This is for those of you who think Palestinians just want the West Bank and Gaza:
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2011/dav...r-of-genocide/There is an eerie déjà vu about an unmistakable and oft-repeated process in the Arab–Israel conflict. The process started in 1937 and has repeated itself with minor variations many times over the subsequent 74 years. The process is as follows: Arabs go to war with Israel, promising Israel’s destruction and the annihilation of its Jews. Israel wins the war and offers peace. Arab leaders reject Israel’s peace offer, renew their promises of destruction and annihilation; and after a while they go to war again, and lose again, and Israel again offers peace. Repeat this process 31 times and you have the history of the Arab-Israel conflict in a nutshell.Unfortunately, this process never seems to make it to our mainstream media’s radar screen, nor into many of the classrooms of professors of Near Eastern Studies.
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The first such opportunity arose in 1937 when the Peel Commission recommended the partition of British Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan River. The Jews would get about 15% of that territory, with the other 85% going to the Arabs, and to a small corridor from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem that would remain under British Mandatory control. The Jews accepted the recommendation. The Arab leadership rejected the plan and escalated Arab violence against the British and Jews to a bona fide war: the “great Arab revolt.” ...
The next opportunity came with the UN Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, and the UN’s non-binding General Assembly Resolution #181.This resolution gave c. 55% of Mandatory Palestine to the State of Israel for the Palestinian Jews, and the other c. 45% would be the state for the Arabs west of the Jordan River. The Zionists accepted. Arab leaders rejected the plan, went to war in high-handed defiance of the UN, and lost. ...
But even in defeat, with their armies in disarray and with the nascent state of Israel in control of far more territory than had been intended by the UN Partition Plan, the Arab belligerents refused to make peace. Instead they agreed to what they triumphantly announced would be a mere temporary armistice. With this agreement came the third opportunity for an Arab state alongside of Israel. At the Rhodes Armistice Talks of 1949 the Israeli negotiators indicated that the newly conquered territory was negotiable, in exchange for recognition, negotiations without preconditions, and peace. The Arab representatives refused, confident that they would soon wipe out the Jewish State. ...
Ironically, it was the 6-Day War (6/5-10/1967) that offered the fourth opportunity for the creation of an Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A few days after the UN cease fire of 6/11/67, Abba Eban, Israel’s representative at the UN, made his famous speech.
He held out the olive branch to the Arab world, inviting Arab states to join Israel at the peace table, and informing them in unequivocal language that everything but Jerusalem was negotiable. Territories taken in the war could be returned in exchange for formal recognition, bi-lateral negotiations, and peace. The Arab representatives at the UN torched his olive branch.
Had the Arab states taken him up on his offer, there could have been peace and the possibility of the fulfillment of the UN General Assembly Resolution #181. Instead, the leaders of eight Arab states met in Khartoum, Sudan, in September, 1967 to discuss what they called the “new reality.” Their decision was no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.
The first Camp David Accords offered the fifth opportunity. During 18 months of intense negotiations, ending on September of 1978, President Carter, Prime Minister Menahem Begin, and Egyptian President Anwar es-Sadat, thrashed out the text of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. In the context of this agreement, Menahem Begin agreed to a 3-month freeze on Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank. He also urged the PLO and Jordan to renounce the three Khartoum “NOs” and join Egypt in negotiations for a more comprehensive peace agreement. Israel offered a framework for negotiating accords to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and to fully implement the UN’s binding Security Council Resolution #242. The accords recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” with implementation of those rights and full autonomy within five years, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza after the democratic election of a self-governing authority to replace Israel’s military government. Israel’s willingness to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for peace demonstrated definitively that its offers of territorial compromise for peace were not mere words. Nonetheless, Arafat refused.
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In 1993, with Pres. Clinton’s support, Israel undertook negotiations in Oslo with Arafat for the creation of an autonomous Palestinian entity. The result was the first iteration of the Oslo Accords.The PLO became the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Arafat was brought out of his Tunisian exile to be the “rais” (head, leader) of the PA, with its capitol in Ramallah. In exchange, Arafat agreed to eschew terror, end incitement, disarm and dismantle the terrorist groups under his control, create a democratic Palestinian government, educate the next generation for peace, and settle all differences by negotiation, per his personal letter signed and handed to Rabin on September 9. Arafat immediately violated every one of the Oslo Accords and began a terror war against Israel with the first suicide bombing on April 6, 1994. This offensive grew into a full-blown terror war with the “2nd Intifada”, which began on 9/29/2000 (see below).
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Israel’s reply to Arafat’s continued terror war, despite his commitments at Oslo was “Oslo 2,” a re-convening of both sides on September 24, 1995 in Taba, Egypt, with Arafat again agreeing to halt terror attacks, end incitement, and handle all disagreements via peaceful negotiations. But he did not, and car bombs, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, kidnappings, sniper shootings, and stabbings continued to be his modus operandi for Palestinian independence.
Three years later, on October 23, 1998, at the Wye River Plantation, Israel and the USA worked again with Arafat to re-engage him on a diplomatic level and pressure him to uphold the commitments he made at Oslo. Per the Wye River Memorandum documenting that meeting Arafat agreed again to crack down on terrorism. In exchange for that renewal of his original promise, Israel agreed to withdraw from more of the West Bank. Arafat continued his terrorism partnership with Hamas, pretending that he could not control Hamas and was thus not responsible for continued terrorism. But for two more years, Arafat continued to sponsor terrorism against Israel, fund more than a dozen terror organizations, work hand in hand with Hamas, teach Palestinian children that Palestine included all of Israel, and pay the salaries of imams who preached the coming of the one last great and mighty jihad that would drive the Jews into the sea.
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Then came the biggest and best ever opportunity for a state for the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the UN General Assembly Resolution #181 in 1947 – Camp David 2. From July 11 – 24, 2000 President Clinton presided over the second Camp David accords. Prime Minister Baraq made what Saudi Crown Prince Bandar bin Sultan called the best offer that Arafat could possibly expect[iv]. This was an historic offer, with Arafat receiving 97% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 3% of Israeli land, and a Palestinian Authority capitol in East Jerusalem. All that was required of Arafat was an end to the conflict. He could not do it.
At Camp David, Dennis Ross has said, there was no comprehensive final settlement offered. The Israeli and American negotiators put forth ideas regarding borders, Jerusalem, and land transfers. One of those was a Palestinian state comprised of four cantons. Arafat rejected these suggestions, but did not raise a single idea himself. Shlomo Ben-Ami, one of Israel’s negotiators who took copious notes at the closed meeting and kept meticulous diaries of the proceedings, said that Clinton exploded at the Palestinians over their refusal to make a counteroffer. “‘A summit’s purpose,’ Clinton said, ‘is to have discussions that are based on sincere intentions and you, the Palestinians, did not come to this summit with sincere intentions.’ Then he got up and left the room.”
According to Ben-Ami, Israel tried to find a solution for Jerusalem that would be “a division in practice…that didn’t look like a division:” that is, Israel was willing to compromise on the issue, but needed a face-saving formula. The Palestinians, however, had no interest in helping the Israelis. To the contrary, they wanted to humiliate them. Nevertheless, Ben-Ami said Israel dropped its refusal to divide Jerusalem and accepted “full Palestinian sovereignty” on the Temple Mount and asked the Palestinians only to recognize the site was also sacred to Jews.
According to Denis Ross’ account[v], in his comprehensive and definitive exposition of the Camp David 2 proceedings, Arafat’s only contribution was the assertion that, in reality, no Jewish Temple ever existed on the Temple Mount, and the real Temple existed in Nablus. Not only did he not make any accommodation to Israel, Ross said, “he denied the core of the Jewish faith.” This stunning remark indicated to the Americans that Arafat was incapable of the psychological leap necessary — the one Anwar Sadat had made — to achieve peace. As a result, President Clinton’s press conference following the summit laid most of the blame for the outcome on Arafat. Clinton made it clear that the failure of Camp David 2 was Arafat’s fault, as did Ross.
There are some dissenting views about Arafat’s posturing[vi]; but even if these dissenting views were correct, the dynamics of the Camp David 2 negotiations remain unchallenged: Baraq offered, Arafat refused, and made no counter offer. And then he went to war.
The clearest demonstration of Arafat’s real intentions came with the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada on September 29, 2000. In English Arafat spoke of the Oslo Accords as “the peace of the brave,” but in Arabic he told his people that the Accords were merely a ploy to give the PLO time to build its strength so that it could more effectively attack Israel in the future. And, indeed, just six months after the failed Camp David 2 negotiations, Arafat was deploying suicide bombers and shrieking on Arab television about the great “Day of Rage” and the renewed terror war that would soon bring Israel to its knees. The ferocity and frequency of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks launched during the 2nd intifada caught the IDF off guard; but after about 6 months, the Israeli military and other security forces were able to intercept and prevent most terror attacks. The fence around the Gaza Strip (built in 1996) and later the security barrier around much of the West Bank (started in 2002) were more than 90% effective in stopping attacks.
Again, Israel offered peace and Arabs went to war, and lost.
In a desperate attempt to quell the violence, President Clinton sent George Mitchell to the region on December 11, 2000. After whirlwind meetings with both sides, the Mitchell Commission proposed that Israel would stop building settlements and return to the negotiating table if Arafat would put an end to terror and return to the negotiating table. ... Since an on-going PA complaint was the continued expansion of the Israeli settlement population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this was an ideal time for Arafat to leverage the opportunity created by Mitchell’s visit, to restrain his terrorists and return to negotiations. Israel accepted the Mitchell Plan. Arafat continued the terror war.
In another attempt to use diplomacy to quell the 2nd Intifada, Clinton suggested a “bridge plan” on December 23, 2000, to pave the way for a return to the negotiating table. This plan was similar to Baraq’s offers, and suggested a physical bridge elevated above Israeli territory connecting the northeast corner of the Gaza Strip with the southwest corner of the West Bank. ...
Nonetheless, Arafat rejected it, and then had his spin-meisters tell the world that actually the plan was not a good one. Saudi crown prince Bandar bin Sultan thought otherwise, and told so to reporter Elsa Walsh of The New Yorker[vii]. ...
Still trying to use diplomacy to end the intifada and fulfill the vision of Oslo, Israel met with PA representatives at Taba, in Sinai, in January 28, 2001, where, by anecdotal ex-post-facto accounts, both sides were on the verge of agreement about many issues. Baraq tried to negotiate in good faith; but Arafat kept the Intifada raging, with from10 to 20 terrorist attacks per day. Arafat’s terror war cost Baraq the next election and brought Ariel Sharon to the Prime Minister’s office. The last meeting at Taba was on January 27, 2001, where Arafat’s team rejected the latest proposals from Baraq for Israeli concessions; but the talks closed with the expectation of further meetings.
Ironically, it is likely that the Taba talked demonstrated to Arafat that the intifada’s terrorist violence was a good tactic for the Palestinian Arabs. Dore Gold and Shimon Peres have noted that the more that Israel agreed to negotiations while Arafat continued to wage his terror war, and the more Israel offered greater and more comprehensive concessions at each negotiation, the more it became clear to Arafat that terror had its rewards.
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Arafat’s outrageous speech at Davos ended any possibility of continuing the Taba negotiations. When he learned of the speech, Prime Minister Ehud Barak cut off diplomatic contact with Arafat until after the election. US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal), a participant at the Davos Conference, made it clear in her speech to Congress on March 7, 2001 that Arafat had squandered a splendid opportunity for peace and statehood, and Israeli leaders had made every conceivable concession to induce him to stop his terror war and enter into serious negotiations. Ariel Sharon’s landslide victory on February 6, 2001 was due in part to Arafat’s speech at Davos.
For the 18th time, Israel offered and Arab leaders refused. At Davos Arafat initiated a diplomatic war, and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip once again missed an opportunity for peace and political self-realization.
On February 24, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell came on a special fact-finding mission.
The facts that he found were very straight-forward: “Prime Minister-elect Ariel Sharon showed openness and a willingness to leave his past behind, while PA Chairman Yasser Arafat is entrenched in stubborn positions and may not be doing everything possible to calm the situation.”
As Arafat’s terror war escalated, President Bush sent in the CIA. George Tenet, CIA director, came to Israel for another whirlwind round of talks, and proposed the “Tenet Plan” on June 13, 2001. Resumption of negotiations between Prime Minister Sharon and Arafat was conditioned upon a single week free of Arab terror attacks. Arafat could not bring himself to forego terrorism for even one week. In desperation, Sharon agreed to drop the demand for one week without terror attacks, but Arafat refused to do anything to stop his terror war. The plan failed.
Israel’s reprisals to a sudden spate of sequential Palestinian terror attacks in early 2002 seem to have prompted a ground-breaking UN resolution, initiated by Secretary General Kofi Anan. UN Security Council Resolution #1397, 3/12/2002, called upon Israel to end its “occupation” of Palestinian territory and upon Arafat to end his “morally repugnant acts of terror.” The resolution affirmed a “vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side with secure and recognized borders.” It further demanded the immediate cessation of violence, terror, incitement, provocation and destruction, urging both sides to co-operate in the implementation of the Tenet and Mitchell plans.
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Even the Saudis joined the “make peace, not war” initiatives. On March 27, 2002, the Arab League met in Beirut to discuss an idea that originated with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (apparently arising from an informal conversation with reporter Thomas Friedman). The Beirut Declaration demanded of Israel the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all “occupied territories” back to the 1949 armistice lines, a solution to the “Palestinian refugees” problem, and the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return the Arab states would consider the Arab-Israel conflict over, sign a peace agreement with Israel and establish normal relations with Israel.
Israel’s response was guarded but positive. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon publicly announced that he was willing to meet Saudi officials, publicly or behind the scenes, to explore the proposal, and Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer indicated that the plan was positive and worth pursuing. Other members of the Israeli government called for immediate dialogue with the Saudis about the plan, stating that it was a positive trend and a new opportunity. The Israeli government, in response to the plan, re-opened negotiations with the PA to stop violence, but Arafat cancelled the meetings.
Coincidentally, or perhaps by design, a suicide bomber self-detonated at the Park Hotel in Netanya, during a Passover Seder, killing thirty Israeli civilians and injuring 140, on the same day that the Saudi initiative was adopted by the Arab League. That and almost a dozen other terror attacks in quick succession over the next two days put an end to any consideration of the “new opportunity” and drove Israel to re-occupy the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield on March 29.
In the wake of the Mitchell and Tenet failures, President Bush sent General Anthony Zinni (retired) to broker peace between Israel and Arafat on March 26, 2002. His plan was simple, clear cut, and straight-forward: both sides immediately and simultaneously declare cease-fires, Israel stops pro-active operations (i.e., arrests or assassinations of known terrorists) at the same time that Arafat orders field commanders to stop all attacks and arrest anyone involved in terror activities, the IDF then begins redeployment from most of the West Bank, and the Palestinian Authority assumes security responsibility for West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel agreed, and enforced its first part of the deal. Arafat said he agreed but then did nothing to stop terror attacks. As terror attacks continued, Israel had no choice but to deploy the IDF to stop them. Arafat’s unwillingness or inability to stop terrorism scuttled the Zinni plan.
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Fed up with Arafat’s unwillingness, or inability, to stop the terrorism, President Bush took a step that no former President had ever done: on June 24, 2002 he promised the Palestinian people their own state, as long as they eschewed terrorism and violence.” Terror must be stopped,” he said. “No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.” He went on record that the United States supports the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a Palestinian state, such that the two states would live side by side in peace and security. He also went on record blaming Arafat for the merciless terror war he initiated against Israel on September 29, 2000, and recognized Israel’s need to use force against the terrorist networks attacking Israeli civilians. But Arafat ignored this offer and did nothing to stop the terror attacks. There was no one among the Palestinian leadership willing to oppose Arafat. The terror war continued.
Less than a year later, in April, 2003, for the first time in history, The USA, the EU, the UN and Russia convened in Washington to create a performance-based “roadmap” intended to lead to a permanent Two-State solution: the “Road Map for Peace.” ... The first line of the first paragraph of the first section of part I of the Road Map stated that the Palestinian Authority must unconditionally and immediately stop the terrorism and incitement. Thereafter Israel must stop settlement expansion. Then Arafat was to enable the creation of a democratic Palestinian parliament with the appointment of a prime minister who will select a cabinet. Then both sides return to the peace talks, the clearly defined purpose of which was to create a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel accepted the Road Map with some reservations, while committing to painful concessions and acknowledging that the Palestinians could ultimately achieve statehood by ending terrorism and committing to peaceful co-existence. Arafat said he accepted the Road Map, but then postponed talks with Israel and put the Road Map’s peace process at risk by rejecting the cabinet of the newly appointed Palestinian Authority Prime Minster Mahmud Abbas. Reports fromPalestinian West Bank officials revealed that Arafat continued the funding of his terrorist groups, while contingents of these groups attacked, abducted, and tortured supporters of Abbas. Thus, in the face of another international offer for the creation of a Palestinian state, Arafat chose to continue his war.
From February 3 to April 14, 2004 President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon developed together a plan for an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Information about this plan was shared with Ahmed Qure’a, the Prime Minister of the PA (by this time, Arafat was too ill to function. He died on November 11, 2004), as was theassessment of this plan by US lobbyists. On April 14 Sharon sent Bush an official letter stating Israel’s willingness to disengage from the West Bank and Gaza Strip simultaneous with the PA’s assumption of effective security controls and the cessation of terrorism and other hostilities. Bush and Sharon held a press conference announcing the plan that same day.
The next day, PA Prime Minister Qure’a sent letters to UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, President Bush, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair expressing the PA’s outright dismissal of Sharon’s plan. So Sharon, with Bush’s backing, offers the PA its freedom from Israeli control and its complete independence, and PA leadership says no.
Prior to the beginning of his discussions with President Bush about unilateral withdrawal from all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on Dec. 19, 2003, Prime Minister Sharon had announced hisplan to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all Israelis from only the Gaza Strip and turn it over, in toto, to the Palestinian Authority. President Bush, the UN and the EU all enthusiastically endorsed the plan and urged Palestinian leadership to step up to the plate and reciprocate by fulfilling the demands of the Road Map and beginning the process that would end with a peaceful two-state solution.
At first Sharon’s plan was rejected by the Israeli government, but after six months of internal negotiations and political gerrymandering, and after the negative responses from the PA about Sharon’s plan for more comprehensive withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza strip, the less ambitious plan for the Gaza Strip alone was approved on June 6, 2004. On August 15, 2005 Israeli security forces evicted more than 9,000 Israeli residents from 21 Israeli communities in the Gaza Strip. And on September 22, 2005 four additional Israeli communities in the West Bank were forcibly dismantled and their residents evicted. ...
But Palestinian leadership did not reciprocate. Almost immediately, Hamas began qassam rocket attacks on Israel from the newly liberated Gaza Strip, forcing Israel to close its Gaza border crossings and police the coast and airspace to prevent Hamas from importing weapons. Over the next five years Hamas would fire more than 10,000 rockets and missiles and RPGs at Israeli civilians in communities around the Gaza Strip.
Five years after its first attempt at peace making, the Saudi royal family renewed its leadership with the Riyadh summit of March 28, 2007, which proposed a retread of its 2002 plan. This time, the demands on Israel were harsher, with the expectation that Israel, a priori, would return to the 1949 armistice lines and accept millions of so-called “Palestinian refugees” into what they claim to be their former homes and farms in Israel. Only after Israel completed these potentially catastrophic concessions would the Arab world agree to peace and a normalization of relations.
Despite this hardening of the Saudi position, Israel’s government, under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, was warm to the plan and referred to it as a “new opportunity” offered by “moderate Palestinians and pragmatic Arab leaders.” Olmert invited Arab leaders to a meeting at which they would discuss the plan in more detail. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, however, declined Olmert’s offer. This snub, and the wording of the plan itself, which presented Israel with a fait acompli, a take-it or leave-it offer which guaranteed that Israel would be flooded with millions of Arabs claiming descent from the refugee population of Arabs who fled Mandatory Palestine during the 1948 war, cooled Israel’s initial enthusiasm. Upon more thoughtful consideration, it became clear to Israeli leaders that the plan was not an invitation to peace negotiations, but an ultimatum that would put Israel in a severely compromised position in the event that the Arab side did not fulfill its requirements.
Moreover, the actions from the Arab side that would guarantee Israel’s security and provide follow-up stages of implementation were vague and overly general. Israel would first need to make substantive and irreversible concessions of territory and polity, and then hope that the Arab side would fulfill its commitments to easily reversible philosophical changes of language, attitude and behavior.
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Just a few months after the plan was presented, Hamas ousted the PA from the Gaza Strip in a bloody coup and took full control of the Strip and promptly renewed rocket and mortar attacksagainst Israel. With Hamas stronger than ever, and the PA reduced in power and influence, Israel’s reluctance to fulfill the requirements of the Riyadh ultimatum seemed wise. Today, in light of the recent “Arab Spring” and the changes taking place in Arab governments across the Middle East, Israel’s hesitation, in hindsight, was clearly justified.
On October 21, 2007, Israeli military intelligence exposed a Palestinian plot to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Mahmud Abbas arrested the perpetrators, but then immediately released them despite the fact that they had confessed to the plot. None the less, Olmert continued to support negotiations with the Palestinians and Israel’s participation in the Annapolis summit scheduled for November 27, 2007.
President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice hosted Abbas and Olmert together at Annapolis, even as Hamas was firing hundreds of rockets in to Israel and murdering Fatah representatives in Gaza. The purpose of the conference was to encourage progress along the lines of the “Road Map” toward a formal peace agreement between Israel and the PA. Olmert made the most generous concessions ever, even offering to re-divide Jerusalem so that the Palestinian state could have East Jerusalem as its capital.
Abbas gave a very up-beat speech of hope and vision and promise and an outstretched hand of friendship and cooperation to Israel, but concluded it by demanding as a pre-condition and sine qua non before the PA would consider peace:“…ending the occupation of all Palestinian occupied territories in 1967, including East Jerusalem (as though Olmert had not just made that very offer), as well as the Syrian Golan and what remains of occupied from Lebanese territories, and to resolve all other issues relating to the conflict, especially the Palestinian refugees question in all its political, humanitarian, individual and common aspects, consistent with Resolution 194…”So in the midst of all his optimism and hope and vision and brotherly love, and even as Olmert made even more far-reaching concessions, Abbas did exactly what every other Arab leader had done over the past 70 years: he laid out the up-front demands, the pre-conditions, making it clear that without these concessions guaranteed before negotiations could start, there could be no peace. In essence he both ignored and rejected Olmert’s offer.
And then, a few days later, during a live news interview in Saudi Arabia, he again re-iterated his refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state[i]; thus effectively negating all the lovely words of brotherhood and intentions of peaceful co-existence that he had eloquently orated in Annapolis.
This was a conference to which 49 nations were invited. Even the UN and the EU backed the conference with its noble objectives of getting both sides stating their commitment to a two-state solution. But because of Abbas’ rejection of Olmert’s offer, and the absence of any counter-proposal from the PA, the Annapolis meeting led to no progress toward peace. Hamas continued its qassam attacks and sporadic terrorism continued in the West Bank. The PA refused to budge from its adamant statement of an all-or-nothing agreement in which the PA gets all that it demands and Israel gets vague promises.
Two years later, on June 14, 2009, President Obama demanded that Israel stop all settlement construction and make every effort to facilitate the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as though Israel had not offered to do so 30 times previously. Netanyahu responded with partial agreement regarding settlement construction, and called upon the Palestinian leaders to stop the terrorism and incitement and join Israel at the negotiating table so that agreement upon the territory and structure of a Palestinian state could be established.
The Palestinian response was not heartwarming. Hamas promised more terrorism, while PA responses were words of rejection and ad hominem attacks on Netanyahu. “Netanyahu’s speech closed the door to permanent status negotiations,” senior Palestinian official Saeb Erekat said. Yasser Abed Rabo, a senior PA negotiator, called Netanyahu a conman and a liar, mere moments after Netanyahu had stated, for the umpteenth time, his commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state living in peace and cooperation with Israel.
According to the Arabic daily al-Hayat al Jedidah, quoted in Haaretz, President Abbas urged President Obama to forcibly impose upon Israel a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict, one that would give the Palestinians an independent state. President Obama’s response came on April 29, 2010, when he stated publicly that he was committed to seeing the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state within two years. In essence, Obama agreed to Abbas’ demand.
Prior Presidents and Mr. Obama had always stated their support for Israel’s right of self defense and need for defensible borders. But on May 19, 2011, one year after his promise to the PA that he was committed to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State, he made a now famous speech in which he demanded that Israel begin negotiations with the Palestinian Authority on the basis of the “1967 lines” with mutually agreed upon land swaps:“The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states. The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.”Given the current deployment of Arab forces around Israel, the upheaval presently under way in many Arab states, and the rise in strength and popularity of Hamas and Hezbollah, the demand to a return to the “1967 lines,” which are the 1949 Armistice lines, is tantamount to a suicide note for Israel. The President’s speech was critiqued in other quarters as well.
So, again the President of the USA, the single most powerful person in the world, offers the Palestinian leadership its state. Yet Abbas seems to have chosen to ignore Obama’s statement, just as Arafat ignored President Bush’s offer in 2002. Instead, Abbas now seeks the creation of Palestinian sovereignty by the UN, before the end of July of this year. President Obama has expressed opposition to such a move and is working with European countries to find ways to politically neutralize Abbas’ UN ploy.
The single most powerful person in the world, the commander in chief of the world’s most powerful army, the leader of the free world, says that he will help you get our state…and you ignore him? How can this make any sense? How can it make any sense that Palestinian leadership has rejected or ignored all 31 offers of peace and statehood since 1937, and rejected every attempt at resolution?
There is only one possible answer. Palestinian leadership does not want, and has never wanted, peace and a state alongside of Israel. If it did, it could have achieved that aim dozens of times in the past 74 years. Rather, Palestinian leadership wants all of Palestine, from the River to the Sea. They want a Palestinian state not alongside of Israel, but instead of Israel.
Yet this obvious reality never seems to make it to our media’s radar screen, or to our countries top political leaders; despite the fact that Arab leadership from Hajj Amin el Husseini to Arafat and his minions to Abbas and Hamas and Hezbollah, have all been forthright and above board about their intentions. They have told the world time and again just exactly what they intend to do. The so-called “Palestinian national movement” is the only one of its kind in the world, and across all of world history, whose sole defining paradigm is terrorism and whose unabashed and unrelenting goal is the destruction of a sovereign state and the genocide of its Jews.
Over and over, they choose the pursuit of genocide against Israel over statehood for their people.
And that is what Abbas is doing now with his UN ploy. Unwilling to restart the negotiations that he suspended in October of 2010, and facing new conflicts with Hamas despite their recent reunion, Abbas has found a new political maneuver. He knows that success in his quest for statehood via a UN fiat means an end to the fiction of negotiations, an end to the Oslo commitments, an end to any need for compromises, and the opportunity for a Palestinian state to arise, fait acompli, with no need for concessions, and all of its demands met in advance, just as Arab leaders from the Hajj onward have always sought — and, of course, a strengthening of Abass’ own political position in the tumultuous politics of his terrorist cronies.
With amazing candor, Abbas tells the world that the entry of “Palestine” into the UN will enable PA leadership to pursue claims against Israel at the UN and the International Court of Justice. So the UN’s creation of this state will not mean the end of the conflict. It will not mean peace. Rather it will mean the elevation of the conflict to a new level, catapulting it to a new arena. It will merely be a new and perhaps more effective means to facilitate the pursuit of the Arab war against Israel via political means.
Anyone suggesting today that Israel needs to hurry up and make a peace offer before the PA presents its case to the UN in September is either ignorant of the history of Israel’s 31 peace offers, or simply hopes that his audience is.
Prime Minister Netanyahu was right: If the Arabs put down their weapons, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons, there would be no more Israel.
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2011/dav...ocide-part-ii/
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