A Right to Rule?

[Origanalist]

May 22, 2015 by Jason Sorens
How can one group of human beings come to enjoy a right to enforce its authoritative commands on other human beings? In other words, how does government come to enjoy a right to rule, and how do citizens come to incur a duty to obey?

An example may help motivate the question. Suppose some of your neighbors start a “neighborhood watch” group. They keep an eye on things, and from time to time they have even apprehended thieves and vandals. Let’s even assume they’re doing a good job.

After a while, they find that the expense of equipment and of volunteers’ time is just too much to keep going without donations from the neighborhood. They go from house to house getting donations. But the donations aren’t enough. At that point, the neighborhood watch group decides to go from house to house demanding “taxes.” If you don’t pay your “taxes” to the neighborhood watchers, they will use physical force to arrest you.

Is it justifiable for the neighborhood watch group to levy and enforce taxes?

United States Capitol
Source: aoc.gov

If we think that the “ends justify the means,” then as long as the security provided by the neighborhood watchers is more valuable than the resources they consume in taxes, they are justified in imposing and enforcing taxes. If you think the ends always justify the means, then you don’t need to read any further; the solution to the problem is simple. But if you don’t think that the ends always justify the means, you will be at least a bit troubled by taxes. How can taxes be morally acceptable, even when they are going to a good cause, given that they are imposed by force?

The famous political philosopher John Locke considered this question in great depth. He believed that taxes and other laws could be justified only by consent. If and only if all of us in the neighborhood agree to set up a government with the power to levy taxes, then we are bound contractually by its decisions. We have a duty to pay taxes to the government we consented to, and the government has a right to levy those taxes. Consent is necessary, because we all enjoy natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and no one may permissibly violate those rights. Taking property without consent is theft.

In his book, The Problem of Political Authority, the contemporary political philosopher Michael Huemer considers the necessary conditions for consent to an agreement. First, the agreement requires a reasonable way of opting out. If the chair of a board meeting says, “Please indicate your dissent to the budget by chopping off your right arm, otherwise I assume that you have consented,” failing to chop off your right arm doesn’t actually indicate your consent to the budget. That’s not a valid agreement, because you don’t have any reasonable way to indicate dissent: the chair has no right to demand your right arm. Second, the agreement must recognize explicit dissent as trumping implicit assent. If at the board meeting you say, “I’m not chopping off my right arm, but I do dissent,” then the chair needs to recognize your explicit dissent as trumping your alleged implicit consent. Third, consent to an agreement is only valid if the supposed consenter believed that in the absence of consent, her will would be respected. If the chair of the board meeting said, “Dissent to the budget if you want, but I’m going to impose it anyway,” then the fact that no one actually voiced dissent doesn’t mean that they don’t truly dissent. They might have not spoken up simply because they saw that it was pointless to speak up. Fourth, any agreement must involve obligations on both sides. If the relationship between government and citizens is a contract among equals, then government must recognize contractual duties to citizens just as citizens recognize contractual duties to government.

Now, does the United States government enjoy a “social contract” with citizens that meets these criteria? No. U.S. citizens don’t consent to be bound by the U.S. government’s laws merely by living here, because the U.S. government doesn’t literally own the property we live on. It has no right to demand that we leave our homes and emigrate as a condition of expressing dissent from being ruled by the laws. That would be like demanding that we cut off our right arms as a condition of expressing dissent from being ruled. Furthermore, lots of Americans do dissent to the laws and don’t recognize the government’s authority. Explicit dissent should trump alleged implicit consent. Next, the U.S. government doesn’t respect the rights of dissenters not to be bound by the laws. For instance, the U.S. government will still collect taxes from an American even if she explicitly denies any consent to be ruled by the U.S. government. Finally, the U.S. government recognizes no obligation to provide services to its citizens, as Huemer points out, and as has been recognized in court cases such as Warren v. District of Columbia and Hartzler v. City of San Jose. In the U.S., the “social contract” gives government all the rights and citizens all the duties.

Huemer concludes that Americans have not consented to be ruled by the U.S. government, and that the U.S. government therefore enjoys no right to enforce any laws that go beyond merely self-defense and defense of others (protecting natural rights). Taxes, for instance, are illegitimate.

This conclusion is surprising, and political philosophers have tried to find other arguments to ground a “right to rule.” Another view might be that democracy creates legitimate political authority: if a government follows democratic procedures, then it has a moral right to enforce its decisions. But that doesn’t seem correct. Imagine that your neighborhood watch decides to impose taxes and allow neighborhood residents to vote on the leadership of the neighborhood watch. That setup still means that those residents who don’t want a neighborhood watch at all or don’t agree to the procedures the neighborhood watch is using will be forced to support it. “Might” doesn’t make “right” simply because a majority is exercising the might. The democracy criterion also doesn’t tell us what to do when two democratic governments dispute which one has the right to rule a particular group of people and the territory they inhabit, which is what will happen if Catalonia votes for independence from Spain in September 2015, for instance.

The most plausible grounds for any government’s “right to rule” therefore seem to be what we started with: the idea that the ends justify the means. If government rule works out better than having no government, then this view would say that government has a right to rule.(*) But the ends-justify-the-means argument has some other curious implications. It would imply, for instance, that citizens owe duties to a government taken over by a drug gang, so long as that drug gang makes the citizens better off than they would be with no government. That’s a very hard position to accept.

We are left with a choice between two difficult philosophical positions: either the U.S. government and virtually all other national governments are illegitimate and we have no duty to obey them, or the reason we have a duty to obey them is also a reason we would have to obey a drug gang or an alien conqueror if they took power.

http://www.e3ne.org/a-right-to-rule/

[otherone]

Rep for that, timely, given the paleolithic activity here of late...

Huemer concludes that Americans have not consented to be ruled by the U.S. government, and that the U.S. government therefore enjoys no right to enforce any laws that go beyond merely self-defense and defense of others (protecting natural rights). Taxes, for instance, are illegitimate.

This conclusion is surprising, and political philosophers have tried to find other arguments to ground a “right to rule.”

[Ronin Truth]

https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&...30.khGSrf7IUp4

[r3volution 3.0]

Not all states are equal.

[totalitarian state]---------------------------------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Whether a particular existing state is legitimate depends on:

(a) where it stands on this spectrum,

and (b) where that state which would replace it, were it to fall, would stand on this spectrum.

Hence the minarchist argument - minarchy, being the best type of state already, cannot possibly be improved upon, and so it is always legitimate.

When dealing with non-minarchic states, the calculation becomes a little more complicated. Suppose the existing state (X) is located as such on the spectrum:

[totalitarian state]-----------------------X--------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Is it legitimate? I comparison to what? In comparison to what would replace it. What will replace it?

There are better states to X's right and worse states to X's left. The replacement could conceivably be either better or worse, we don't know for sure. We have to look at the particular circumstances and try to predict what the outcome of X's overthrow would actually be, and then locate that outcome on the spectrum. If it's to the right of X, then revolt is justified; if to the left, not.

[P3ter_Griffin]

May 22, 2015 by Jason Sorens
...
In his book, The Problem of Political Authority, the contemporary political philosopher Michael Huemer considers the necessary conditions for consent to an agreement. First, the agreement requires a reasonable way of opting out. ...

http://www.e3ne.org/a-right-to-rule/

Great article. I've given the bolded some thought before, specifically if and when someone can 'lose' that right to opt out, and I'm interested in hearing other peoples' take on it. For example, a women who has voluntarily submitted herself to a government who uses Sharia law as its legal basis, then breaks the law by not covering her face in public, and is then sentenced to death by stoning, can she at this point opt out, to skirt the punishment, whether its because of a 'change of heart' or self preservation? Or, by not opting out of a government, would a person be essentially contractually obliged to follow the rules set forth, and to accept the punishment for breaking them?

Obviously these stipulations may be laid out by the government itself, but I'm asking from a moral perspective. Would we be morally justified in shooting up the stoning party to save this hypothetical women, even though she submitted herself to the rules in the first place?

[otherone]

Obviously these stipulations may be laid out by the government itself, but I'm asking from a moral perspective. Would we be morally justified in shooting up the stoning party to save this hypothetical women, even though she submitted herself to the rules in the first place?

What do you think?

[P3ter_Griffin]

What do you think?

I think I am not opposed to it, but that the actions themselves are probably not morally justifiable. She willfully submitted to the rules, she willfully broke the rules, therefore her 'rulers' are justified in punishing her. Where I struggle is, can she end consent after willfully breaking the rules she consented to? If she can then punishing her wouldn't be justified, and saving her would be. It seems unreasonable to expect the other party to end consent in such a manner though, but unreasonable doesn't necessarily mean its not 'right'.

[HVACTech]

y'all DO realize this is NOT a new question...right?
the founders spoke volumes on this subject.

AND, they made decisions with regard to same.

http://lp.hillsdale.edu/constitution...ampaign=con101

[P3ter_Griffin]

y'all DO realize this is NOT a new question...right?
the founders spoke volumes on this subject.

AND, they made decisions with regard to same.

http://lp.hillsdale.edu/constitution...ampaign=con101

Huemer concludes that Americans have not consented to be ruled by the U.S. government, and that the U.S. government therefore enjoys no right to enforce any laws that go beyond merely self-defense and defense of others (protecting natural rights). Taxes, for instance, are illegitimate.

The Congress shall have power

To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence[note 1] and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

It does not seem like they made the same decision at all, but I'm listening.

[HVACTech]

It does not seem like they made the same decision at all, but I'm listening.

just what,

same decision

are you referring to?

they made decisions with regard to same

perchance, might it be.

"who is fit to rule" or said yet another way. "who has the right to rule" mayhaps?

what do you NOT like about the founders decision?

[P3ter_Griffin]

just what,


are you referring to?



perchance, might it be.

"who is fit to rule" or said yet another way. "who has the right to rule" mayhaps?

what do you NOT like about the founders decision?

Well, first is ageism. I am not old enough to be a senator. And second is, they did not direct to those that the public (and state legislatures) saw 'fit to rule' that all laws and taxes only apply to individuals who voluntarily wish to participate in the created government.

[Anti Federalist]

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Blank check.

And why we're in the mess we're in.

[heavenlyboy34]

Blank check.

And why we're in the mess we're in.

You must spread some Reputation around before giving it to Anti Federalist again.

Someone plz +rep my brother here^^

[ProIndividual]

Not all states are equal.

[totalitarian state]---------------------------------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Whether a particular existing state is legitimate depends on:

(a) where it stands on this spectrum,

and (b) where that state which would replace it, were it to fall, would stand on this spectrum.


Hence the minarchist argument - minarchy, being the best type of state already, cannot possibly be improved upon, and so it is always legitimate.


When dealing with non-minarchic states, the calculation becomes a little more complicated. Suppose the existing state (X) is located as such on the spectrum:

[totalitarian state]-----------------------X--------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Is it legitimate? I comparison to what? In comparison to what would replace it. What will replace it?

There are better states to X's right and worse states to X's left. The replacement could conceivably be either better or worse, we don't know for sure. We have to look at the particular circumstances and try to predict what the outcome of X's overthrow would actually be, and then locate that outcome on the spectrum. If it's to the right of X, then revolt is justified; if to the left, not.

None of that is relevant to legitimacy or justification claims of the state. You just tried to claim relativism is a means to derive legitimacy...which ignores every claim of legitimacy and justification is based on FIRST ethical theory and ethical claims, and THEN AND ONLY THEN legal theory and legal claims. If the whole world was Nazis and state Communists, I don't think we can say either form of government is "legitimate" simply because they are the only two in existence, proposed, or whatever. Those aren't criteria that say whether or not those forms of state, or a state at all, is ethically justified/legit.

Just because the whole world except us is worse doesn't make us a legit or just form of government. Justification and legitimization are based on ethical analysis, which can also be used to test legal theories. Relativism can NEVER be used to justify or legitimize a coercion of a non-victimizer. In fact, relativism can never be used to justify or legitimize anything. Ethical questions answer to absolute criteria only. The theory can be shown to be invalid on its premises or inconsistent in application of logic when it claims to justify or legitimize any act or institution that coerces non-victimizers.

One need not even say ethical theory is objective...they need only, at minimum, admit ethics exist and that those theories are either subjective or objective. Simply saying ethics are subjective doesn't create the relativism necessary either. I cover this in the link below. The point is, claiming one slave master is ethical merely because he's less cruel, by a little or a lot, than another slave master does not make, according to consistent logic, either slave master legit, illegitimate, just, or unjust. The ethical argument has not been made here, so no ethical conclusion can come from it. You simple stated that the state is assumed legit, and then went about how, only compared to other states that are assumed legit, that it or the other states can be delegitimized. This A) assumes legitimacy that has not been proven at all, and B) presupposes that legitimacy is based on relative criteria when it clearly cannot be.

This fallacious way of claiming the state "legitimate" or "justified" is covered in Section D, #5, #6, #7, and #8, and alternatives to the state are covered in Section E (among other places) of my essay in the OP of the following thread:

http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthr...s-Illegitimate

[DamianTV]

Their 'Right to Rule' ends where my EQUAL 'Right to be Free and Independant' begin.

Im sure that statement would get undermined by every Ruler out there.

[r3volution 3.0]

Not all states are equal.

[totalitarian state]---------------------------------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Whether a particular existing state is legitimate depends on:

(a) where it stands on this spectrum,

and (b) where that state which would replace it, were it to fall, would stand on this spectrum.

Hence the minarchist argument - minarchy, being the best type of state already, cannot possibly be improved upon, and so it is always legitimate.

When dealing with non-minarchic states, the calculation becomes a little more complicated. Suppose the existing state (X) is located as such on the spectrum:

[totalitarian state]-----------------------X--------------------------------------[minarchist state]

Is it legitimate? I comparison to what? In comparison to what would replace it. What will replace it?

There are better states to X's right and worse states to X's left. The replacement could conceivably be either better or worse, we don't know for sure. We have to look at the particular circumstances and try to predict what the outcome of X's overthrow would actually be, and then locate that outcome on the spectrum. If it's to the right of X, then revolt is justified; if to the left, not.

None of that is relevant to legitimacy or justification claims of the state. You just tried to claim relativism is a means to derive legitimacy...which ignores every claim of legitimacy and justification is based on FIRST ethical theory and ethical claims, and THEN AND ONLY THEN legal theory and legal claims. If the whole world was Nazis and state Communists, I don't think we can say either form of government is "legitimate" simply because they are the only two in existence, proposed, or whatever. Those aren't criteria that say whether or not those forms of state, or a state at all, is ethically justified/legit.

Just because the whole world except us is worse doesn't make us a legit or just form of government. Justification and legitimization are based on ethical analysis, which can also be used to test legal theories. Relativism can NEVER be used to justify or legitimize a coercion of a non-victimizer. In fact, relativism can never be used to justify or legitimize anything. Ethical questions answer to absolute criteria only. The theory can be shown to be invalid on its premises or inconsistent in application of logic when it claims to justify or legitimize any act or institution that coerces non-victimizers.

One need not even say ethical theory is objective...they need only, at minimum, admit ethics exist and that those theories are either subjective or objective. Simply saying ethics are subjective doesn't create the relativism necessary either. I cover this in the link below. The point is, claiming one slave master is ethical merely because he's less cruel, by a little or a lot, than another slave master does not make, according to consistent logic, either slave master legit, illegitimate, just, or unjust. The ethical argument has not been made here, so no ethical conclusion can come from it. You simple stated that the state is assumed legit, and then went about how, only compared to other states that are assumed legit, that it or the other states can be delegitimized. This A) assumes legitimacy that has not been proven at all, and B) presupposes that legitimacy is based on relative criteria when it clearly cannot be.

1. It was an implicit premise of my argument that the ethical ideal is a purely voluntary society (I assume this requires no argument here on a libertarian forum). I am comparing and ranking different social orders by their distance from that ideal; such that it is ethical to overthrow the existing social order if and only if the result will be nearer to the ideal. Or, to say the same thing in different words; a social order is legitimate if and only if it cannot be replaced by anything nearer to the ideal.

2. Another implicit premise of my argument was that anarcho-capitalism is impossible (obviously this is highly controversial, but I've argued my case at great length elsewhere - incidentally, the last post in that thread was my response to you, which I hope you'll reply to at some point). Thus minarchy is the closest possible social order to the ideal. And therefore it is always unethical to overthrow a minarchic regime (since the replacement will either be identical or worse - it cannot be better). While, as I said in #1, for regimes further from the ideal than minarchy, it may or may not be ethical to overthrow them, depending on what can be reasonably expect to replace them, and whether those replacements are nearer to the ideal or not.

This fallacious way of claiming the state "legitimate" or "justified" is covered in Section D, #5, #6, #7, and #8, and alternatives to the state are covered in Section E (among other places) of my essay in the OP of the following thread:

http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthr...s-Illegitimate

None of these apply to my argument in any way.

5. It is a circular argument to claim the state is legitimate or justified without trying to show the ethical justification or legitimacy (the only way to legitimize or justify any legal theory or legal system based on that legal theory). All that does is say it is "legitimate" because it is in existence, or because it follows its own rules (which it doesn't, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument). The former is an "Is versus Ought" fallacy (saying because it IS, then that shows it OUGHT to be)...you cannot (generally) derive a justification for what OUGHT to be just based on what IS currently, and you cannot claim an IS ought to be, simply because it currently IS. The latter is fallacious because it assumes first the system itself is legitimate, and that its internal mechanisms and processes are only the question...but the system itself is what is being challenged, not the internal process by which it claims "legitimacy". To legitimize the system, the entire concept of a state (a form of coerced monopolization of law and defense, among other monopolies, quasi-monopolies, monopsony, and cartels, specific to a geographic area) must be ethically defended. This requires digging into the ethical theory that attempts to justify the social contract theory (which is a legal theory).

I'm not saying that a state is legitimate because it exists.

I'm saying a state is legitimate if whatever would follow its overthrow would be worse (i.e. farther from the ethical ideal of a voluntary society).

6. Majority rule as a way to legitimize an ethical theory (which creates a following legal theory) is fallacious (argumentum ad populum - the informal logical fallacy of appealing to majority opinion, or the crowd). If this was a logical justification of ethics, then gang rape should/would be legal, as 5 men can out-vote a woman on a desert island when it comes to sex.

Nowhere did I say anything about majority opinion.

7. Tradition is also not a logical argument to legitimize an ethical theory (argumentum ad antiquitatem, or the informal logical fallacy of appealing to traditions). If this were a logical justification of ethics, then slavery should/would never have been outlawed (as it was tradition, until it wasn't).

Nowhere did I make an argument from tradition; don't know where you got that.

8. Authority is also not a logical argument to legitimize an ethical theory (argumentum ad verecundiam - or the appeal to authoritative knowledge). This usually means appealing to an authority outside of their specialized field of expertise, but also means the same even if they are an expert. It then can be called "snob appeal", and a form of ad populum. Using this fallacy would result in not finding justification and legitimacy for the social contract, and therefore state, in philosophy (fields of which include epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics, and the rather irrelevant for this exercise, aesthetics).

Again, this has absolutely nothing to do with my argument. To what authority did I allegedly appeal?

[Natural Citizen]

May 22, 2015 by Jason Sorens
How can one group of human beings come to enjoy a right to enforce its authoritative commands on other human beings? In other words, how does government come to enjoy a right to rule, and how do citizens come to incur a duty to obey?

This is the best (meaning the most critical) question, or set of questions that I've read in my time here on the board.

It comes down to citizenship in my view.. The 14th amendment needs repatriating. We need to specifically say "Natural Citizen" in that amendment. And this could be accomplished at the state level. The door is wide open in many cases. What I've quoted here is as far as I read, O. I've made up my mind on the answer to your question a long time ago and, so, I'd likely not even try to make sense out of looking at it from the boundaries of some other terms of controversy that may fragment the problem by focusing on specific instances. And I say this respectfully.

I'll read the latter but won't provide any thoughts on it.

But, yeah...that is a great, great question that is asked there in the first paragraph. It is the million dollar question. I think we just tend to look for a maze instead of walking a straight line sometimes. And, so, we get what we get. We did it to ourselves.

[ProIndividual]

1. It was an implicit premise of my argument that the ethical ideal is a purely voluntary society (I assume this requires no argument here on a libertarian forum). I am comparing and ranking different social orders by their distance from that ideal; such that it is ethical to overthrow the existing social order if and only if the result will be nearer to the ideal. Or, to say the same thing in different words; a social order is legitimate if and only if it cannot be replaced by anything nearer to the ideal.

If it is implicit to your argument that a voluntary society is ethical, then the word "ideal" is not really necessary. That word implies a bastardization of ethics...ethics and pragmatics are not at all related. Slavery was evil, whether it was necessary or not. What history shows is that every single evil that has ever been said to be less than ideal but pragmatically necessary has ended up not being necessary at all. The state is no exception. Like every other so-called "necessary evil", logic and reason showed why they weren't ethical or pragmatically necessary long before empiricism caught up. This rationalism vs empiricism argument is also how praxeology works in Austrian economics.

We don't accept a little rape, a little murder, etc. when none is the ethical "ideal", for an example. We acknowledge that all of these evils will continue to exist, but nonetheless ALWAYS judge them as evils. The state is no different. Whether or not it is necessary has no relevance to whether it is ethical or not. The extortion the state euphemistically calls "taxation" is not ethical just because it is POSSIBLY (not likely) necessary.

You didn't just compare and give criteria for overthrow...you said the comparison was the criteria for legitimacy. You suggested that a state could be legitimate (which is an ethical claim) simply because no better state existed or was proposed. First, perhaps what is better is not a state at all, which cannot be ignored as a possibility. Second, EVEN IF a state was possibly legitimate ethically (which I do not see as possible), then its legitimacy in ethics cannot be determined relative to other existing or proposed states. Ethics don't work that way. Ethics, in order to pass the test of universality, must be consistent (which the state violates by legalizing extortion for themselves, but making it illegal for everyone else), and that means the legitimacy of a thing is determined via stand-alone criteria that is subject to comparison of like to like. So, if every human was a murderer, the murderer who is most humane and murders least is NOT ethical simply because he's the least worst human. The "ideal" is the only ethical point (if murder is unethical, and only a lack of murder is ethical, then ALL murderers, no matter their frequency of murders or intensity of murders, are unethical).

By suggesting a purely voluntary society is "ideal" you have both accidentally associated ethics with pragmatics, but you have also admitted that voluntaryism IS the ethical standard. Nothing beyond that can be ethical. It doesn't matter how close you get to the that standard, if you are NOT that exact standard, it has to be (logically) unethical. A little extortion is not more ethical than a lot of extortion...one is just as unethical as the other...one just creates more victims, or even worse treated victims, than the other.

Ethics are about principles, not matters of degree. Once you get into matters of degree you have abandoned principles. Either extortion is wrong or it is not. Either threatening competition with violence is wrong or it is not. If both are wrong, then ANY state, be it totalitarian or minarchist, is flatly unethical, as at minimum a state requires threats against competition in the markets the state necessarily, as part of its definition, coercively monopolizes/holds monopsony over/cartelizes. At the very least a state requires a monopsony, coercively held, over the defense market. The law market can be private and competitive (the Icelandic Commonwealth, for example), but there is no state without the coercive monopsony over defense. This can be territorially-based militia or standing army. Since this violates the principle of threats against competition being unethical (assuming, of course, the competition isn't victimizing people - because they'd be the state in that case, and you'd be rightfully putting them out of business), then logically the minarchist state is also unethical. It may be less harmful or less intrusive on our individual autonomy, but it nonetheless is evil.

Another way to explain this is a totally different crime/unethical act. If a mafia family were to extort you for 100% of you income, you'd say that was unethical and should be illegal. The same would be true at 99.9%. 99%, 97.6%, 52%, 13.354%, 1%, .000000237%, etc. Any non-zero amount of mafia extortion is in violation of the principle. It doesn't matter one iota to right/wrong the percentage extorted from you. Those may determine the amount owed to you when this crime is stopped, but it has no relevance as to whether or not it is unethical or ethical. Ethics has ZERO to do with matters of degree. It ONLY has to do with matters of principle.

Any non-zero number of involuntary activities foisted upon an individual or group of individuals (society), when those individuals haven't FIRST coerced a non-victimizer, IS unethical. This passes muster of universality and is a matter of principle. It makes no difference if pragmatically it can or cannot be replaced by some other ideal. Evil does not cease to be evil simply because it is less evil than all other evils, proposed or realized.

2. Another implicit premise of my argument was that anarcho-capitalism is impossible (obviously this is highly controversial, but I've argued my case at great length elsewhere - incidentally, the last post in that thread was my response to you, which I hope you'll reply to at some point). Thus minarchy is the closest possible social order to the ideal. And therefore it is always unethical to overthrow a minarchic regime (since the replacement will either be identical or worse - it cannot be better). While, as I said in #1, for regimes further from the ideal than minarchy, it may or may not be ethical to overthrow them, depending on what can be reasonably expect to replace them, and whether those replacements are nearer to the ideal or not.

Anarchism is not impossible, as anthropology and history show stateless societies with law, roads, trade, defense, etc. existed for thousands of years before the state. They tended to outlive the current average lifespans of states by centuries. Their stability was tremendous. They were quite robust, if not antifragile. And besides the fact stateless societies already existed and for longer than the state has existed thus far, there is the problem of refuting one form of anarchism and not all forms. It's quite the heterogeneous philosophy...the economic and organizational preferences of each school vary widely, and since many of them are opposed to one another (which isn't a problem for co-existence, in a stateless society where polycentricity exists), I find it difficult to understand how the entirety of it can be simply deconstructed and shown not to be possible. Very little in this reality can be shown to be impossible. This is a point often made in science and mathematics...nearly all operates on probability, not certainty. I find it not only possible to have an anarchy that is functional and thriving, but I find it so probable precisely because of the fact conflicting forms of economics and organization cannot all simultaneously be defeated. In spots, when you defeat one you are simultaneously validating another form (capitalist vs communist, individualist vs collectivist, pure pacifist vs self defensive, democratic vs anti-democratic, etc.).

Philosophers have been trying to both justify and legitimize, and prove the pragmatic necessity of, the state for thousands of years. Due to logic, reason, and more recently empirical evidence and anthropological discoveries, they have all failed. The ethics realm is failed because logic and reason show why the state and its basis (the social contract theory) cannot be found valid/consistent. The idea the state is a pragmatic necessity has been thrown into the trash heap more recently based on anthropology and its discovery of more and more evidence of stateless societies, how they operated, and how long they lasted in stability. This Locke and Hobbes and the Founders had no access too, as it came after they were gone. They can't be blamed for buying into the idea of a pre-state world being a "war of all against all"...but it just wasn't the case, unfortunately for their justifications/legitimizations/pragmatic excuses for the state.

None of these apply to my argument in any way.

Actually most all of them did. The main one though, was #5...the circular argument. You are suggesting that a state is legitimate simply because it exists and no better alternative exists (or is suggested). This is A) an IS/Ought problem, as you're claiming what IS is what OUGHT to be unless a better alternative IS, whether in thought or practice, and B) a circular argument that suggests that the existence of the idea of, or the actual existence of, the state and its relative alternatives somehow breathes ethical legitimacy into it. This latter argument is clearly circular...it's saying the state is legit because it exists and has no better alternative of its same class...this of course presupposes the state is legitimate to begin with, which it is not. Since you don't call into question, based on principle instead of arbitrary degree, the state's ethical legitimacy, you are essentially saying the state is ethic de facto or a priori. Neither can be defended as positions. The state's legitimacy must be called into question, and it cannot pass the test of ethics then it is NOT legitimate. If indeed it is unethical, a state cannot be ethical relative to alternatives...it violates the universally, consistently logical principle. It instead operates on arbitrary degree. This is the essence of the circular argument...that the state is legit because the state exists (and is best relative to alternative states, which presupposes it need only compete with other states in pragmatics, and that pragmatics mean anything in terms of ethics - which it does not).

I'm not saying that a state is legitimate because it exists.

I'm saying a state is legitimate if whatever would follow its overthrow would be worse (i.e. farther from the ethical ideal of a voluntary society).

Which is an arbitrary degree of evil, not a lack of it. As I have just demonstrated, alternatives and pragmatics have no relevance to ethical determinations. If it did, murder and rape could be ethical, given there was no place on Earth where a single non-rapist or non-murderer existed. Of course, living in today's world, we have already established those things are unethical, so if suddenly you were transported to an alternate Universe where there were only murderers and rapists of varying degrees of evil, you'd still understand the PRINCIPLE matters, not the arbitrary degrees. This is what the test of universality shows in ethics (and in fact, in science and logic as well)...all SIMILARLY SITUATED CIRCUMSTANCES, in alternate cultures, worlds, Universes, times, etc. all must bear the same standards. When slavery was ubiquitous among humans that didn't make it ethical. We know it to be unethical now, so it was always unethical. Social norms are no excuse...people must always be responsible for their acts, and therefore must always think for themselves and question or authority to CYA (cover their asses). The idea that people "just lived another time" is such horse$#@!, for example...because A) there were a minority in every time trying to point out something was unethical, and B) being brainwashed by social and institutional norms to do evil is no excuse for it. Also, EVEN KNOWING something is ethical or not is irrelevant. I need not know that extortion is wrong to be found guilty of it or for it to be unethical. This is covered in several theories of Truth in philosophy...the Truth is NOT dependent on the perceivers ability to perceive it or not. Truth is true even if not one single person can perceive it (yet). Gravity was real and true before anyone theorized about it. Something is evil long before someone figures it out.

Nowhere did I say anything about majority opinion.

But a minarchy would work how? Voting? There you go then. Also, even if no voting occurs, the sanction of the majority of victims is necessary to allow the nationalism (mass Stockholm Syndrome) to overtake reason and logic, not to mention evidence, so that the state can continue to exist. The state existing boils down to the existence of two distinct social norms: the acceptance of the masses that a minority ruling class can legalize extortion for itself, but keep it illegal for everyone else, AND the acceptance of the masses that a minority ruling class can use violent threats against potential or actual competition, and do so for its cronies as well...and this latter part, of course, leads to limits on tort liability for the state and its cronies. Once the masses (majority appeal) give up on this acceptance of clear hypocrisy in ethics, and therefore law, the abstraction of the state goes "poof" and disappears...as it isn't a real thing that exists; it's just people doing stuff to other people. The state doesn't really exist....2 social norms that create the manifestation of its "authority" (another thing that doesn't actually exist) exists. If people are convinced those social norms are schizophrenic in application (as they surely are), then social norms change, and the state is dead.

That's all it is...2 mere social norms that accept crime as legal, and evil as good, when some minority ruling class or their underlings and cronies carry them out. It's just about applying existing and logically consistent ethics to everyone, instead of everyone but those guys over there we call troops, cops, bureaucrats, politicians, crony corporatist capitalist, crony unionist, crony religious leader, etc., etc.

Nowhere did I make an argument from tradition; don't know where you got that.

That's true...I threw that in because it directly relates to other arguments. I have debated this so many times with so many people I just grouped the arguments together that usually appear together. Most people start with circular arguments, then move to pragmatics, then move to majority rule, then to tradition, and then authority. It's a natural progression pattern I've noticed.

But to be fair, most people get caught up in this cult of personality worship of cruel slave owners we call some/most of our Founders/Framers. They try to talk about them in deified ways and discuss their invention of the American state (although usually ignoring the statelessness of the Revolutionary period, as written about by Thomas Paine himself, and the AoC that preceded the current state) as if it were ordained by some actual Prime Mover god or something...and from that they try to justify the state today and the legitimacy of it based on American traditions and traditional religious values, and who knows what else (I've heard some ridiculous arguments on this topic).

Again, this has absolutely nothing to do with my argument. To what authority did I allegedly appeal?

I'm not sure, but I hope there is one. I hope your false claim the state MUST exist, given anthropology's proof it in no way must exist for society to exist and thrive, is taken from some authority or another...otherwise you just pulled out of your rear. Usually this is taken from outdated arguments of Locke and Hobbes, and since they weren't privy to anthropological evidence we are today, one can be too hard on those guys (but we can be hard on the presenter of the argument today). Other times they use sources who SAY the state is necessary, ethical, or whatever...but those sources can't defeat reason/logic and anthropology.

We all learn from somewhere, so to some degree this is inevitable unless we all want to take on every specialized profession ourselves. The trick is to remember that even a majority of experts can be wrong, so an honest effort to truly understand their conclusions and methodology for coming to those conclusions as well as possible so you judge the conclusion and experiments for yourself. If this is not possible, then have humility and don't speak in absolutes. It's easier said than done. Anyways, I'm guessing your claim can't be abolished is based on someone who taught you stuff that no longer holds. That's what I would have based it on when I was statist years ago. Now I counteract that stuff with not only other experts and my own appeal to expert mass opinion, but also by a deep understanding of how stateless societies functioned and how their functioning would be as easy or easier (depending on the topic) with today's advancements and advantages over the past societies.

To sum up, your argument is that the state can be ethical if it is necessary or best relatively. This is saying an evil is good if necessary or best relatively. You should likely stop asserting this. You should learn from the Founders...government is EVIL, but in their view necessary. It's necessity or "best in class" award doesn't make it good. The Founders, for all their flaws, never claimed any form of government could be ethical...they gave up that argument, to their credit. Instead, they merely argued this best in class evil was just necessary; nothing more. In the end, you can't justify or legitimize the state...geniuses have tried for centuries upon centuries - and failed, hard. It just probably can't be done. I don't think it can even be argued to be necessary anymore, but at least that argument doesn't try to turn a pure and obvious evil into some kind of perverted "good".

[otherone]

Nowhere did I say anything about majority opinion.

Minarchy can only exist with majority consent.

Succinctly, it's the most ideal form of government when the other guy's rights are being violated.

[r3volution 3.0]

1. It was an implicit premise of my argument that the ethical ideal is a purely voluntary society (I assume this requires no argument here on a libertarian forum). I am comparing and ranking different social orders by their distance from that ideal; such that it is ethical to overthrow the existing social order if and only if the result will be nearer to the ideal. Or, to say the same thing in different words; a social order is legitimate if and only if it cannot be replaced by anything nearer to the ideal.

Ethics are about principles, not matters of degree. Once you get into matters of degree you have abandoned principles. Either extortion is wrong or it is not. Either threatening competition with violence is wrong or it is not. If both are wrong, then ANY state, be it totalitarian or minarchist, is flatly unethical

Ethics is about guiding human action.

"In this situation, it is possible for me to do X, Y, or Z - which should I do?"

The purpose of ethics is to provide an answer to that question.

My ethics can provide an answer - "choose the least bad of those options, the one which most closely resembles the ideal."

The alternative, to insist that Q is the only proper course of action, when Q is not possible, strikes me as quite insane.

But I guess we'll have to agree to disagree.

Anarchism is not impossible...

It is, as explained here. I don't want to repeat myself so I'll leave it there.

None of these apply to my argument in any way.

Actually most all of them did.

So you assert.

The main one though, was #5...the circular argument. You are suggesting that a state is legitimate simply because it exists and no better alternative exists (or is suggested).

That's right.

This is A) an IS/Ought problem, as you're claiming what IS is what OUGHT to be unless a better alternative IS, whether in thought or practice,

I am making an ethical statement, not attempting to justify an ethical statement.

So the is-ought problem (which is about fallacious attempts to justify ethical statements by reference to facts) has nothing to do with it.

and B) a circular argument that suggests that the existence of the idea of, or the actual existence of, the state and its relative alternatives somehow breathes ethical legitimacy into it. This latter argument is clearly circular...it's saying the state is legit because it exists and has no better alternative of its same class...this of course presupposes the state is legitimate to begin with, which it is not.

How does "the state is legitimate if what would replace it would be further from the ideal" presume that the state is legitimate?

non sequitur

Since you don't call into question, based on principle instead of arbitrary degree, the state's ethical legitimacy...

The statement I made in my original post ("The state which is nearest to the ideal is best") is an ethical principal.

An ethical principle is simply a premise in an ethical argument. Nowhere is it written that it cannot talk about degrees or gradations of things.

Nowhere did I say anything about majority opinion.

But a minarchy would work how? Voting?

No, I'm for a non-democratic state.

Also, even if no voting occurs, the sanction of the majority of victims is necessary to allow the nationalism (mass Stockholm Syndrome) to overtake reason and logic, not to mention evidence, so that the state can continue to exist. The state existing boils down to the existence of two distinct social norms....

We've talked about this in the other thread cited above.

Nowhere did I make an argument from tradition; don't know where you got that.

That's true

Indeed

Again, this has absolutely nothing to do with my argument. To what authority did I allegedly appeal?

I'm not sure

Which makes me wonder why you made the charge in the first place...

[osan]

Nothing of what we today experience in terms of that being discussed has the least thing to do with rights. It has everything to do with force and the will to employ it in whatever manner and degree deemed necessary by those wielding it to gain the end they seek.

This ain't rocket surgery. At the end of the day, political power as addressed in the OP is pure and utterly corrupt force. It is the means of the pure pragmatist for whom the only principle to which he cleaves is that of getting what he wants by whatever means he decides is appropriate. It is the purest and most concentrated criminality men have ever known.