf

    What do you not understand?

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Arguing requires control over one's body: e.g. it is physically impossible for one to speak without controlling one's vocal cords. Ownership has nothing to do with it.
    Ownership — exclusive right to control. It has everything to do with it. FYI — You can communicate without using one's vocal cords. Besides the point though.

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Once again, he is conflating control and ownership.There is a performative contradiction in saying "I do not control my vocal cords."

    There is no performative contradiction is saying "I do not own my vocal cords."

    The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “this is my body”? For this a twofold requirement exists.

    1. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”).
    2. On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been “objectified” in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.


    As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified.

    It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).
    — Informal translation from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Manuscriptum Verlag, 2005, pp. 98-100; originally published in 1985).

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    That is not a fact but an ethical statement, and the very one he's is trying to prove.

    The argument is not only not objective (because it has an ethical statement as a premise), but circular (since the conclusion is a premise).
    Not an "ethical" (ought) claim at all. Crystal clear you have literally no proper understanding of what APoA is.

    What about following no property norm at all?

    “To begin with, this is a self-contradictory “norm of following no norm.” It is a proposed norm, and thus fails as impossible merely by being stated. Hoppe also makes clear that every alternative to the NAP implies some property norm. The difference among possible property norms is the specific criteria for who shall be deemed to justifiably control what. All variants of statism claim that “the people” own certain resources described as “public” via the state, but since this is impossible, it masks the fact that specific people actually control these various resources, only in a less just, less efficient and more arbitrary way than under the NAP, a way dominated by “political” skills rather than skills in employing scarce resources so as to better satisfy demand (Hoppe 2010, Chapter 3).

    In sum, this interpretation of the Hoppean APoA alters what “ought” ethics faces in the realm of property theory. Instead of facing a thorny question of which property norms are justified, ethics itself is faced only with the question of whether a person should follow the only justifiable norms with regard to property. The APoA establishes that there is no justifiable alternative to the NAP and therefore little choice to be made with regard to it except, as Ayn Rand would say, the choice to either acknowledge it or to mentally evade it. The APoA at once does not violate the is/ought gap problem and simultaneously does show that “is” possibility criteria can dramatically inform and delimit what can be justified, particularly when it comes to property norms.

    Categories such as ethics and law, normative and descriptive, have evolved to denote fields of interest and investigation. Reality and its understanding must take priority. Resort to field classifications and thought aids such as “branches” of knowledge must always serve this end, not vice versa. It is not our conclusions that must be modified in light of existing field classifications, but our field classifications that, if necessary, must bend to the emerging contours of our understanding of reality.

    None of the foregoing should leave the impression that the normative field of ethics in relation to ends is unimportant or uncomplicated at levels beyond basic property norms. In Part IV, we shall return to the relationship between property norms, law, rules, and ethics to examine the role of ethics within an action framework and in relation to law. I will argue that the above division between the “is” and “ought” elements of the APoA-based NAP remains in place and takes on additional importance at higher levels.”

    Konrad Graf
    Last edited by Conza88; 01-13-2018 at 02:07 AM.
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
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  3. #62

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    Yo rev-3.0,

    What are you thoughts on the action axiom?



    “The attempt to disprove the action-axiom would itself be an action aimed at a goal, requiring means, excluding other courses of action, incurring costs, subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal and so leading to a profit or a loss.

    And the very possession of such knowledge then can never be disputed, and the validity of these concepts can never be falsified by any contingent experience, for disputing or falsifying anything would already have presupposed their very existence. As a matter of fact, a situation in which these categories of action would cease to have a real existence could itself never be observed, for making an observation, too, is an action.”
    — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method

    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
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  4. #63

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    The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and © then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement.
    For the Nth time, the underlined is false.

    There is no performative contradiction in denying that one own's oneself, let alone that others own themselves.


    1. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”).
    2. On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been “objectified” in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person.
    i.e. ownership must be demonstrated (contra mere control), which is precisely what Hoppe fails to do

    As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified.
    His argument is that we must accept self-ownership, because libertarian homesteading theory doesn't work without it (one can't homestead things using a body one doesn't own). The obvious problem with this argument is that it presupposes libertarian homesteading theory (an ethical claim). If someone rejects libertarian homesteading theory, he has no reason to accept self-ownership. Hoppe might as well argue that libertarianism in general requires self-ownership, therefore self-ownership is justified (obviously not going convince anyone who isn't already a libertarian).

    Quote Originally Posted by Conza88 View Post
    thoughts on the action axiom?
    The statement "I am not acting [or "no one acts," or the like]" is a performative contradiction, ala "I am dead."

  5. #64

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    I haven't read the book and won't do it. It is not possible to derive a standard of ought from what is, which is all empirical atheistic worldviews have to build from. You can't derive prescriptions from descriptive premises. End of story.



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  7. #65

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    Quote Originally Posted by Sola_Fide View Post
    I haven't read the book and won't do it. It is not possible to derive a standard of ought from what is, which is all empirical atheistic worldviews have to build from. You can't derive prescriptions from descriptive premises. End of story.
    It's certainly impossible to "prove" ethics, but this applies also to theistic ethics.

    The logical problem is the same regardless of the subject matter.

  8. #66

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    It's certainly impossible to "prove" ethics, but this applies also to theistic ethics.

    The logical problem is the same regardless of the subject matter.
    How do you say?

  9. #67

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    Quote Originally Posted by Sola_Fide View Post
    How do you say?
    Well, if the premises are all is-statements, then the argument is invalid (is --/--> ought).

    If at least one of the premises is an ought-statement, then the argument might be valid, but the conclusion cannot be proved true.
    Last edited by r3volution 3.0; 01-20-2018 at 02:17 AM.

  10. #68

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    For the Nth time, the underlined is false.

    There is no performative contradiction in denying that one own's oneself, let alone that others own themselves.

    i.e. ownership must be demonstrated (contra mere control), which is precisely what Hoppe fails to do.
    Yes, there bloody well is. Own = exclusive right to control.

    WHO has a better claim to your body, than yourself? FFS. You are demonstrating it right now.

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    His argument is that we must accept self-ownership, because libertarian homesteading theory doesn't work without it (one can't homestead things using a body one doesn't own). The obvious problem with this argument is that it presupposes libertarian homesteading theory (an ethical claim). If someone rejects libertarian homesteading theory, he has no reason to accept self-ownership. Hoppe might as well argue that libertarianism in general requires self-ownership, therefore self-ownership is justified (obviously not going convince anyone who isn't already a libertarian).
    Nope. Lmao. You still don't get it. You literally have it ass backwards. Here it is. Real simple:


    “In general, I am moving in the direction of a one-step argument in which self-ownership is not treated separately from homesteading, but as a special example of homesteading such that there is a single unified justification of both “self-ownership” and homesteading of external resources. I think the key to resolving this issue more clearly is once again better applying the subject/object distinction, in this case to the precise meaning of “self.”

    In this view, the act of making use of one’s own physical body before anyone else does as part of the natural process of human development is simply the prototype of a first-appropriation (“homesteading”) act. The whole body is a "relevant technological unit” in Rothbard’s sense, a natural unity for appropriation by an actor (Let’s say you are hunting and kill a deer. If a stranger shows up and tries to arbitrarily claim a section of it, which part of the deer is yours? The whole deer; not just the patch where the arrow struck! That would be another application of the RTU idea).

    Now, in the idea of self-ownership, who is doing the appropriating of the “self”? Can the “self” appropriate the “self?” What does that mean? This is where this literature has sometimes gotten confusing. The answer is there, but it’s not always clarified as well as I think it could be.

    Much of the confusion stems from a double meaning attached to “self” (sorting this out is also a resolution path for the larger “mind-body problem” controversy, as Ken Wilber has suggested). To unpack this, I define the “self” as the subject, the actor. That subject can claim the physical body associated with itself, which is the “self” as an object, that is, “empirically” measurable in the physical world. Thus, the human being considered as an acting person is a SUBJECT and not any kind of physical “object.” An acting person is not just a body, not just an empirical object, like a kidney or a stone (or a kidney stone…). A subject as contrasted with a physical object is not measurable or claimable as property at all. This (subject) “self” is an intangible like an idea (the basis of anti-IP thought too, is that ideas are not scarce objects and can therefore not be properly owned). The acting person has a physically observable aspect, but is not reducible to physical substance. We are subjects-and-objects by nature.

    This is why I try to bring in Ken Wilber to re-emphasize the importance of better refining our differentiation of the interior perspective of a subject (an acting person) and the exterior perspective of an object, which can be a non-bodily external “object” or a bodily “object” such as a particular part of the body in just the same sense. AE [Argumentation Ethics] is talking about subjects making statements and the nature of justifiability of claims so made. It bridges subject/object in that it treats claim-making as a physical action, which it is, rather than a disembodied one, which is impossible. It depicts a subject making use of physical resources (objects) to make propositional claims. Such resources include the acting person’s physical body, etc. In contrast to this necessary dualism, two flavors of reductionism will get you either “an object making claims” (an internal contradiction) or “a subject making claims without any physical means for making them” (an absurdity).

    Actually appropriating physical objects through a process of action and claiming is a different layer from having a consciousness capable of acting/claiming. The prototype of appropriation, as I said, is using and claiming one’s own physical body. It may already be evident from the above that I am working to develop this into a one-step argument, whereas Hoppe’s presentations have been multi-step, in that self-ownership is given first and then the justifiability of other appropriations are based on it in step two. However, if we maintain a clear subject-object duality of personhood the whole way through, “self-ownership” (meaning an acting subject’s ownership of its own physical body) is not any different from any other case of homesteading scarce physical resources; it is just another result of the acquisition by an actor/subject of a physical resource, in this case, the acting subject making use of the physical body that is associated with that subject in “a subject/object duality pair” (that is, “a person” ☺). This has also been harder to see, because relative to the case of a truly external resource such as an apple, a subject is uniquely positioned to make use of and claim the physical body uniquely associated with itself, the alternative being some kind of fantastic neurobiological remote control system (although guardianship of someone incapable of acting, as below, is a more realistic alternative).

    So we actually embody methodological dualism because we are more or less integrated subject/objects. Yet in theorizing, we always have to go back to asking which perspective we are talking about or taking. We may have been missing that self(own-body)-appropriation is just another case of homesteading, simply because it is so obvious that it is hard to even reflect on it. The physical body is one case of first appropriation in which it is basically impossible for it to be otherwise. (I say, “basically” because, in extremis, one could imagine a hypothetical human who was born, but never developed in such a way as to be able to discernibly act or make choices. Such a person would never develop the ability to “take over” the reigns of their own life from their initial caretakers and would presumably remain a ward of a parent or guardian).“


    Whether it is convincing or not to anyone is utterly irrelevant to whether it is true or not.


    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    The statement "I am not acting [or "no one acts," or the like]" is a performative contradiction, ala "I am dead."
    Argumentation Ethics: Summarised

    “Argumentation Ethics states that no moral (or I argue more specifically legal; it is about property rights and the justifiability of aggression, after all) argument against the NAP can be successfully justified in discourse without performative contradiction in the act of doing so. The above looks like just another typical failure to understand AE followed by a straw man attack on things that no one actually claims. Of course, a person is capable of running around shouting about how they cannot run and shout but in that case it is harder to find people to take them seriously. So in summary, AE shows certain minimal conditions under which claims about rights can or cannot possibly be successful as valid arguments according to the laws of logic (non-contradiction). It never claims that people are incapable of making invalid and internally contradictory arguments. They certainly are known to do so regularly.”

    Konrad Graf
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
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  11. #69

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    Quote Originally Posted by Conza88 View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by You Quoting Hoppe
    The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and © then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement
    For the Nth time, the underlined is false.

    There is no performative contradiction in denying that one own's oneself, let alone that others own themselves.

    i.e. ownership must be demonstrated (contra mere control), which is precisely what Hoppe fails to do
    Yes, there bloody well is. Own = exclusive right to control.

    WHO has a better claim to your body, than yourself? FFS. You are demonstrating it right now.
    Yes, ownership is the exclusive right to control, in contrast to the mere fact of exclusive control.

    A car thief who in fact has exclusive control of your car does not thereby own it.

    That I am typing demonstrates that I have exclusive control of my body, not that I own it.

    Quote Originally Posted by You Quoting Graf
    “Argumentation Ethics states that no moral...argument against the NAP can be successfully justified in discourse without performative contradiction in the act of doing so.
    ...which is false, for reasons repeatedly explained.

  12. #70

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Yes, ownership is the exclusive right to control, in contrast to the mere fact of exclusive control.
    Conflating Use with Ownership

    In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate use with ownership. The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership” simply overlap. However, “use” and “ownership” can be distinguished on logical grounds. Clearly, from the very fact that one sits on a chair it is impossible to infer that she is its owner. To determine the ownership, one has to find out who decides upon its use. This distinction between “use” and “ownership” is commonly illustrated by the difference in a firm between manager and owner. The function accomplished by a manager who takes all the current decisions concerning the use of resources in a firm is different from the function of an owner who decides as a last resort.

    The last resort decision is epitomized by the fact that the owner can decide to fire the manager. In fact, the owner decides who should make the current decisions in a firm. Besides this distinction, the crucial question in ethics is: “Who has the legitimate ownership?” A different formulation may be: “Who has the right to own a specific resource?” Of course, from an ethical point of view an owner, i.e., a person who effectively control as a last resort a specific good, is not necessarily its legitimate owner. Here it is an obvious question to ask: am I the legitimate owner of the chair on which I am sitting right now?

    Let us now apply this idea to self-ownership. If one can lose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can never lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land, the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by cancelling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e., by transforming her into a zombie or robot. For most of the scholars, this is the common way to understand self-ownership. “Man can neither be inherited, nor sold, nor given; he can be no one’s property” (Fichte, [1793] 1996, 124). Now it appears clearly why the “use of the body” and the “self-ownership” (even though they are logically distinct) have the same extension. While it is possible to sit on a chair without being its owner, it is impossible to use a body and not being its owner. This is the case because, one cannot not use her own body and one cannot not decide as a last resort of the action of her own body.

    While the ownership in her own body cannot be alienated, one can be nonetheless coerced to act otherwise than she would have wished. This is the case of slaves, prisoners, victims of occasional robberies, etc. The master does not own a slave as one may own a piece of land. An owner of slaves does not own bodies but can coerce the self-owners to use their own bodies according to her wishes. Since land can be acquired, sold or stalled, the question to ask from an ethical standpoint is: am I the legitimate owner of the land? Obviously, the body cannot be acquired, sold or stalled but it can be aggressed.

    Therefore, the right to self-ownership means the right to be free from coercion. As we have seen since the beginning of this article, this is precisely the sense of the self-ownership axiom. From this point of view, slaves should be considered coerced self-owners. The slaves have as a last resort the ultimate choice to obey their master or to revolt against her.
    — Marian Eabrasu


    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    A car thief who in fact has exclusive control of your car does not thereby own it.

    That I am typing demonstrates that I have exclusive control of my body, not that I own it.
    Of course; because you have a better claim. It might in fact been his vehicle to begin with, that was stolen and you purchased the same vehicle unknowingly.

    He has a better claim to it.

    In any case; what you don't get is self-ownership.

    WHO HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO YOUR BODY THAN YOU DO? YOU DEMONSTRATE THAT OWNERSHIP BY ACTING, EVERY TIME.

    After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource. Property rights specify which persons own - that is, have the right to control - various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource. If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.

    Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this.[…]

    The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, and civilization. The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundorms; it is implied by them.
    — Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
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  13. #71

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    Quote Originally Posted by dannno View Post
    From the article:



    What is the idea that is so excellent?

    UPB, as I understand it, in a nutshell. That is the "idea" that he is so excited about. That is precisely the "idea" that I have been discussing here with Rev3.

    The rest of the article doesn't argue against UPB, it argues against some other things he says in the book which he seems to not fully understand the reasoning. [/FONT][/COLOR]
    The idea that Gordon describes as excellent, as shown by the very next sentence after the quote you provided:

    Although I have so far been critical of Molyneux, I am happy to give him credit for an excellent idea. He suggests that a good test for a moral theory is its ability to arrive at the correct result for obvious cases, like rape, murder, and theft. If a theory cannot show that a rule that purported to make such conduct obligatory is ill-formed, the theory should be rejected. Molyneux thinks he can show exactly this for his own account of universally preferable behavior.
    Quote Originally Posted by Ron Paul
    Perhaps the most important lesson from Obamacare is that while liberty is lost incrementally, it cannot be regained incrementally. The federal leviathan continues its steady growth; sometimes boldly and sometimes quietly. Obamacare is just the latest example, but make no mistake: the statists are winning. So advocates of liberty must reject incremental approaches and fight boldly for bedrock principles.
    The epitome of libertarian populism

  14. #72

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    Quote Originally Posted by Conza88 View Post
    Conflating Use with Ownership...
    You already posted that and I already addressed it.

    WHO HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO YOUR BODY THAN YOU DO?
    Your assertion that the possessor of a thing has the best claim on it presupposes the very point in contention.

    YOU DEMONSTRATE THAT OWNERSHIP BY ACTING, EVERY TIME.
    Once again, no, my action demonstrates only that I control my body, not that I own it.

    After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource. Property rights specify which persons own - that is, have the right to control - various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource. If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.

    Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this.[…]

    The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, and civilization. The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundorms; it is implied by them.
    — Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is


    That has no bearing on argumentation ethics.

    ...how about making your argument in your own words, rather than trying to bury me in repetitive/irrelevant quotes?



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  16. #73

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    You already posted that and I already addressed it.
    Pettifogging isn't addressing it.

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Your assertion that the possessor of a thing has the best claim on it presupposes the very point in contention.
    It's not merely an assertion when your actions confirm it to be true. That is why it is an axiom. You're just utterly blind to it;

    “In order to do so, Mises notices in accordance with the strictures traditionally formulated by rationalist philosophers, economic propositions must fulfill two requirements:

    1. First, it must be possible to demonstrate that they are not derived from observational evidence, for observational evidence can only reveal things as they happen to be; there is no thing in it that would indicate why things must be the way they are. Instead, economic propositions must be shown to be grounded in reflective cognition, in our understanding of ourselves as knowing subjects.
    2. And secondly, this reflective understanding must yield certain propositions as self-evident material axioms. Not in the sense that such axioms would have to be self-evident in a psychological sense, that is, that one would have to be immediately aware of them or that their truth depends on a psychological feeling of conviction.


    On the contrary like Kant before him, Mises very much stresses the fact that it is usually much more pain staking to discover such axioms than it is to discover some observational truth such as that the leaves of trees are green or that I am 6 foot 2 inches.”
    Hans-Hermann Hoppe

    Specifically like the human action axiom:

    “The attempt to disprove the action-axiom would itself be an action aimed at a goal, requiring means, excluding other courses of action, incurring costs, subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal and so leading to a profit or a loss.

    And the very possession of such knowledge then can never be disputed, and the validity of these concepts can never be falsified by any contingent experience, for disputing or falsifying anything would already have presupposed their very existence. As a matter of fact, a situation in which these categories of action would cease to have a real existence could itself never be observed, for making an observation, too, is an action.
    — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method


    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    Once again, no, my action demonstrates only that I control my body, not that I own it.
    Once again, you have a better claim to anyone else — given ownership is established from first principles... The relevant axioms, in the sense of irrefutable starting places, are non-contradiction, action, and argumentation.


    Arguing is an activity and requires a person’s exclusive control over scarce resources (one’s brain, vocal cords, etc.). More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other’s exclusive control over such resources. It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. (Lomasky does not seem to dispute this.

    He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs. Whatever [the law of contradiction, for instance] must be presupposed insofar as one argues cannot be meaningfully disputed because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt; hence, it must be regarded as indisputable or a priori valid.

    In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must be a self-owner. It is a self-contradictory absurdity to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.
    — Hoppe, EEPP, Appendix: Four Critical Replies - http://mises.org/books/economicsethics.pdf)

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    That has no bearing on argumentation ethics.
    This has everything to do with it... and the fact that you have no response makes your cluelessness even more clear.

    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    ...how about making your argument in your own words, rather than trying to bury me in repetitive/irrelevant quotes?
    Your objections are old hat and nothing origional, why should I waste my time recreating the wheel - when it's already been made?

    Direct source material is far more apt than piss poor paraphrasing I've seen above which sets up strawmen as the standard modus operandi.
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
    Worthy Threads:

  17. #74

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    The action axiom is not a moral statement, it is a statement of fact; the one has nothing to do with the other.

    As for the rest, you're repeating yourself again and ignoring/not understanding my criticism.

    Though, in your defense, you're no more confused that Hoppe himself:

    Quote Originally Posted by You Quoting Hoppe
    In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation.
    Moral concepts (like ownership) are not facts, not matter how many times one may insist that they are.

    It is simply a category mistake, like referring to saltiness as a color: gibberish.

  18. #75

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    The action axiom is not a moral statement, it is a statement of fact; the one has nothing to do with the other.
    Wrong. They have everything to do with each other.

    Praxeology and Epistemology:

    “…It is not difficult to detect that both a priori axioms—of action and argumentation—are intimately related. On the one hand, actions are more fundamental than argumentations with whose existence the idea of validity emerges, as argumentation is only a subclass of action. On the other hand, to recognize what has just been recognized regarding action and argumentation and their relation to each other requires argumentation, and so, in this sense, argumentation must be considered more fundamental than action: without argumentation nothing could be said to be-known about action. But then, as it is in argumentation that the insight is revealed that—while it might not be known to be so prior to any argumentation—in fact the possibility of argumentation presupposes action in that validity claims can only be explicitly discussed in the course of an argumentation if the individuals doing so already know what it means to act and to have knowledge implied in action—both the meaning of action in general and argumentation in particular must be thought of as logically necessary interwoven strands of a priori knowledge.

    What this insight into the interrelation between the a priori of action and the a priori of argumentation suggests is the following:

    • Traditionally, the task of epistemology has been conceived of as that of formulating what can be known to be true a priori and also what can be known a priori not to be the subject of a priori knowledge. Recognizing, as we have just done, that knowledge claims are raised and decided upon in the course of argumentation and that this is undeniably so, one can now reconstruct the task of epistemology more precisely as that of formulating those propositions which are argumentatively indisputable in that their truth is already implied in the very fact of making one’s argument and so cannot be denied argumentatively; and to delineate the range of such a priori knowledge from the realm of propositions whose validity cannot be established in this way but require additional, contingent in formation for their validation, or that cannot be validated at all and so are mere metaphysical statements in the pejorative sense of the term metaphysical.


    Yet what is implied in the very fact of arguing? It is to this question that our insight into the inextricable interconnection between the a priori of argumentation and that of action provides an answer:

    • On a very general level, it cannot be denied argumentatively that argumentation presupposes action and that arguments, and the knowledge embodied in them, are those of actors. And more specifically it cannot then be denied that knowledge itself is a category of action; that the structure of knowledge must be constrained by the peculiar function which knowledge fulfills with in the framework of action categories; and that the existence of such structural constraints can never be disproved by any knowledge whatsoever.


    It is in this sense that the insights contained in praxeology must be regarded as providing the foundations of epistemology. Knowledge is a category quite distinct from those that I have explained earlier—from ends and means. The ends which we strive to attain through our actions, and the means which we employ in order to do so, are both scarce values. The values attached to our goals are subject to consumption and are exterminated and destroyed in consumption and thus must forever be produced a new. And the means employed must be economized, too. Not so, however, with respect to knowledge—regardless of whether one considers it a means or an end in itself. Of course, the acquisition of knowledge requires scarce means—at least one’s body and time. Yet once knowledge is acquired, it is no longer scarce. It can neither be consumed, no rare the services that it can render as a means subject to depletion. Once there, it is an inexhaustible resource and incorporates an everlasting value provided that it is not simply forgotten. Yet knowledge is not a free good in the same sense that air, under normal circumstances, is a free good. Instead, it is a category of action.

    It is not only a mental ingredient of each and every action, quite unlike air, but more importantly; knowledge, and not air, is subject to validation, which is to say that it must prove to fulfill a positive function for an actor within the invariant constraints of the categorical framework of actions. It is the task of epistemology to clarify what these constraints are and what one can thus know about the structure of knowledge as such.
    While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly important implications.”
    Hans-Hermann Hoppe


    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    As for the rest, you're repeating yourself again and ignoring/not understanding my criticism.

    Though, in your defense, you're no more confused that Hoppe himself:

    Moral concepts (like ownership) are not facts, not matter how many times one may insist that they are.

    It is simply a category mistake, like referring to saltiness as a color: gibberish.
    Ownership is not a moral concept you neophyte. It relates to legal theory / property theory. It is about IS statements, not OUGHT.

    What part of this do you not understand?

    Disentangling Law & Ethics

    “It is becoming clearer and clearer to me that ethical and legal theory need to be completely disentangled and that at the essence of what libertarianism is we find a legal position rather than an ethical position (sure, the legal position can and is combined with various ethical positions, but this does not make the two identical in content).

    Understanding what rights are (legal) is different than deciding how, whether and in what ways to actually respect them or not in action (ethical).

    Now when I look back at Rothbard, I am seeing that he effectively was already doing this (some passages above and elsewhere, even in Power and Market), but was still bogged down in the use of the word "ethics” in the effort to distinguish what he was talking about from economic theory (and this usage continues in Hoppe, with the word “ethics” subbing in for what I think is actually “property theory.”).

    Yet in looking at what they are actually presenting rather than some labels, it is much much more about legal content (definition of property rights), rather than whether or not one ought to violate or respect such rights (knowing what they are being a separate question) on ethical grounds.“
    Konrad Graf

    Further:

    Deductive legal theory, when properly applied in a given context, objectively and descriptively defines the parameters of what justice is in relation to questions of property rights, contracts, torts, and other legal matters. This yields a deeper-than-expected foundation for the traditional libertarian insistence on not mixing law with morality and the corollary opposition to “legislating morality.” Legal theory is a discrete field that, like Mises’s conception of economic theory, can provide descriptive, categorical input for use in “ought” considerations, even as legal theory and ethics remain distinct in foundations, scope, and method.
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
    Worthy Threads:

  19. #76

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    Quote Originally Posted by Conza88 View Post
    Ownership is not a moral concept you neophyte. It relates to legal theory / property theory. It is about IS statements, not OUGHT.
    No, ownership is most definitely a moral concept; this is elementary.

    "Bob owns X" is not a statement of fact; it is an ought statement directed to others ("you all ought not interfere with Bob's use of X," etc).

    That you can't understand/refuse to recognize this is astonishing.

    I don't know what else to tell you.

  20. #77

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    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    No, ownership is most definitely a moral concept; this is elementary.

    "Bob owns X" is not a statement of fact; it is an ought statement directed to others ("you all ought not interfere with Bob's use of X," etc).
    Lmao. What a woefully ignorant strawman / red herring... no, actually it is a claim.

    Whether Bob does or not involves a variety of individual specifics to the case. See:

    Action-based legal theory provides tools to take into each case. It supplies some of the underlying questions to which case-specific details shape answers. Legal principles guide inquiry into specifics while emerging details suggest the most relevant set of legal principles to apply. Justice may be found at the meeting theory and practice—of deduction, institutions, and the details of specific cases. Sound theory functions as a service to legal practitioners, enabling them do their jobs more easily and reliably. […]


    Legal practice should always be on trial in the court of legal theory, while legal theory should be recognized as insufficient to do justice in any real case. Legal theory and legal practice must therefore persist in a challenging but necessary marriage between distinctive partners if they are to produce the offspring of justice. Used properly, praxeological legal concepts not only boost the clarity of legal theorizing from “the armchair,” they also enhance the ability of practitioners to parse specific cases from “the bench.”

    Further:

    Clearly, while “objective” (external, observable) criteria must play an important role in the determination of ownership and aggression, such criteria are not sufficient. In particular, defining aggression “objectivistically” as “overt physical invasion” appears deficient because it excludes entrapment, incitement and failed attempts, for instance. Both the establishment of property rights and their violation spring from actions: acts of appropriation and expropriation.


    However, in addition to a physical appearance, actions also have an internal, subjective aspect. This aspect cannot be observed by our sense organs. Instead, it must be ascertained by means of understanding (verstehen). The task of the judge cannot-by the nature of things-be reduced to a simple decision rule based on a quasi-mechanical model of causation. Judges must observe the facts and understand the actors and actions involved in order to determine fault and liability.

    — Hoppe, EEPP




    Understanding what rights are (legal) is different than deciding how, whether and in what ways to actually respect them or not in action (ethical).

    Do you understand the distinction? Do you even acknowledge it exists? Why conflate the two?


    Quote Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0 View Post
    That you can't understand/refuse to recognize this is astonishing.

    I don't know what else to tell you.

    What about following no property norm at all?

    “To begin with, this is a self-contradictory “norm of following no norm.” It is a proposed norm, and thus fails as impossible merely by being stated. Hoppe also makes clear that every alternative to the NAP implies some property norm. The difference among possible property norms is the specific criteria for who shall be deemed to justifiably control what. All variants of statism claim that “the people” own certain resources described as “public” via the state, but since this is impossible, it masks the fact that specific people actually control these various resources, only in a less just, less efficient and more arbitrary way than under the NAP, a way dominated by “political” skills rather than skills in employing scarce resources so as to better satisfy demand (Hoppe 2010, Chapter 3).


    In sum, this interpretation of the Hoppean APoA alters what “ought” ethics faces in the realm of property theory. Instead of facing a thorny question of which property norms are justified, ethics itself is faced only with the question of whether a person should follow the only justifiable norms with regard to property. The APoA establishes that there is no justifiable alternative to the NAP and therefore little choice to be made with regard to it except, as Ayn Rand would say, the choice to either acknowledge it or to mentally evade it. The APoA at once does not violate the is/ought gap problem and simultaneously does show that “is” possibility criteria can dramatically inform and delimit what can be justified, particularly when it comes to property norms.


    Categories such as ethics and law, normative and descriptive, have evolved to denote fields of interest and investigation. Reality and its understanding must take priority. Resort to field classifications and thought aids such as “branches” of knowledge must always serve this end, not vice versa. It is not our conclusions that must be modified in light of existing field classifications, but our field classifications that, if necessary, must bend to the emerging contours of our understanding of reality.


    None of the foregoing should leave the impression that the normative field of ethics in relation to ends is unimportant or uncomplicated at levels beyond basic property norms. In Part IV, we shall return to the relationship between property norms, law, rules, and ethics to examine the role of ethics within an action framework and in relation to law. I will argue that the above division between the “is” and “ought” elements of the APoA-based NAP remains in place and takes on additional importance at higher levels.”

    Konrad Graf
    “I will be as harsh as truth, and uncompromising as justice... I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard.” ~ William Lloyd Garrison

    Quote Originally Posted by TGGRV View Post
    Conza, why do you even bother? lol.
    Worthy Threads:

  21. #78

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    It's wierd that you guys can't understand what Rev is saying. There is no need to delve deep into argumentation ethics or legal theory: use is not an adequate proof of ownership.
    ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ЄCΤΙΝ ЄξΟΥCΙΑ ЄΙ ΜΗ ΥΠΟ ΘЄΟΥ

    "Patriotism should come from loving thy neighbor, not from worshiping graven images" - Ironman77

    "ideas have the potential of being more powerful than any army....The concept of personal sovereignty was pulled screaming from the ether into this reality by the force of men believing in a self evident truth, that men are meant to be free." - The Northbreather

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  22. #79

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    Quote Originally Posted by Conza88 View Post
    Lmao. What a woefully ignorant strawman / red herring... no, actually it is a claim.
    Yes, an ethical claim, contra a factual claim. A factual claim is a claim about something existing in empirical reality, something which can be empirically verified. "Look," I say while pointing to the dog in front of us, "the dog has four legs." I am referring to something existing in empirical reality, which you can verify with your own eyes. Not so with "Look at that car, Bob owns it." Look at what? All that's there is a car. There is nothing about the car which indicates who owns it. No one can empirically verify who owns it. Ownership is a concept, not a property of physical things.

    As for your several excerpts about the nature of law, they are entirely beside the point. Whether law is imposed from above, from the armchair, out of pure theory, or emerges from below, ala the common law, it consists of ethical statements ("someone should or should not do this or that"), not statements of fact ("something is or is not the case"). Likewise, however the specific legal rules are formulated (purely mechanistically or otherwise), they remain ethical not factual statements.

    As for Hoppe's claim that all ethical systems are sets of rules governing property rights, it is, once again, both true and totally irrelevant. The point is that argumentation ethics fails, contrary to all of your/Hoppe's assertions, to prove that only libertarian property rules can be advanced in argument without contradiction.

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