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Thread: ISIS debate - issues of intervention, blowback, war propaganda & more

  1. #1

    ISIS debate - issues of intervention, blowback, war propaganda & more

    Even war dove Rand Paul, who was recently attacked by the Democratic National Committee for being insufficiently hawkish (yes you read that right), has a strategy for confronting ISIS. President Obama, on the other hand, does not.

    According to an Associated Press report on Paul’s speech at an Americans For Prosperity gathering in Dallas last week:
    [S]ome of the loudest applause for Paul came when he quipped: “If the president has no strategy, maybe it’s time for a new president.”

    In an emailed comment, however, Paul elaborated by saying: “If I were President, I would call a joint session of Congress. I would lay out the reasoning of why ISIS is a threat to our national security and seek congressional authorization to destroy ISIS militarily.”

    More:http://freebeacon.com/blog/even-rand...ilitary-force/



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  3. #2
    Wrong path. If these guys pose a legitimate threat, bring all your intell assets to bear to identify the threat down to last the individual, and then issue Marque to whomever shall manage to bring those individuals to you. Alive preferably. Done. Constitutionally, and at less than one-tenth of the cost. Dog the Bounty Hunter would probably even make a hit TV show out of it.

    ETA - for the record, I am not a fan of Dog the Bounty Hunter.

  4. #3
    well c'mon all you big strong men, Uncle Sam needs your help again...

  5. #4
    I would like to see a full video of the speech before commenting. Tube or it didn't happen.
    "Foreign aid is taking money from the poor people of a rich country, and giving it to the rich people of a poor country." - Ron Paul
    "Beware the Military-Industrial-Financial-Corporate-Internet-Media-Government Complex." - B4L update of General Dwight D. Eisenhower
    "Debt is the drug, Wall St. Banksters are the dealers, and politicians are the addicts." - B4L
    "Totally free immigration? I've never taken that position. I believe in national sovereignty." - Ron Paul
    They are what they hate.” - B4L


    The views and opinions expressed here are solely my own, and do not represent this forum or any other entities or persons.

  6. #5
    Quote Originally Posted by GunnyFreedom View Post
    Wrong path. If these guys pose a legitimate threat, bring all your intell assets to bear to identify the threat down to last the individual, and then issue Marque to whomever shall manage to bring those individuals to you. Alive preferably. Done. Constitutionally, and at less than one-tenth of the cost. Dog the Bounty Hunter would probably even make a hit TV show out of it.

    ETA - for the record, I am not a fan of Dog the Bounty Hunter.
    ^^^

  7. #6
    I know it's debatable, but assuming there is a real threat, obtain Marque authorization and prepare a Company of MARSOC Marines to secure a Congressional liaison officer with cash money, staff and HQ. Drop cash from a Navy hardpoint and return prisoners via the same route. Keep a targetboard and adjust bounty returns like a live market as individuals become more and less critical for intelligence reasons. The MARSOC company can provide some limited (logistics and raid level) support for non government assets obtaining targets of Marque.

    This is assuming that there is a real threat, of course, then the correct process is to go to Congress for Marque, and set up a Navy and/or Marine detachment to chauffeur the cash around and strategize the payout and capture order for the most effective returns. 'Marque' will set up the bounty fund, and 'Reprisal' will allow said Navy/Marine detachment to participate to a limited extent in securing those bounties.

    The point is, assuming the threat is real, there is a legitimately Constitutional way to handle it that is not actually war. Rand should be considering this. If people want answers, give them answers.

  8. #7
    Throw on some camo, pick up a gun, and lead the charge yourself there, Ranbo.
    Last edited by mac_hine; 09-02-2014 at 05:06 PM.
    "The danger is not that a particular class is unfit to govern. Every class is unfit to govern."
    ~Lord Acton

    “Do not conquer the world with force, for force only causes resistance. Thorns spring up when an army passes. Years of misery follow a great victory. Do only what needs to be done without using violence.” ~Lao Tzu

  9. #8
    Quote Originally Posted by GunnyFreedom View Post
    Wrong path. If these guys pose a legitimate threat, bring all your intell assets to bear to identify the threat down to last the individual, and then issue Marque to whomever shall manage to bring those individuals to you. Alive preferably. Done. Constitutionally, and at less than one-tenth of the cost. Dog the Bounty Hunter would probably even make a hit TV show out of it.

    ETA - for the record, I am not a fan of Dog the Bounty Hunter.
    I suggested that idea and then became convinced that that probably wouldn't work in this situation. Perhaps you can respond and give your take on the objections 69360 raised below.

    Quote Originally Posted by 69360 View Post
    A ship full of pirates is one thing, almost 100k IS fighters with heavy weapons and SAMs is another. Who exactly is the US going to give these letters to that is equipped to deal with IS?
    Quote Originally Posted by 69360 View Post
    It's in the 80-100k range now. Apparently once they took the Mosul area every extremist wanted in to IS.

    Who's going to equip these mercenaries? IS has weaponry that US citizens can not privately own.

    Letters of marque can not be used for foreigners. They are meant to be used by a US citizen who has suffered a financial loss to a foreign government. IS is not an internationally recognized state. Also a letter of marque requires the privateer to bring the pirate/enemy to court. What court would try IS? That issue has yet to be resolved with the gitmo detainees.

    I just can't see this working out in the real world.



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  11. #9
    Quote Originally Posted by mac_hine View Post
    Throw on some camo, pick up a gun, and lead the charge yourself there, Ranbo.
    He's talking about airstrikes, not troops on the ground. I see nothing but straw man arguments here.

  12. #10
    Quote Originally Posted by GunnyFreedom View Post
    Wrong path. If these guys pose a legitimate threat, bring all your intell assets to bear to identify the threat down to last the individual, and then issue Marque to whomever shall manage to bring those individuals to you. Alive preferably. Done. Constitutionally, and at less than one-tenth of the cost. Dog the Bounty Hunter would probably even make a hit TV show out of it.

    ETA - for the record, I am not a fan of Dog the Bounty Hunter.
    Haha, bounty hunters like Dog would not be a challenge for a massive army like ISIS.

  13. #11
    The elephant in the room on all of these actual and proposed military solutions has been the lack of anyone talking about Congressional authorization or declarations of war. It's good that Rand made that part clear.

    It would be good to see all of these short quotes in full context.
    "Foreign aid is taking money from the poor people of a rich country, and giving it to the rich people of a poor country." - Ron Paul
    "Beware the Military-Industrial-Financial-Corporate-Internet-Media-Government Complex." - B4L update of General Dwight D. Eisenhower
    "Debt is the drug, Wall St. Banksters are the dealers, and politicians are the addicts." - B4L
    "Totally free immigration? I've never taken that position. I believe in national sovereignty." - Ron Paul
    They are what they hate.” - B4L


    The views and opinions expressed here are solely my own, and do not represent this forum or any other entities or persons.

  14. #12
    1:20 timestamp is the comment of Obama having no strategy and inferring perhaps getting a president that has one.



    The quote where he says

    “If I were President, I would call a joint session of Congress. I would lay out the reasoning of why ISIS is a threat to our national security and seek congressional authorization to destroy ISIS militarily.”
    Was allegedly sent via email, but I'm wondering was it sent to the audience, to the media, did he write it? Would be nice to see a copy of the email and see in what context he made the statement, if he did.
    Last edited by orenbus; 09-02-2014 at 05:13 PM.
    It does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds. -Samuel Adams

  15. #13
    Quote Originally Posted by Traditional Conservative View Post
    He's talking about airstrikes, not troops on the ground. I see nothing but straw man arguments here.
    Do you even read any of the responses members write to you? There's no way in hell air strikes will succeed in "destroying ISIS militarily.” Ground forces will be needed, and we will be dragged into another no win quagmire.
    "The danger is not that a particular class is unfit to govern. Every class is unfit to govern."
    ~Lord Acton

    “Do not conquer the world with force, for force only causes resistance. Thorns spring up when an army passes. Years of misery follow a great victory. Do only what needs to be done without using violence.” ~Lao Tzu

  16. #14
    I don't know if force makes sense. But this is perfectly congruent with libertarian principles. Isis has beheaded two American journalists on camera, and it is a threat against the United States. That is never okay. There is absolutely no way that can ever be justified. I will listen to more facts before I have an opinion on what should be done though. Just because it is morally okay to take them out, doesn't mean it makes sense strategically.

    I would support military action if there is a clear plan. But the threshold is high.

  17. #15
    Quote Originally Posted by kylejack View Post
    Haha, bounty hunters like Dog would not be a challenge for a massive army like ISIS.
    Sure, but he would get a hit TV show out of it. RIP in the eighth episode will just skyrocket the residuals.

  18. #16
    Quote Originally Posted by Krugminator2 View Post
    I don't know if force makes sense. But this is perfectly congruent with libertarian principles. Isis has beheaded two American journalists on camera, and it is a threat against the United States. That is never okay. There is absolutely no way that can ever be justified. I will listen to more facts before I have an opinion on what should be done though. Just because it is morally okay to take them out, doesn't mean it makes sense strategically.

    I would support military action if there is a clear plan. But the threshold is high.
    Two deaths is a pretty small reason to take a country to war. Doesn't fit the proportionality requirement of Just War Theory that Ron Paul endorses.



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  20. #17
    Would really like to know what his plan is. Do we bomb Israel first? CIA Headquarters? The White House?

    The former NSA and CIA agent Edward Snowden revealed that the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi was trained in Israel, various Iranien sources reported.
    Snowden added that the American CIA and the British Intelligence collaborated with the Israeli Mossad to create a terrorist organization that is able to attract all extremists of the world to one place, using a strategy called “the hornet’s nest”.
    The “Hornet’s nest’’ strategy aims to bring all the major threats to one place in order to track them, and mostly to shake the stability of the Arab countries. The NSA agent revealed that the ISIS “Calif”, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi went trough intense military training in the Israeli intelligence “Mossad”.
    Besides military training, Al Baghdadi studied communication and public speaking skills in order to attract “terrorists” from all the corners of the world.
    The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), an independent non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, which focuses on research and media, relayed a story about this as well, adding that “three countries created a terrorist organisation that is able to attract all extremists of the world to one place,” using the aforementioned “the hornet’s nest” strategy.

    “The only solution for the protection of the Jewish state is to create an enemy near its borders,” Snowden was reported to say. http://moroccantimes.com/2014/07/nsa...sraeli-mossad/

  21. #18
    Quote Originally Posted by kylejack View Post
    Two deaths is a pretty small reason to take a country to war. Doesn't fit the proportionality requirement of Just War Theory that Ron Paul endorses.
    i don't totally disagree. I am very curious to know what the scope and plan of attack is. Ron Paul has a much higher threshold for when it is okay to attack than I do. I think it would be justifiable morally to take out Iran's nuclear capability tomorrow. That doesn't mean it is practical though.

  22. #19
    How do you destroy ISIS if it's global? And how the hell did no one know ISIS was becoming such a large threat (supposedly) so quickly?

  23. #20
    http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100111.txt

    Title: Seven Pillars of Wisdom
    Author: T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935)


    CHAPTER XXXIII



    About ten days I lay in that tent, suffering a bodily weakness which
    made my animal self crawl away and hide till the shame was passed. As
    usual in such circumstances my mind cleared, my senses became more
    acute, and I began at last to think consecutively of the Arab Revolt,
    as an accustomed duty to rest upon against the pain. It should have
    been thought out long before, but at my first landing in Hejaz there
    had been a crying need for action, and we had done what seemed to
    instinct best, not probing into the why, nor formulating what we really
    wanted at the end of all. Instinct thus abused without a basis of past
    knowledge and reflection had grown intuitive, feminine, and was now
    bleaching my confidence; so in this forced inaction I looked for the
    equation between my book-reading and my movements, and spent the
    intervals of uneasy sleeps and dreams in plucking at the tangle of our
    present.

    As I have shown, I was unfortunately as much in command of the campaign
    as I pleased, and was untrained. In military theory I was tolerably
    read, my Oxford curiosity having taken me past Napoleon to Clausewitz
    and his school, to Caemmerer and Moltke, and the recent Frenchmen. They
    had all seemed to be one-sided; and after looking at Jomini and
    Willisen, I had found broader principles in Saxe and Guibert and the
    eighteenth century. However, Clausewitz was intellectually so much the
    master of them, and his book so logical and fascinating, that
    unconsciously I accepted his finality, until a comparison of Kuhne and
    Foch disgusted me with soldiers, wearied me of their officious glory,
    making me critical of all their light. In any case, my interest had
    been abstract, concerned with the theory and philosophy of warfare
    especially from the metaphysical side.

    Now, in the field everything had been concrete, particularly the
    tiresome problem of Medina; and to distract myself from that I began to
    recall suitable maxims on the conduct of modern, scientific war. But
    they would not fit, and it worried me. Hitherto, Medina had been an
    obsession for us all; but now that I was ill, its image was not clear,
    whether it was that we were near to it (one seldom liked the
    attainable), or whether it was that my eyes were misty with too
    constant staring at the butt. One afternoon I woke from a hot sleep,
    running with sweat and pricking with flies, and wondered what on earth
    was the good of Medina to us? Its harmfulness had been patent when we
    were at Yenbo and the Turks in it were going to Mecca: but we had
    changed all that by our march to Wejh. To-day we were blockading the
    railway, and they only defending it. The garrison of Medina, reduced to
    an inoffensive size, were sitting in trenches destroying their own
    power of movement by eating the transport they could no longer feed. We
    had taken away their power to harm us, and yet wanted to take away
    their town. It was not a base for us like Wejh, nor a threat like Wadi
    Ais. What on earth did we want it for?

    The camp was bestirring itself after the torpor of the midday hours;
    and noises from the world outside began to filter in to me past the
    yellow lining of the tent-canvas, whose every hole and tear was stabbed
    through by a long dagger of sunlight. I heard the stamping and snorting
    of the horses plagued with flies where they stood in the shadow of the
    trees, the complaint of camels, the ringing of coffee mortars, distant
    shots. To their burden I began to drum out the aim in war. The books
    gave it pat--the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy by the one
    process-battle. Victory could he purchased only by blood. This was a
    hard saying for us. As the Arabs had no organized forces, a Turkish
    Foch would have no aim? The Arabs would not endure casualties. How
    would our Clausewitz buy his victory? Von der Goltz had seemed to go
    deeper, saying it was necessary not to annihilate the enemy, but to
    break his courage. Only we showed no prospect of ever breaking
    anybody's courage.

    However, Goltz was a humbug, and these wise men must be talking
    metaphors; for we were indubitably winning our war; and as I pondered
    slowly, it dawned on me that we had won the Hejaz war. Out of every
    thousand square miles of Hejaz nine hundred and ninety-nine were now
    free. Did my provoked jape at Vickery, that rebellion was more like
    peace than like war, hold as much truth as haste? Perhaps in war the
    absolute did rule, but for peace a majority was good enough. If we held
    the rest, the Turks were welcome to the tiny fraction on which they
    stood, till peace or Doomsday showed them the futility of clinging to
    our window-pane.

    I brushed off the same flies once more from my face patiently, content
    to know that the Hejaz War was won and finished with: won from the day
    we took Wejh, if we had had wit to see it. Then I broke the thread of
    my argument again to listen. The distant shots had grown and tied
    themselves into long, ragged volleys. They ceased. I strained my ears
    for the other sounds which I knew would follow. Sure enough across the
    silence came a rustle like the dragging of a skirt over the flints,
    around the thin walls of my tent. A pause, while the camel-riders drew
    up: and then the soggy tapping of canes on the thick of the beasts'
    necks to make them kneel.

    They knelt without noise: and I timed it in my memory: first the
    hesitation, as the camels, looking down, felt the soil with one foot
    for a soft place; then the muffled thud and the sudden loosening of
    breath as they dropped on their fore-legs, since this party had come
    far and were tired; then the shuffle as the hind legs were folded in,
    and the rocking as they tossed from side to side thrusting outward with
    their knees to bury them in the cooler subsoil below the burning
    flints, while the riders, with a quick soft patter of bare feet, like
    birds over the ground, were led off tacitly either to the coffee hearth
    or to Abdulla's tent, according to their business. The camels would
    rest there, uneasily switching their tails across the shingle till
    their masters were free and looked to their stabling.

    I had made a comfortable beginning of doctrine, but was left still to
    find an alternative end and means of war. Ours seemed unlike the ritual
    of which Foch was priest; and I recalled him, to see a difference in
    land between HIM and us. In his modern war--absolute war he called
    it--two nations professing incompatible philosophies put them to the test
    of force. Philosophically, it was idiotic, for while opinions were
    arguable, convictons needed shooting to be cured; and the struggle
    could end only when the supporters of the one immaterial principle had
    no more means of resistance against the supporters of the other. It
    sounded like a twentieth-century restatement of the wars of religion,
    whose logical end was utter destruction of one creed, and whose
    protagonists believed that God's judgement would prevail. This might do
    for France and Germany, but would not represent the British attitude.
    Our Army was not intelligently maintaining a philosophic conception in
    Flanders or on the Canal. Efforts to make our men hate the enemy
    usually made them hate the fighting. Indeed Foch had knocked out his
    own argument by saying that such war depended on levy in mass, and was
    impossible with professional armies; while the old army was still the
    British ideal, and its manner the ambition of our ranks and our files.
    To me the Foch war seemed only an exterminative variety, no more
    absolute than another. One could as explicably call it 'murder war'.
    Clausewitz enumerated all sorts of war . . . personal wars, joint-proxy
    duels, for dynastic reasons . . . expulsive wars, in party
    politics . . . commercial wars, for trade objects . . . two wars seemed
    seldom alike. Often the parties did not know their aim, and blundered till
    the march of events took control. Victory in general habit leaned to the
    clear-sighted, though fortune and superior intelligence could make a
    sad muddle of nature's 'inexorable' law.

    I wondered why Feisal wanted to fight the Turks, and why the Arabs
    helped him, and saw that their aim was geographical, to extrude the
    Turk from all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia. Their peace ideal of
    liberty could exercise itself only so. In pursuit of the ideal
    conditions we might kill Turks, because we disliked them very much; but
    the killing was a pure luxury. If they would go quietly the war would
    end. If not, we would urge them, or try to drive them out. In the last
    resort, we should be compelled to the desperate course of blood and the
    maxims of 'murder war', but as cheaply as could be for ourselves, since
    the Arabs fought for freedom, and that was a pleasure to be tasted only
    by a man alive. Posterity was a chilly thing to work for, no matter how
    much a man happened to love his own, or other people's already-produced
    children.

    At this point a slave slapped my tent-door, and asked if the Emir might
    call. So I struggled into more clothes, and crawled over to his great
    tent to sound the depth of motive in him. It was a comfortable place,
    luxuriously shaded and carpeted deep in strident rugs, the aniline-dyed
    spoils of Hussein Mabeirig's house in Rabegh. Abdulla passed most of
    his day in it, laughing with his friends, and playing games with
    Mohammed Hassan, the court jester. I set the ball of conversation
    rolling between him and Shakir and the chance sheikhs, among whom was
    the fire-hearted Ferhan el Aida, the son of Doughty's Motlog; and I was
    rewarded, for Abdulla's words were definite. He contrasted his hearers'
    present independence with their past servitude to Turkey, and roundly
    said that talk of Turkish heresy, or the immoral doctrine of YENI-TURAN,
    or the illegitimate Caliphate was beside the point. It was Arab
    country, and the Turks were in it: that was the one issue. My argument
    preened itself.

    The next day a great complication of boils developed out, to conceal my
    lessened fever, and to chain me down yet longer in impotence upon my
    face in this stinking tent. When it grew too hot for dreamless dozing,
    I picked up my tangle again, and went on ravelling it out, considering
    now the whole house of war in its structural aspect, which was
    strategy, in its arrangements, which were tactics, and in the sentiment
    of its inhabitants, which was psychology; for my personal duty was
    command, and the commander, like the master architect, was responsible
    for all.

    The first confusion was the false antithesis between strategy, the aim
    in war, the synoptic regard seeing each part relative to the whole, and
    tactics, the means towards a strategic end, the particular steps of its
    staircase. They seemed only points of view from which to ponder the
    elements of war, the Algebraical element of things, a Biological
    element of lives, and the Psychological element of ideas.

    The algebraical element looked to me a pure science, subject to
    mathematical law, inhuman. It dealt with known variables, fixed
    conditions, space and time, inorganic things like hills and climates
    and railways, with mankind in type-masses too great for individual
    variety, with all artificial aids and the extensions given our
    faculties by mechanical invention. It was essentially formulable.

    Here was a pompous, professorial beginning. My wits, hostile to the
    abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the
    algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we
    wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles:
    sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand
    square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a
    trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners;
    but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing
    intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a
    gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through
    long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed.
    Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material
    to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It
    seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning
    only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke
    his rifle at.

    Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this
    ground, to save it from our attack-in-depth, sedition putting up her
    head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles. I
    knew the Turkish Army exactly, and even allowing for their recent
    extension of faculty by aeroplanes and guns and armoured trains (which
    made the earth a smaller battlefield) still it seemed they would have
    need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not
    be less than twenty men. If so, they would need six hundred thousand
    men to meet the ill-wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the
    active hostility of a few zealots.

    How many zealots could we have? At present we had nearly fifty
    thousand: sufficient for the day. It seemed the assets in this element
    of war were ours. If we realized our raw materials and were apt with
    them, then climate, railway, desert, and technical weapons could also
    be attached to our interests. The Turks were stupid; the Germans behind
    them dogmatical. They would believe that rebellion was absolute like
    war, and deal with it on the analogy of war. Analogy in human things
    was fudge, anyhow; and war upon rebellion was messy and slow, like
    eating soup with a knife.

    This was enough of the concrete; so I sheered off [GREEK], the
    mathematical element, and plunged into the nature of the biological
    factor in command. Its crisis seemed to be the breaking point, life and
    death, or less finally, wear and tear. The war-philosophers had
    properly made an art of it, and had elevated one item, 'effusion of
    blood', to the height of an essential, which became humanity in battle,
    an act touching every side of our corporal being, and very warm. A line
    of variability, Man, persisted like leaven through its estimates,
    making them irregular. The components were sensitive and illogical, and
    generals guarded themselves by the device of a reserve, the significant
    medium of their art. Goltz had said that if you knew the enemy's
    strength, and he was fully deployed, then you could dispense with a
    reserve: but this was never. The possibility of accident, of some flaw
    in materials was always in the general's mind, and the reserve
    unconsciously held to meet it.

    The 'felt' element in troops, not expressible in figures, had to be
    guessed at by the equivalent of Plato's (greek?), and the greatest
    commander of men was he whose intuitions most nearly happened. Nine-tenths
    of tactics were certain enough to be teachable in schools; but
    the irrational tenth was like the kingfisher flashing across the pool,
    and in it lay the test of generals. It could be ensued only by instinct
    (sharpened by thought practising the stroke) until at the crisis it
    came naturally, a reflex. There had been men whose [GREEK] so nearly
    approached perfection that by its road they reached the certainty of
    [GREEK]. The Greeks might have called such genius for command [GREEK];
    had they bothered to rationalize revolt.

    My mind seesawed back to apply this to ourselves, and at once knew that
    it was not bounded by mankind, that it applied also to materials. In
    Turkey things were scarce and precious, men less esteemed than
    equipment. Our cue was to destroy, not the Turk's army, but his
    minerals. The death of a Turkish bridge or rail, machine or gun or
    charge of high explosive, was more profitable to us than the death of a
    Turk. In the Arab Army at the moment we were chary both of materials
    and of men. Governments saw men only in mass; but our men, being
    irregulars, were not formations, but individuals. An individual death,
    like a pebble dropped in water, might make but a brief hole; yet rings
    of sorrow widened out therefrom. We could not afford casualties.

    Materials were easier to replace. It was our obvious policy to be
    superior in some one tangible branch; gun-cotton or machine-guns or
    whatever could be made decisive. Orthodoxy had laid down the maxim,
    applied to men, of being superior at the critical point and moment of
    attack. We might be superior in equipment in one dominant moment or
    respect; and for both things and men we might give the doctrine a
    twisted negative side, for cheapness' sake, and be weaker than the
    enemy everywhere except in that one point or matter. The decision of
    what was critical would always be ours. Most wars were wars of contact,
    both forces striving into touch to avoid tactical surprise. Ours should
    be a war of detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent
    threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till we
    attacked. The attack might be nominal, directed not against him, but
    against his stuff; so it would not seek either his strength or his
    weakness, but his most accessible material. In railway-cutting it would
    be usually an empty stretch of rail; and the more empty, the greater
    the tactical success. We might turn our average into a rule (not a law,
    since war was antinomian) and develop a habit of never engaging the
    enemy. This would chime with the numerical plea for never affording a
    target. Many Turks on our front had no chance all the war to fire on
    us, and we were never on the defensive except by accident and in error.

    The corollary of such a rule was perfect 'intelligence', so that we
    could plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the general's head;
    and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance.
    Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance. When we knew
    all about the enemy we should be comfortable. We must take more pains
    in the service of news than any regular staff.

    I was getting through my subject. The algebraical factor had been
    translated into terms of Arabia, and fitted like a glove. It promised
    victory. The biological factor had dictated to us a development of the
    tactical line most in accord with the genius of our tribesmen. There
    remained the psychological element to build up into an apt shape. I
    went to Xenophon and stole, to name it, his word DIATHETICS, which had
    been the art of Cyrus before he struck.

    Of this our 'propaganda' was the stained and ignoble offspring. It was
    the pathic, almost the ethical, in war. Some of it concerned the crowd,
    an adjustment of its spirit to the point where it became useful to
    exploit in action, and the pre-direction of this changing spirit to a
    certain end. Some of it concerned the individual, and then it became a
    rare art of human kindness, transcending, by purposed emotion, the
    gradual logical sequence of the mind. It was more subtle than tactics,
    and better worth doing, because it dealt with uncontrollables, with
    subjects incapable of direct command. It considered the capacity for
    mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation
    of whatever in them promised to profit our intention. We had to arrange
    their minds in order of battle just as carefully and as formally as
    other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men's
    minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds
    of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; then those other minds of
    the nation supporting us behind the firing line, since more than half
    the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation
    waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond
    circle.

    There were many humiliating material limits, but no moral
    impossibilities; so that the scope of our diathetical activities was
    unbounded. On it we should mainly depend for the means of victory on
    the Arab front: and the novelty of it was our advantage. The printing
    press, and each newly-discovered method of communication favoured the
    intellectual above the physical, civilization paying the mind always
    from the body's funds. We kindergarten soldiers were beginning our art
    of war in the atmosphere of the twentieth century, receiving our
    weapons without prejudice. To the regular officer, with the tradition
    of forty generations of service behind him, the antique arms were the
    most honoured. As we had seldom to concern ourselves with what our men
    did, but always with what they thought, the diathetic for us would be
    more than half the command. In Europe it was set a little aside, and
    entrusted to men outside the General Staff. In Asia the regular
    elements were so weak that irregulars could not let the metaphysical
    weapon rust unused.

    Battles in Arabia were a mistake, since we profited in them only by the
    ammunition the enemy fired off. Napoleon had said it was rare to find
    generals willing to fight battles; but the curse of this war was that
    so few would do anything else. Saxe had told us that irrational battles
    were the refuges of fools: rather they seemed to me impositions on the
    side which believed itself weaker, hazards made unavoidable either by
    lack of land room or by the need to defend a material property dearer
    than the lives of soldiers. We had nothing material to lose, so our
    best line was to defend nothing and to shoot nothing. Our cards were
    speed and time, not hitting power. The invention of bully beef had
    profited us more than the invention of gunpowder, but gave us
    strategical rather than tactical strength, since in Arabia range was
    more than force, space greater than the power of armies.

    I had now been eight days lying in this remote tent, keeping my ideas
    general, till my brain, sick of unsupported thinking, had to be dragged
    to its work by an effort of will, and went off into a doze whenever
    that effort was relaxed. The fever passed: my dysentery ceased; and
    with restored strength the present again became actual to me. Facts
    concrete and pertinent thrust themselves into my reveries; and my
    inconstant wit bore aside towards all these roads of escape. So I
    hurried into line my shadowy principles, to have them once precise
    before my power to evoke them faded.

    It seemed to me proven that our rebellion had an unassailable base,
    guarded not only from attack, but from the fear of attack. It had a
    sophisticated alien enemy, disposed as an army of occupation in an area
    greater than could be dominated effectively from fortified posts. It
    had a friendly population, of which some two in the hundred were
    active, and the rest quietly sympathetic to the point of not betraying
    the movements of the minority. The active rebels had the virtues of
    secrecy and self-control, and the qualities of speed, endurance and
    independence of arteries of supply. They had technical equipment enough
    to paralyse the enemy's communications. A province would be won when we
    had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom. The
    presence of the enemy was secondary. Final victory seemed certain, if
    the war lasted long enough for us to work it out.

    -t

  24. #21
    Quote Originally Posted by GunnyFreedom View Post
    Sure, but he would get a hit TV show out of it. RIP in the eighth episode will just skyrocket the residuals.
    Just imagine, Dog's crying wife, in weird tailored multicam, weeping openly with a machine gun hanging loose from one arm. Camera zooms close into her face to capture the anguish. That's reality TV gold right there.

  25. #22
    Quote Originally Posted by Carlybee View Post
    How do you destroy ISIS if it's global? And how the hell did no one know ISIS was becoming such a large threat (supposedly) so quickly?
    Ideas can gel a lot more quickly than people can be gathered. Get 1000 people in 100 different flavors, pass on some idea and now they are all one flavor. That's how such a thing goes global that quickly. I am actually focusing most of my posting of late on describing how to appropriately and Constitutionally combat IS as a threat.

  26. #23
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    Quote Originally Posted by GunnyFreedom View Post
    Wrong path. If these guys pose a legitimate threat, bring all your intell assets to bear to identify the threat down to last the individual, and then issue Marque to whomever shall manage to bring those individuals to you. Alive preferably. Done. Constitutionally, and at less than one-tenth of the cost. Dog the Bounty Hunter would probably even make a hit TV show out of it.

    ETA - for the record, I am not a fan of Dog the Bounty Hunter.
    Or, even just allowing the governments in the countries where they are take care of them as well. Instead, like in Syria, we prevented Assad from completely destroying them, and helped them instead. Same in Libya. They turned it to a "humanitarian crisis", and supported them with airstrikes in Libya, and weapons and funding.
    So, I'm not against a letter of marque and reprisal (getting the weapons back, would be nice) being used as it has in the past, but I think also just allowing the governments to take care of them would work, instead of using them to try and take care of certain governments.

    But what we have now, is complete idiocy with funding and arming them, because some wanted regime change in certain countries like Libya and Syria?

    We created the problem. Now we just need to wait on the M.I.C. to give us another multi-trillion dollar solution.

  27. #24
    Quote Originally Posted by jjdoyle View Post
    Or, even just allowing the governments in the countries where they are take care of them as well. Instead, like in Syria, we prevented Assad from completely destroying them, and helped them instead. Same in Libya. They turned it to a "humanitarian crisis", and supported them with airstrikes in Libya, and weapons and funding.
    So, I'm not against a letter of marque and reprisal (getting the weapons back, would be nice) being used as it has in the past, but I think also just allowing the governments to take care of them would work, instead of using them to try and take care of certain governments.
    Well sure. Of course. That horse is kind of already out of the barn door now though.

    But what we have now, is complete idiocy with funding and arming them, because some wanted regime change in certain countries like Libya and Syria?

    We created the problem. Now we just need to wait on the M.I.C. to give us another multi-trillion dollar solution.
    What we have now is a handful of moneymen becoming obscenely rich off of the blood and treasure of the United States.



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  29. #25
    Obama should have been in the Middle East instead of Martha's Vineyard, organizing the regional powers, Iraqi militias, and any other interested parties, developing a coalition to converge on ISIS on all sides. All the U.S. would need to do is bomb supply lines, if that.

  30. #26
    Quote Originally Posted by TaftFan View Post
    Obama should have been in the Middle East instead of Martha's Vineyard, organizing the regional powers, Iraqi militias, and any other interested parties, developing a coalition to converge on ISIS on all sides. All the U.S. would need to do is bomb supply lines, if that.
    Or we could just not intervene in the affairs of other nations.

  31. #27
    Quote Originally Posted by kylejack View Post
    Or we could just not intervene in the affairs of other nations.
    Like it or not, this is our affair.

    ISIS has threatened us, they have killed our citizens, they threaten trade routes, and they are committing genocide. I really don't care if people don't agree with me, I have no problem with annihilating ISIS.

  32. #28
    The whole situation is making me nervous for Rand politically. The propaganda machine is in full gear in conservative media and its going to be really hard to go against the grain. Beheading 2 Americans is hardly a threat to the mainland and is not worth spending a few hundred billion dollars on. Personally I don't care if ISIS takes control of Iraq and Syria. We shouldn't fight for countries that won't put up their own fight
    Hofstadter's Law: It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter's Law. -Douglas Hofstadter

    Life, Liberty, Logic

  33. #29
    Quote Originally Posted by TaftFan View Post
    Like it or not, this is our affair.
    That is for congress to decide.

    Airstrikes? Pfft. 6 Months of carpet bombing followed by half a million troops on the ground. No rules of engagement. Millions of civilians dead.

    That is how you prosecute war, you don't dick around. You kill all the opposition, you kill anyone standing next to the opposition.

    Then you avoid war for as long as you are able.

    The problem with these countries is that there is nothing left to blow up. The local population needs to pick a side rather than waiting for the US to come save em.

    Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran could take down ISIS in their sleep if the international community would let them.
    Last edited by idiom; 09-02-2014 at 07:41 PM.
    In New Zealand:
    The Coastguard is a Charity
    Air Traffic Control is a private company run on user fees
    The DMV is a private non-profit
    Rescue helicopters and ambulances are operated by charities and are plastered with corporate logos
    The agriculture industry has zero subsidies
    5% of the national vote, gets you 5 seats in Parliament
    A tax return has 4 fields
    Business licenses aren't even a thing nor are capital gains taxes
    Constitutional right to refuse any type of medical care

  34. #30
    Quote Originally Posted by mac_hine View Post
    Do you even read any of the responses members write to you? There's no way in hell air strikes will succeed in "destroying ISIS militarily.” Ground forces will be needed, and we will be dragged into another no win quagmire.
    We can still destroy the weapons and artillery we left behind via airstikes. This weaponry should have never been there and should have never been left. The lobby enjoyed this leaving behind of equipment.
    "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it."
    James Madison

    "It does not take a majority to prevail ... but rather an irate, tireless minority, keen on setting brushfires of freedom in the minds of men." - Samuel Adams



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