1990 - The Sellout of Afghanistan and the Mujahideen (Pre- Al-Qaeda)

[FrankRep]

The Sellout of Afghanistan


The New American
June 18, 1990


Will there ever be an end to United States betrayal of anti-communist freedom fighters around the world? Apparently not until the very last one has been thrown to the Russian bear. Just as it appeared that the nadir had been reached with China, Angola, and Namibia, Secretary of State James Baker moved to put in place the final sell-out of Afghanistan. In a surprise reversal of U.S. policy, Baker dropped the U.S. demand for the ouster of the sadistic Soviet puppet President Najibullah before negotiations for a transitional government can begin. Dismayed members of the Senate moved quickly in an attempt to forestall Baker's proposal. A letter drafted by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) and signed by seven other Senators, including minority leader Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), excoriated the disastrous policy shift:

The endorsement of any so-called transitional government which includes Najibullah and/or his close associates would put the United States into the unconscionable position of legitimizing a regime which presided over the brutalization of the Afghan people and the destruction of the very fabric of their society over a decade of killing and armed occupation.

The new government now being set up under United Nations auspices is being formulated by the communist Kabul regime headed by Najibullah and neighboring Pakistan. The six major mujahideen parties, the people of Afghanistan, and the government-in-exile in Peshawar are not represented, nor have they ever participated in any of the talks deciding their fate during the past eight years. As Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), long the Senate's leading advocate of mujahideen victory, put it:

The State Department's proposal is a serious mistake, a tragic mistake, and undercuts a decade of bipartisan policy. It places Najibullah and his communist cronies in a commanding position to influence the form of any government that emerges.

History of Treachery

This kind of treachery in regard to Afghanistan is hardly new. Dating back to the Carter Administration before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and continuing through the Reagan and Bush years, U.S. policy has followed the familiar pattern of supporting the freedom fighters rhetorically while undercutting their interests in favor of the Soviets. More than fifty percent of the Afghan population of 15 million has been killed or dispersed, or has died from disease or famine. Two to three million have died horribly in Soviet and Afghan communist carpet bombings, artillery bombardments, and massacres. Five to six million are refugees living in camps in Pakistan and Iran. Two million or more have been driven from their homes and are living as homeless "internal refugees." Over 50,000 have been forcibly shipped to the Soviet Union for communist training; of these, more than half were kidnapped children between the ages of four and eight. The whole socio-economic-cultural roots of the country have been ripped out.

Situated on the southern border of the Soviet Union, with the Arabian Sea nation of Pakistan on the east and the Persian Gulf nation of Iran on the west, Afghanistan has been coveted for centuries, first by the Czars and then by the Soviets, as a necessary step toward access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Afghanistan under its Islamic rulers has carried on a half-accommodating, half-fearful relationship with its powerful northern neighbor for many years. Underlying their more recent policy was the fateful delusion that they could use Soviet economic and military aid to enhance their own power, outwit the communists, and then discard them. During the 1950s and 1960s, agreements were signed that opened the door to Soviet economic penetration, then domination.

Millions flowed into Kabul for the construction of airports, river ports, bridges, dams, factories, hydroelectric stations, and -- with the help of financing from the United States -- major highways linking the Soviet Union with Afghanistan's cities. Each agreement tied Afghanistan closer and closer to the Soviet Union. Each required thousands of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan to instruct, advise, manage, and construct. Thousands of Afghans went to the Soviet Union for technical training and "cultural exchange." By 1970 Afghanistan had become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union -- one hundred percent for armaments, ninety percent for petroleum, and fifty percent for all international trade.

"Genuine Nonalignment"

During this period, "discussion" groups for Afghanistan's educated elite -- civil servants, army officers, professors and students -- were openly conducted by two Afghan KGB agents, Noor Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, who later organized the communist Afghan People's Democratic Party and, not surprisingly, became the first two communist rulers of Afghanistan, both by force of arms.

The most decisive Kabul/Soviet agreement was that which provided for the equipping of Afghanistan's military with Soviet weapons and material and the training of Afghan officers in the Soviet Union. The indoctrination of the Afghan armed forces in Marxism-Leninism inevitably followed and made possible the Afghan communist coup of 1978, when Taraki killed Prince Daoud and seized the government.

The Carter Administration described the savage Taraki regime as "more nationalistic than communist"; the New York Times reported that President Carter was "rightly unruffled." The Washington Post declared that Taraki was an "agrarian reformer formidably opposed to Soviet intervention," with "genuine nonalignment as his aim."

When the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was murdered in February 1979, Jimmy Carter (CFR) refused to halt U.S. aid to the communist government and allowed Taraki to prohibit an investigation. The following month, the people of Herat, the third largest city in the country, rebelled against the communist government and killed forty Soviet officials. The first of thousands of subsequent Soviet air strikes was launched from the Soviet Union at this time; over 20,000 innocent men, women, and children were wiped out. In April, the people of the village of Kerala rose up against the communists; Afghan soldiers, acting under Soviet command, massacred the entire male population in the first of many such mass murders of the war. In August, Afghan army troops at a fortress in Kabul mutinied and were smashed by Soviet helicopters and tanks. But Jimmy Carter remained "unruffled."

Soviet Invasion

In September, rival communist leader Hafizullah Amin, whom Taraki had tried to kill, staged a coup and killed Taraki instead. But Amin's rule was brief. He was an educated man who had received a master's degree from Teachers College at Columbia University in New York, where he had become an ardent communist. Although equally as brutal as any other communist, he let it be known that he planned to rule a communist Afghanistan independently. Signs of an invasion promptly began to appear. Soviet troops were sent to critical communication links. Reservists were called to active duty. Two battalions of Soviet armor and artillery were airlifted to Kabul's air base, built with U.S. dollars. Thirty thousand troops were massed on the border. Still Carter did nothing.

On December 24, 1979, the airborne invasion began with large transports arriving every few minutes. Amin was killed by a specially trained KGB force; Babrak Karmal was installed in his place. Immediately afterward, the Soviet motorized divisions crossed the border and headed for the cities. They came in trucks manufactured at the Kama River truck plant, which was financed by the U.S. Export Import Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank. They drove on roads built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Token Disapproval

And from that day to this the U.S. government has continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Kabul Soviet puppet regime, giving it space on Embassy Row in Washington while both Ronald Reagan and George Bush have refused to recognize the mujahideen government-in-exile. The U.S. has done nothing to oust this illegitimate, terrorist regime from the United Nations; nor has it done anything to secure observer status -- which even the PLO enjoys -- for the mujahideen. Until recently, the Kabul regime enjoyed Most Favored Nation trade status, while U.S. goods including aircraft components, chemical products, and engine parts have been allowed to reach Kabul. As a token show of disapproval of the invasion, Carter cut off shipments of wheat to the Soviets in 1980, but Reagan soon restored them in ever larger amounts at ever lower prices, subsidized by the U.S. taxpayer.

As part of the important business of conditioning the public, Secretary of State George Shultz (CFR) backed up the Soviet propaganda claim that its troops had been "invited" into Afghanistan. In 1986, after six years of despicable slaughter, Shultz declared that "we recognize that Afghanistan is in the Soviet sphere of influence" and that "the Soviet Union has a right to a non-hostile Afghanistan on its southern border." "Any negotiated settlement," Shultz said, "must take into consideration Soviet sensitivities." Truly effective aid such as food and medicine and anti-aircraft weapons to protect against helicopter gunships and MIGs, would "jeopardize U.N. negotiations."

When Reagan took office in 1981, Carter's passive acceptance of the Soviet conquest had already given the Soviets a year in which to gain control of Afghanistan's cities. Reagan gave them another year. It was not until 1982 that Reagan made his first move; he put the CIA in charge of a covert operation of military assistance. Then he handed the implementation over to third-level bureaucrats. Alexander Haig (CFR), Secretary of State, also bowed out by ruling that most aspects were "operational" and therefore could be handled only by the CIA in the field.

Or so the story went when it surfaced two years and 325 million tax dollars later that the CIA had been delivering inferior, unworkable foreign weapons to the desperate mujahideen. Those who had been mystified as to why this nation felt obliged to provide help secretly -- as though the U.S., rather than the Soviets, had reason to be ashamed -- began to see the light. CIA operatives had gone into China and Poland with cash and bought copies of Soviet SAM-7s that couldn't be traced to the U.S. The only problem was that they had a 100 percent malfunction rate, a fact which had already been discovered in Angola. "We'd give them to these guys (mujahideen)," said one U.S. official, "and they'd go out and get killed."

Meanwhile, the mujahideen and the villagers were completely at the mercy of Soviet air power; HIND helicopter "flying tanks" were raining down death and destruction, destroying whole villages -- all the inhabitants, animals, crops, every living thing -- in a matter of minutes. The heavy machine guns that were the mujahideen's only functioning weapons had failed to down a single helicopter in four years time.

"Covert" Support

When this perfidy surfaced in Congress in 1985 -- largely through the efforts of Senator Humphrey -- and the CIA was questioned about its role, the agency said it had kept the aid "covert" for fear of "provoking the Soviets" and "low in volume" because "long supply trains to the mujahideen might actually hamper their fighting ability." It also came to light that the resistance had attempted to buy weapons directly from an American manufacturer, but, due to a mysterious set of State Department regulations, the sale of American firearms to the anticommunist Afghans was prohibited. George Shultz. explained that allowing a private U.S. company to make such a sale would change State's policy from "covert" into an overt posture of support; and what would the Soviets think?

The exposure of this betrayal resulted in enormous pressure being put on Reagan by certain members of Congress to provide what obviously was the crucial weapon, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Stingers are light-weight, shoulder-fired, state-of-the-art, heat-seeking missiles, with sensors that lock on to the target. The State Department, the CIA, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many members of Congress all opposed the provision of Stingers. "They could be intercepted," they said, "and used by terrorists against civilian aircraft." They conveniently overlooked the fact that this type of missile is a basic weapon for Soviet guerrillas worldwide.

"Diversion" of Aid

It was not until March 1986 that the decision was finally made to send a limited number of Stingers. The Wall Street Journal headlined the story: Reagan Ready To Risk Ties With Soviets. Aid was increased to $600 million per year (the cost per Stinger being $75,000), a drop in the bucket compared to the several billions per year being spent by the "bankrupt" Soviet Union, now headed by Gorbachev. By the fall of 1986 a few Stingers actually began showing up in mujahideen camps; although their shipment has been halted several times by the State Department, they have helped slow down, but not stop, the holocaust.

From the beginning, the Reagan Administration decided that all aid must be channeled exclusively through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), trained and controlled by the CIA. It was claimed that -- since Afghanistan's other neighbors are the Soviet Union, Iran, and China -- Pakistan offered the only possible conduit. Strangely overlooked were the hundreds of our C-130s, C-141s and C-5s, all with air-drop capability specifically designed for exactly this kind of task. When an airlift was finally mentioned, it was dismissed as being "too provocative." So it was that a year later, July 13, 1987, the Wall Street Journal ran a small paragraph reading:

Pakistan has diverted for its own use millions of dollars of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles intended for U.S. backed Afghan rebels, intelligence sources said. Last year, only one third of the 600 Stingers the U.S. shipped through Pakistan arrived in Afghanistan.

Although some observers estimated that the true amount siphoned off was closer to ninety percent, and although Pakistan is the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, Ronald Reagan made no move of any kind.

Hekmatyar and Hezb-i-Islam

Diversion, a polite word for theft, has been only part of the problem with Pakistan. The other part has historical roots. Although there are ten ethnic groups in Afghanistan, by far the largest (eight million) is the Pushtuns, who spill over into Pakistan. In 1893, when the British drew the border of Afghanistan, Pushtun territory was split; some lies in what is now Pakistan. Ever since the split, there has existed an irridentist movement, among communists and non-communists alike, for a Pushtunistan that would incorporate Pakistani territory into the new nation. In the 1970s, playing upon that divisiveness for their own ends, communists in Kabul befriended Pushtun separatists; President Zia of Pakistan responded by supporting anti-Pushtunistan insurgents against the Kabul government. By 1979, when the Soviet invasion took place, a resistance network was already in place, headed by Zia's favorite, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now commander of the Hezb-i-Islam resistance party.

Hekmatyar, reportedly a member of the Afghan communist party before turning to radical Islamic politics, is an anti-Western fundamentalist cut from the same extremist cloth as the Ayatollah Khomeini, whom he supported. His goal is a centrally controlled Islamic theocracy with authority centered in himself. Although he has long been known to have killed more mujahideen than the Soviets, he gets the lion's share of U.S. aid, 25-30 percent, with the rest divided among the six other major resistance parties. According to Sibgatullah Mojadidi, president of the government-in-exile, American aid has helped Hekmatyar kill hundreds of innocent people in Peshawar alone, with the knowledge of police but protected by the Pakistani government.

One of his most brutal crimes took place in July 1989 when six senior commanders and 28 key officers of the rival Massoud resistance group were ambushed, tortured, and assassinated in a grotesque massacre. Some had their eyes gouged out before being shot. This act, too gross for the administration to gloss over, reportedly "sparked a high level controversy in Washington" and "posed a profound dilemma for policymakers." What to do? Cut off all aid to the freedom fighters? "They are losing credibility," one top official said. "This could severely damage U.S. support."

An enraged Representative Bill McCollum (R-FL), member of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, was one who knew what to do. He fired off a blistering letter to James Baker demanding to know who in the U.S. government had made the decision to support Hekmatyar; what controls Washington has over the delivery of supplies; what the relationship is between Washington and ISI; and on what basis supplies are sent to the different groups. This letter is particularly interesting in revealing how much has been kept hidden even from Congressmen, whose job it is to know this subject.

The ISI and the CIA moved quickly to defuse the situation by assuring Congress that U.S. aid to Hekmatyar had been cut off; what they failed to add was that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had made a deal for the Saudis to supply Hekmatyar with $435 million in arms.

Lately Hekmatyar has been conspiring with dissident communists in Kabul and the ISI. Evidently seeing it as the only way that he, rather than any of the other commanders, would gain power in the (unlikely) event of the demise of the communist regime, Hekmatyar supported Defense Minister General Shahnawaz Tanai in an attempted coup on March 16th. Although a few dissident pilots bombed Kabul, the Soviet puppet President Najibullah escaped injury, the coup failed, and Tanai fled to the security of Hekmatyar's base. It is reported that ISI offered $15,000 apiece to commanders to join Hekmatyar, for a total of roughly $100,000 -- in all probability American tax dollars,

Lion of Panjshir

If there were any sincerity in the U.S. position, George Bush would be strongly supporting the Jamiat-e-Islami party headed by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir, whose men control virtually all of northeastern Afghanistan. Known as the best organized and most successful of the commanders, Massoud is also the most moderate and pro-Western. He and his men govern Takliar province in the old, decentralized way, through traditional council meetings in which the people have a voice. Central power has always been resisted in this land of fiercely independent clans, isolated even from each other by the forbidding territory of majestic mountains and precipitous valleys. Massoud has built up strong grass-roots support by establishing law and order through a civil administration that is in the hands of locals. He has also developed a mechanized army that is the best in the field.

But Massoud is strongly anti-communist and a Pushtun. Refusing to take orders from ISI, he has not received even a single AK-47 bullet within the past year. Late in 1989, desperate for ammunition, he bought five truckloads with his own money. When they were delivered to his depot in northern Pakistan, a mysterious explosion occurred, destroying all the ammunition and killing 40 of his men. The U.S. responded by "putting pressure" on the ISI, and more than 50 truckloads of ammunition were "earmarked" for Massoud. They never arrived; Washington pleaded helplessness.

The interests of Pakistan and Washington transparently converge: One desires a strong Islamic, anti-Pushtun leader in Kabul; the other wants to keep the mujahideen divided and prevent the emergence of a popular anti-communist leader who would pose a real challenge to Gorbachev's puppet in Kabul.

When Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq was blown up in his plane along with American Ambassador Arnold Raphel in August 1988, the Reagan Administration was quick to show its power. The State Department clamped a lid on the investigation, refusing to provide experts and warning Pakistani authorities against speaking out.

"Peace Process"

Genuinely helpless in the midst of all this violence and intrigue is the Afghan Interim Government, the government-in-exile of the mujahideen headquartered in Peshawar. Without recognition, it has no stature or authority. When its leaders met with Reagan and urgently requested recognition, the President, in a display of breathtaking hypocrisy, argued that this was "not appropriate" because it would "make it look as though the Interim Government were a U.S. creation." He also brushed aside their request for a voice in the "peace process," continued to back Pakistan and the Kabul regime as the only participants, and made no move to oust Kabul as a recipient of World Bank and IMF funds.

When the Geneva Peace Accord was finally signed in April 1988, the 50,000 mujahideen, who had had nothing to say about it, greeted it with scorn. According to S.J. Masty, a Peshawar editor, "The talks between Pakistan and Kabul were meaningless. The Soviets didn't need an agreement to leave ... having accomplished their objective, they were ready to leave anyhow." The CIA, however, celebrated with a victory party in Washington. "This was one of the most successful operations in our history," said CIA head William Webster (CFR), in what must be the most remarkably true double entendre ever uttered.

Although the Soviet pullout has been described as a tactical defeat leaving no alternative but withdrawal, the truth, of course, is quite the opposite. The Soviets left only because they had secured a permanent, reliable satellite loyal to Moscow, fulfilling their lasting interest. "U.N. negotiated peace," in fact, has come to be a euphemism for establishing communism. For his pusillanimous part in fastening totalitarianism upon the Afghan people by "guaranteeing" the Accord, Ronald Reagan was enabled to leave office with a foreign policy "victory" greater than Grenada, while the warmonger Gorbachev gained enhanced standing as a "peacemaker."

Propaganda War

Only there is no victory and there is no peace. Dozens of transport planes arrive in Kabul daily with stepped-up aid to the tune of $300,000 per month. Although the Soviets claim to have withdrawn all "uniformed" troops, no one knows how many there were; estimates vary from 115,000 to 175,000. No one knows how many Central Asians are wearing Afghan uniforms. About $3 billion worth of armaments are in place in the cities, which the communists still control. Although the mujahideen control the devastated countryside, the refugees can't return home because of over 30 million mines and booby-trapped toys.

The Soviets have the maps of the mines, but James Baker has been "unable to obtain them." Neither does he send mine-clearing devices, because of "bureaucratic resistance." Mammoth Scud missiles, capable of reaching Pakistan and destroying an entire city, are still in place. MIGs from Soviet bases reach their targets in Afghanistan in eight to ten minutes. Right now constant raids are taking place, especially in the Herat area, creating a flood of new refugees.

Nevertheless, the U.S., which cut off almost all aid to the mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal, is lending credence to the present propaganda twist that, since "peace" has been "restored," what is going on now must be a "civil war." Therefore, the mujahideen must be the problem -- rather than those who have exterminated half of the population. Najibullah, thought to be responsible for 35,000 "disappeareds" while head of the Afghan secret police, is being given a new public persona; the media are recasting him as a "nationalist" and devout Muslim, while the mujahideen are being transformed into murderous fanatics and "agents of foreign powers," no less!

Afghanistan Betrayed

"Overlooked" by the media is the Soviet rape of the land in Afghanistan; egress to the Persian Gulf has not been the only objective. Rich in natural gas, copper, uranium, gems, and minerals, Afghanistan has been ruthlessly exploited without compensation. Ninety-five percent of natural gas production is piped directly into the Soviet Union, while highly valued lapis lazuli and emeralds are sold for high prices on the international market. Thus Afghanistan has been forced to pay for its own conquest.

With the final pieces being put in place by the Bush/Baker Insider team, the Afghanistan story of genocide and scorched earth is coming to a close. Stripped of ammunition and isolated, the mujahideen, except for Hekmatyar, are nearly helpless. The "transitional government" being set up by Najibullah and Pakistan will only increase Kabul's control. The U.S. role in all this has been one of unmitigated betrayal. While mouthing support for the freedom fighters, the Insiders have undercut them at every turn in order to bring another nation under totalitarian control in preparation for world merger with themselves at the top.

[FrankRep]

Selling Out Anti-Communist Afghans


The New American
August 15, 1988


The campaign to convince the world that there is a "new Soviet Union" led by "the different Gorbachev" continues. If you express doubt that any real changes have taken place, be prepared to be offered as evidence the Soviet plans announced in April to pull their troops out of Afghanistan.

Incredibly Vicious War

The Soviets invaded neighboring Afghanistan in December 1979 to support a puppet government they had installed only months before. In the incredibly vicious war they have waged against a civilian population of 15 million, over one million Afghans have been killed, four million have fled to other countries (mostly to Pakistan), and millions more have been made homeless. The Soviets have forcibly relocated a sizable portion of the population, dropped booby-trapped toys to maim and kill youngsters, and shipped at least 10,000 children to the USSR for indoctrination.

The USSR's rape of its neighbor has not been without cost to itself, however. Moscow admits that 13,000 of its troops have been killed and 35,000 more wounded. Reports of serious morale problems and near mutiny among its forces persist. And the expense of the operation has added a huge burden to an already staggering economy.

To say that the Soviet Union would like to end its military involvement is to state the obvious. But to expect the Kremlin to admit defeat, or even to relax its grip on yet another nation, is extremely naïve. What has to be done, from Moscow's point of view, is to get the Afghans to quit.

The Geneva Agreements

The April agreements, signed in Geneva, have the potential to solve all of Moscow's problems in a most favorable way. They are remarkably pro-Soviet. Close examination shows that only agents of the Soviet-backed Afghan regime and the government of President Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan formally agreed to the accords. Our Secretary of State Shultz and Moscow's Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed only as "guarantors." One immediate result is legitimacy for the Afghan puppet regime.

But the major feature of the accords restricts Pakistan from accepting and distributing supplies for the Afghan resistance (the Mujahideen) based within its territory. The USSR's Shevardnadze hailed the agreement because it requires Pakistan to dismantle Mujahideen bases and training camps. Even the New York Times pointed out that requirements for Soviet withdrawal are "vague," as are limits on Soviet aid to the Kabul regime.

Translated, all this amounts to pulling the rug out from under the anti-Communist Afghan forces, providing an excuse for the United States to back away from its pledge to aid them, and supplying Moscow with both a strategic and propaganda victory. Afghan resistance leader Gulbaddin Hekmatyar now accuses the United States of conspiring with the Soviet Union against his forces and his nation. Who can blame him?

Armand Hammer's Role

On June 4th, the New York Times published lifelong Soviet apologist Armand Hammer's breast-beating revelations about his role in arranging the sellout. He bragged about 14 months of effort that included a trip to Kabul, six visits to Pakistan, numerous meetings with Soviet officials in Moscow, and conferences with President Reagan and top aides.

The crux of the Hammer effort was his securement of Pakistan President Zia's "desperately needed reassurance that Pakistan and the millions of Afghan refugees in that country would not be abandoned by the United States." Once Zia's arm was sufficiently twisted, he agreed to sign the pact. But even Hammer admitted that "the killing continues," though he exulted in helping to arrange this latest betrayal. Chalk up another victory for world tyranny, courtesy of Armand Hammer and other pro-Communists, many of whom claim to speak for America.

[FrankRep]

Whose Side Are We On?


The New American
May 23, 1988


On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, Switzerland, representatives of the Soviet-installed Afghan regime and the government of Pakistan signed the UN-sponsored Accords on Afghanistan. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union as "guarantors" of the agreements. Despite the major media's hype concerning the proposed withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the Accords failed to specify the number and origin of the "foreign troops" to be withdrawn, and Moscow signed only the "Declaration of International Guarantees" that preceded the withdrawal agreement. Technically then, it is left up to broad interpretation how many troops will leave and the degree to which the Soviets are bound to this agreement. Point 5 of the second Bilateral Agreement, between the Afghan regime and Pakistan, states, "there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above [May 15, 1988]. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months."

Western media have highlighted the Accords' positive points, such as the promised withdrawal of troops and return of refugees. Taken as a whole, however, the Accords severely restrict Afghanistan's neighboring state of Pakistan, which has until now provided a haven for the flood of refugees fleeing Soviet brutality. They also give the impression that Pakistan is the principle aggressor in the troubled region.

In the Bilateral Agreements, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to "noninterference and nonintervention" in each other's affairs, including a prohibition on "harboring in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming political, ethnic or any other groups ... and the transportation of arms, ammunition, and equipment by such individuals and groups." This clear reference to the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistan compels Islamabad to cut off all assistance to the Afghans short of expelling them from its territory. It also forbids the acceptance of U.S. aid for the Mujahideen, who rely on the Pakistani conduit for all assistance. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze hailed the agreement as a victory for Moscow, explaining that its terms oblige Pakistan to dismantle Mujahideen bases and training camps on its territory within 30 days.

The Geneva Accords will have four major effects:

(1) To prevent Pakistan from accepting supplies for the Mujahideen from any other country;
(2) To cut off outside aid to the Mujahideen;
(3) To provide the Kabul regime with international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; and
(4) To endorse Moscow's claim that Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to protect Kabul's Communist revolution from "external enemies."

The New York Times reported on April 16, 1988: "The Soviet agreement to withdrawal is so vague that experts on the war do not agree on what will happen to the Kabul regime and its army .... The Geneva accords do not clearly state what limits will be put on Soviet aid to the Government in Kabul. Soviet tactical and logistical aircraft flying from airfields in the Soviet Union may be able to continue to support the Government forces, and those forces may even be supported by [10,000] Soviet advisors and technical personnel." Moscow will also rely on the approximately 160,000 troops of the Afghan Army, most of whom have been forcibly conscripted, and an unconfirmed number of border guards whose ranks undoubtedly include KGB agents.

The Mujahideen claim that the United States has stopped supplying Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in anticipation of a troop withdrawal. Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi, leader of the Harekat Islamic party, said during an interview on April 14, 1988 that the Mujahideen had not been receiving the shoulder-launch missiles for the past four to five months. "We are extremely worried," said Mohammedi, "We don't trust the Russians. They are deceitful and sly." Secretary of State Shultz suggested in January 1988 that aid to the Mujahideen would stop long before the final withdrawal of Soviet troops: "As withdrawal proceeds ... you don't have the need for that continued support and it would cease."

In February 1988, leaders of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, commonly known as the Afghan Alliance refused to meet with Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost (CFR), after learning that a slow-down in arms shipments would precede a Soviet pullout. "That is a shameful answer you gave us," Younis Khalis told Armacost in response to the U.S. refusal to grant the Mujahideen formal political recognition, thus denying them a part in the Geneva negotiations.

Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) argues that the agreement is "fundamentally flawed" because it fails to acknowledge even the existence of the Mujahideen. By signing the Accords, the Reagan Administration put the U.S. seal of approval on the Najibullah regime in Kabul and absolved the Soviets of blame for the nine years of genocide they have waged on the Afghan people. The document omitted mention of the 1.24 million Afghan civilians killed, the six million left homeless and the 10,000 Afghan children abducted to the Soviet Union for indoctrination. Abdul Satar of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry said that the UN-sponsored agreement could not promote peace in Afghanistan because political power remains in the hands of a government rejected by most of the Afghan people. The "moral issue" in the negotiations, he pointed out, is not necessarily an end to the war but "who is the legitimate government of Afghanistan."

The Afghan Alliance's formula for an interim government to replace the Kabul regime has been systematically ignored by all the governments involved in the negotiations. The Alliance's formula outlines the structure for a transitional government in Afghanistan, calling for a Shoora-i-Ali (Grand Council), which would be the supreme body of state, controlled by the seven-party Alliance. Pakistan's strong support for the interim government weakened in mid-March 1988, after Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo's meeting with Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost. Fourteen Islamic governments -- including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, and Sudan -- had already extended diplomatic recognition.

Neutralizing Undesirable Elements

A UPI article, dated March 21, 1988, announced: "U.S. and Soviet officials, seeking an orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan are sharing information on the radical Islamic rebels seen as a threat to agreement, administration officials say." The article explained: "A CIA source, speaking about the rebels, confirmed a shift in the U.S. position and said officials 'want to see some [mujahid] groups fed to other groups' -- intelligence terminology for neutralizing undesirable elements."

Administration officials claim that "the war in Afghanistan has produced at least two factions of guerrilla leaders ... whose clash of ideologies and ambitions is hampering negotiations for a Soviet troop withdrawal and eventual peace." The same officials, however, have consistently denied the Mujahideen a role in the Geneva negotiations. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, current leader of the IUAM, acknowledged that there have been clashes, but denied that his party had ever been attacked by any other. "There is no internal fighting on the level of the [seven Mujahideen] parties. If there is an odd case, it is on the individual level."

The Mujahideen vehemently demanded that Pakistan not sign the agreement. Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq concurred with the demand that the Mujahideen be included in the Accords. This "major obstacle" to the signing of the Accords was resolved in mid-March when Pakistan, at the urging of the Reagan Administration, abandoned its insistence that a transitional government be established in Kabul.

In 1985, three State Department officials -- Robert Peck, Arnold Raphel, and Charles Dubar -- sent a secret letter to the UN mediator Diego Cordovez. The letter outlined a plan to accommodate a Soviet withdrawal while allowing Moscow to continue its arms shipments to the puppet regime in Kabul. "Foreign interference," the letter assured, would step -- meaning that the United States would suspend its trickle of support to the Mujahideen. This scheme was known as the Day One Deal: Soviet aid to the Communist regime would continue uninterrupted, while U.S. support of the Mujahideen would stop on Day One of a year-long Soviet withdrawal.

Under the present Geneva Accords, the Reagan Administration and the Soviet Union have verbally agreed to suspend all arms deliveries to Afghanistan on the first day of a Soviet withdrawal. Nevertheless, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated in March 1988 that Moscow would "rule out" any cut-off of aid to the Kabul regime, claiming that "the Soviet Union has its obligations to the Afghan government ... based on the status of a treaty, a treaty signed by the Soviet government and the Afghan government. Those are legitimate supplies and we are not going to review that treaty. We have had this type of relationship -- such agreements -- with Afghanistan since 1921."

After returning from a three-day visit to Pakistan in April 1988, Senator Humphrey called on President Reagan to reject the Accords. Humphrey warned that the terms of the Accords were unacceptable to the Afghan Resistance because they would keep the United States from living up to its obligations to support the Mujahideen. "If the Accord was signed in its present form," Humphrey lamented, "Pakistan would be violating the treaty if it allowed the U.S. to continue supplying weapons to the guerrillas across its territory as it is doing now." Humphrey termed the Accords a "slow-motion sell out" and said that he "found it hard to stomach the contradiction between Reagan's words and what the United States appears actually committed to do."

In an interview in the New York Times on March 18, 1988, Afghan Resistance leader Gulbaddin Hekmatyar of Hezb-i-Islami (Party of God) accused the United States of conspiring with the Soviet Union against Afghanistan. "[T]here are people in America who are against our jihad (holy war)," claims Hekmatyar; "they are in the government, in the parties, in the public." Hekmatyar, head of one of the strongest and most effective Mujahid groups of the seven aligned parties, was an engineering student at Kabul University before the invasion of Soviet troops. He is accused of being a radical Islamic fundamentalist determined to lead an Islamic revolution similar to the one under Khomeini in Iran. But such a revolution in Afghanistan, which follows the more moderate Sunni sect of Islam, is highly unlikely.

Former New York Times editor A.M. Rosenthal warns that the Kremlin has shown no signs that it intends to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. According to Rosenthal, Gorbachev has a "plan to salvage political power from its military defeat in Afghanistan." The agreement signed in Geneva is designed to keep the Soviet Union in power as long as possible in Afghanistan, and to stop American aid as soon as possible, so that Moscow can deal the final blow to the Mujahideen without any interference from the United States. Not only has Moscow insisted that it will continue its arms shipments to the Kabul regime; it has also annexed two Afghan provinces in the northern part of the country, perhaps to use as a base from which to continue its bid for control over the country.

Afghan News, an Afghan Resistance newspaper published by Jami'at Islami, reported: "A news black-out will follow a Geneva agreement between Pakistan and the puppet regime .... The only news reaching the world will be propaganda presented by the Soviets .... A Geneva accord will not bring peace to the country but the immediate effect would be to deprive the Afghans of the possibility of telling the truth to the rest of the world. Who will inform the world about massacres, the use of forbidden weapons, torture in prison, participation of Soviet combat troops against the strongholds of the Resistance, Sovietization measures, famine, epidemics and the thousand other things?"

[FrankRep]

Again and Again, May God Forgive Us


The New American
February 15, 1988


On December 15, 1987, the Mujahideen captured 500 DRA (Afghan Communist) loyalists in a victorious operation against a Soviet-controlled garrison in Baghlan province -- the fifth Communist-controlled garrison to be toppled by the Mujahideen forces in the nine months since their receipt of U.S. Stinger missiles. On October 29, 1987 the Afghan Mujahideen had succeeded in a major operation against Soviet and DRA forces. The capture of the Keran garrison and elimination of the Communist presence in the Munjan valley of the northern province of Badakhshan was an important achievement for the freedom fighters in 1987. The fighting lasted only an hour and forty minutes and ended in the capture of 566 DRA loyalists, important documents revealing informers, and a large amount of armaments and supplies. Located on a strategic supply route for the Mujahideen, the Keran garrison was a stronghold for DRA forces since it was captured by Communists in 1981.

In June 1987, the Mujahideen carried out "Operation Avalanche" which resulted in 800 Soviet casualties. In the surprise attack directed by Commander Rahim Wardak, the Mujahideen fired bazookas at garrisons along the strategic road linking Kabul with Jalalabad, causing the soldiers to take cover inside the fortresses. Incendiary devices were then fired into the garrisons forcing the soldiers out and into rebel fire. During the operation, 133 convoy vehicles were trapped on the same road and fired upon with armor-piercing missiles, while Stingers were used against Soviet aircraft that responded to the attack.

These successful operations exemplify the improved coordination of the freedom fighters in attacks against the Soviets. A year ago the Mujahideen were prevented from travelling on much of the land during daylight hours because of the Soviet's domination of the skies. But the delivery of the U.S. Stinger missiles in April 1987 has helped the freedom fighters gain valuable ground from the Red Army. In 1978, when resistance to Communist forces in Afghanistan began, the Mujahideen possessed little more than Molotov cocktails and pre-WWI Lee Enfield rifles, but today they are inflicting heavy damage on sophisticated Soviet weaponry. The dominant problem the Mujahideen have faced is lack of defense from Soviet air attack. With the receipt of anti-aircraft Stingers, however, they are challenging Soviet occupation with an average of 1.2 downed Soviet aircraft per day. A victorious free Afghanistan could have a tremendous effect on anti-Communist resistance movements world-wide. A successful Afghan resistance could start the dominos falling in the opposite direction.

Moreover, despite Afghan Communist leader Najibullah's latest propaganda campaign of national reconciliation and cease fire, the Afghans have won a number of political victories on their own, the latest being the defection of Najib's younger brother, Sidiqullah, to the forces of rebel Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. Massoud, Commander of the Mujahideen forces in the Panjshir valley, has been a bulwark against Soviet aggression in that region for the past nine years. The defection of Sidiqullah is a source of personal embarrassment for Najib, who has desperately sought to legitimize his regime by claiming that his government is thoroughly Islamic, even though he was known for his criticism of religion during his early days at Kabul University. Since that time, Najib has added to his name the ullah that means "of God." The defection of his own brother can only harm his campaign.

There were also unconfirmed reports that the brother of Noor Mohammed Taraki, the first Communist to take power in Afghanistan in a violent coup in 1978, had also surrendered to the Mujahideen. Anahita Ratebzad, the woman who set out with former president Babrak Karmal to bring Communism to Afghanistan in the 1960s and 70s, now works with the Mujahideen Alliance. Red Army defections have been increasing as well; between 1980 and 1982 there were only 34 known defections of Soviet soldiers to the Mujahideen, but between 1983 and 1986 there were 843 known defections, and in just the first six months of 1987 there were 350 defections. Among Afghan DRA forces, about 50 percent are actively working with Mujahideen. Because most of them have been forcibly conscripted, many under the age of 17, the defection rate among Afghan soldiers ran at about 80 to 90 percent at the beginning of the invasion, many returning with Mujahideen to capture whole weapons arsenals. Now, many remain with DRA forces only to act as double agents for Mujahideen to uncover informers and orchestrate attacks. Suffering low morale, Soviet and puppet DRA troops sell their weapons and ammunition for hashish and opium and often shoot their officers in the back during battles.

One Afghan boasted recently in a Wall Street Journal article, "The world thinks the Russians cannot be conquered. But we've been fighting them for eight years and we know they're nothing. They only have more modern weapons." Now if we could only get the American government to stop aiding the Soviet Union and their puppet regime in Kabul!

Reagan Vows To Halt Afghan Aid

With U.S. Stinger and British Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles, the Afghans could surely make strategic gains against the Soviets, if not win the war. Historically, the Afghans have never been defeated or ruled by a foreign power. In 1919, the Afghans were the first people to defeat the British Army, foiling an attempt by Great Britain to colonize the country.

The U.S. administration has done little more than provide lip service to the Afghan Mujahideen Alliance based in Peshawar, Pakistan. The Reagan administration, despite its rhetoric concerning the heroic freedom fighters, has yet to offer diplomatic recognition of the Afghan Alliance, thus depriving them of a place in the Geneva negotiations and thereby minimizing their political clout in the international arena. The latest and probably the most decisive move by the Reagan administration toward the Afghan freedom fighters has been the pledge to Mikhail Gorbachev during the INF negotiations in December to halt the trickle of U.S. aid to the Afghan Mujahideen. According to the Boston Globe of December 14, 1987, Mr. Reagan "reconfirmed the US commitments, which include a pledge of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs -- understood by 'all' sides to include an end to providing military supplies to the Afghan anti-communist resistance ... apparently in an attempt to clear up confusion caused by President Reagan's (earlier) comments suggesting there would be no such cutoff." Just two days before, when asked in an interview with Congressional Quarterly if he would make a commitment not to supply the Mujahideen if the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan, Mr. Reagan said:

I don't think we could do anything of that kind because the puppet government that has been left there has a military and it would be the same as what I'm arguing about with regard to Nicaragua. You can't suddenly disarm them and leave them prey to the other government ... the people of Afghanistan must be assured of the right of all of them to participate in establishing the government they want, and that requires more than just getting his forces out of there.

During a recent tour through Indochina, Afghan Communist leader Najibullah stated on a Vietnamese television broadcast: "Today the policy of national reconciliation is the way forward for some countries such as Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia and so on who are fighting for revolutionary transformation, independence and territorial integrity." All of the countries he mentioned are currently under Soviet-backed Communist domination. He added: "[T]his new way of thinking will appear as a norm in relations between people." The elements of the policy of "national reconciliation" include negotiated ends to guerrilla conflicts, withdrawal of foreign troops, and establishment of a coalition government. An open letter from the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was published in the New York Times in February 1987 calling for national reconciliation and urging native Afghans to return to their homeland "regardless of their previous political views, grudges and hostilities" in order to bring legitimacy to the Communist puppet regime and help rebuild the country in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles. The policy is not limited to Afghanistan, but is being applied to all developing nations presently under Communist domination.

On January 10, 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz confirmed the U.S. intention to cut off aid to the Mujahideen and seemingly endorsed the Soviet campaign of "national reconciliation." "We would presume that, as a part of that agreement (of a Soviet timetable for military withdrawal), military supplies would stop going in there," he said. "What we want to see is the people of Afghanistan, through a process of 'national reconciliation' take control of their own destiny." Shultz added: "We would do our part to see an Afghanistan which rules itself ... an Afghanistan that is not in any way aligned with us as a military matter..."

Background to Betrayal

During the initial invasion of Soviet troops on December 27, 1979, lines of communication, roads, and media were immediately severed. Kabul was isolated from the rest of the world, while Soviet troops -- disguised as Afghan Army soldiers -- engaged in a bloody shoot-out at the Presidential Palace that lasted five hours and resulted in the assassination of Afghan President Hafezullah Amin. Babrak Karmal, exiled in Czechoslovakia, was then installed as the new President. Karmal promptly issued a statement that under Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship Goodneighborliness and Cooperation, the government of Afghanistan had called upon the Soviet Union to provide "urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid" in order to protect the Communist revolution and help combat the "provocation of external enemies." These external enemies were purported to be American and Chinese forces, and Soviet soldiers entered Afghanistan believing that they would be combatting American and Chinese forces, rather than bombing villages filled with Afghan women and children.

1987 marked a heightened propaganda campaign toward Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, as well as within Afghanistan by the Communist regime. Probably not so coincidentally, 1987 was the first in eight years of bloodshed that Western media paid any real attention to the Afghan-Soviet war. Gorbachev lamented that Afghanistan had become a "bleeding wound." Meanwhile, Western media sources were drawing parallels between the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The conflict in Afghanistan, however, is no Soviet Vietnam. The Kremlin has initiated no effort to "win the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people, instead pursuing a policy of scorched earth designed to drive all opposition to Communist rule out of the country. The Soviets have been drawing a reported 95 percent of the country's natural gas resources to fuel the Soviet war on the remaining Afghan population or to sell to Western Europe.

In the words of Senior Soviet official Yuri Gankovsky: "We are paid for everything we are sending to Afghanistan. All of our expenses are paid by Afghanistan ... There is a giant gas field in the northern part of (the country), by supplying the gas they are paying for everything. Afghanistan is also supplying agricultural products such as fruit, skins, and cotton." The payment for these commodities is deducted from the Kabul regime's interest payments on their outstanding debt for Soviet military aid. Moscow has also confiscated without compensation large quantities of minerals, including uranium.

World condemnation of the Soviet invasion has been faint and desultory; the United States has maintained relations with the puppet regime in Kabul, in 1986 selling them $7.3 million worth of chemicals and aircraft parts; and there has been little internal condemnation of the Soviet involvement in the war. With all of these reprehensible acts committed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan alone, not to mention the heinous human rights violations committed against the Soviet people themselves, it is apparent that the conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union adopted by the United States is incongruent with the principles of Americanism. During the past few weeks in particular, the Reagan Administration has bent over backwards to please the Soviets. During an interview in December 1987, Mr. Reagan was asked if he agreed with Mr. Gorbachev's contention that the Soviet troops were invited into Afghanistan in December 1979. Mr. Reagan's answer: "Well, you must remember that there were other leaders under which this happened. He inherited that. And those leaders are the ones who had created the puppet government. Whether he knows that -- to what extent they did that -- I don't know."

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost (CFR) is presently in charge of negotiating an Afghan settlement with Pakistani leaders, who have recently been put under a great deal of pressure to acquiesce to Soviet demands. In addition, Diego Cordovez, United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, visited Moscow in December 1987 in order to negotiate an Afghan settlement. The New York Times reported on December 31, 1987: "In recent months Mr. Cordovez, with tacit American and Soviet support, has been urging the various guerrilla groups as well as the exiled Afghan King, Mohammed Zahir Shah, to start preparing a broad-based coalition government of national reconciliation that would give Moscow reassurances it needs before removing its forces." Industrialist Armand Hammer, acting as a self-appointed diplomat between Kabul and Moscow, has been lobbying for Shah to resume his position as Afghan leader. In a brief interview given to the New York Times in a Moscow restaurant, Hammer said "he hoped to persuade the major parties in the conflict to accept a coalition government with the participation of the country's former King, Mohammed Zahir Shah." The "three major parties" that Hammer referred to are "President Reagan, Mikhail S. Gorbachev and President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan." No mention was made of the Afghan Mujahideen Alliance.

Living in near-seclusion on the outskirts of Rome since 1973, Zahir Shah has refrained from speaking out in condemnation of the atrocities committed against his countrymen for the past nine years. The 73-year-old King has been previously condemned by Mujahideen groups as leading the way to international agreements and treaties with the Soviets that eventually set the stage for the invasion. Despite this fact, Zahir Shah has emerged as a key figure in efforts to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from his country. Shah ruled the country for 40 years, until 1978, when his brother-in-law and cousin, General Mohammed Daoud, staged a coup while Shah was in Italy for medical treatment. Daoud was Afghanistan's first openly Communist President, and it was his brazen policy of removing religious books from school curricula that enraged the Afghan people and led them to take up arms in defense of their Islamic beliefs.

The plan for an interim government, which is a Soviet precondition to an agreement for troop withdrawal, would include the King. However, it is highly likely that Zahir Shah would serve in much the same way that the Royal family of Great Britain serves. On November 29, 1987 Najibullah approved a new Afghan Constitution creating an all-powerful post of president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces endowed with sweeping "emergency powers." This is the plan for a coalition government for which the Mujahideen are to lay down their arms, and which the United States has approved as representative of the Afghan people.

In the words of conservative columnist Don Feder: "Now Gorby and his Afghan Gunga Din want the West to hand them the victory they've been denied on the battlefield, and we are asked to thank Moscow in the bargain, to view the scheme as further evidence of Soviet beneficence." Just as timely is the writing of Robert Welch, founder of The John Birch Society, in his book, Again, May God Forgive Us. In it he lamented:

America was long looked to as the light of the world; a land and a people of happiness and strength; a nation that had for itself, and promoted for others wherever its influence reached, justice and honor and decency and freedom. The remembrance of that light dies slowly, even when it can no longer be seen. Today in Poland, in China, in Czecho-Slovakia, in numberless areas behind the Iron Curtain, there are millions of families -- like yours and mine -- which have been decimated, starved, and frightened into abject submission; but which still cling to the dream that presently, maybe even next week or next year, the United States is going to come, in all its beneficent majesty, to rescue them from the inhuman tyranny which owns them now. In their moments of greatest misery or despair they ask the question: "When will the Americans come?" The Americans, unfortunately, all of us, are busy playing our little games; while our government, far from worrying about how the Iron Curtain might ever be lifted, is frequently lending a hand -- as to Mao in China -- to those who are trying to bring down another section of the curtain to swallow up another piece of the globe.

[FrankRep]

State Department Backs Afghan Sellout


The New American
June 2, 1986


The Kremlin's decision to retire Babrak Karmal as the head of the Soviet-puppet government in Afghanistan and to replace him with the brutal former secret police chief Najibullah is seen by many here in Washington as a sign of worse things to come for the people of Afghanistan.

On May 4th, the day he assumed the role of General Secretary of the Afghan Communist party, Najibullah promised the Central Committee that he would use his experience as head of Khad (the secret police) to boost the armed forces fighting the Moslem freedom fighters known as the Mujahideen, Radio Kabul reported. Najibullah listed the first duties of the "new" government as "strengthening the armed forces, improving their fighting ability, intensifying the struggle against the [Mujahideen], stopping the bloodshed and establishing peace and tranquility."

Yet according to many observers "stopping the bloodshed and establishing peace and tranquility" means only that the 115,000-strong Soviet Army and their Afghan "allies" are all the more intent on crushing the Moslem guerrillas fighting for the liberation of their homeland.

Another Stooge

Sabahuddin Kushkaki, who directs a U.S.-backed education program for the freedom fighters, told a Washington news conference that the appointment of Najibullah represents only a "cosmetic change." And Burhanuddin Rabbani, spokesman for the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen, the coalition of the seven major resistance groups, noted, "As long as the Russian invading forces are in Afghanistan and the Russian generals rule, it does not make any difference who stays or who goes."

Even the U.S. State Department, which has long opposed American aid for the resistance, denounced the new leader. The appointment of Najibullah appears to be designed to increase the brutality of the Afghan regime, State Department spokesman Charles Redman told reporters. "Najibullah's appointment as General Secretary of the party seems aimed only at having him apply within the party the organization skills he developed in the secret police in building an effective Soviet-style state and party structure," he said.

"He is a longtime Communist who has risen to prominence under Soviet tutelage under the ubiquitous and much feared Afghan secret police," Redman continued. "He is well known in the country for his ruthlessness in suppressing regime opponents and his close affiliation with Moscow -- hardly qualities one would look for in a leader seeking to broaden the regime."

Indeed, as head of Khad, the secret police, Najibullah has earned the infamous reputation of overseeing a reign of terror unprecedented in Afghan history. Besides directing the brutal suppression of internal dissent, Najibullah is responsible for masterminding and implementing a terrorist campaign against border areas in Pakistan.

Thus, as Marvin Zonis, chairman of the committee on human development at the University of Chicago and a frequent writer on Middle Eastern affairs, observed in the New York Times, the appointment of Najibullah "suggests that the Russians are poised on the brink of a major effort to eliminate, once and for all, the resistance of the Islamic guerrillas. Afghanistan could then be integrated into the Soviet empire and Moscow could turn its attention to new targets of opportunity."

The appointment of Najibullah is especially significant in that it preceded by three days the seventh round of UN-sponsored peace negotiations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva. According to sources familiar with the progress of the negotiations, the leadership change in Kabul represents an oblique warning to Pakistan of greater turmoil and bloodshed if the government of President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq does not submit to Kremlin demands.

However, even without Najibullah ruling in Kabul, the peace talks promise to end only in defeat for the Afghan people. "Peace talks on the Afghan war, under way again in Geneva, may soon bear bitter fruit," Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), co-chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, wrote in mid-May. "From all indications, the United Nations-sponsored talks are edging closer to a "settlement" which smells a lot more like a wholesale sellout of the Afghan resistance."

Happy To Oblige

According to sources in Washington, the U.S. State Department is prepared to back the "wholesale sellout." In December of 1985, the State Department offered to act as a guarantor of a negotiated settlement between Pakistan and the Communist government of Afghanistan, even before such a settlement was reached. The State Department has surrendered to two key Soviet demands: (1) The Afghan resistance will not be included in the talks; and, (2) the right of self-determination after a Soviet withdrawal has been eliminated from the current round of negotiations.

The appointment of Najibullah as head of the Communist regime in Afghanistan and the impending State Department-sanctioned sellout at the Geneva peace talks do not herald glad tidings for the Afghans fighting and dying to liberate their country from the Soviet empire.

[FrankRep]

Soviet Destruction of Afghan Culture


The New American
March 14, 1988


The carpets and jewelry of Afghanistan are some of the finest in the world. The vibrant colors, intricate designs, and rich fabrics have won Afghan carpet and kilim work an uncontested place in art history. The fire-gilded silver and brass jewelry, set with precious and semi-precious stones, have been the treasures of kings throughout the centuries. But the years of rug weaving and gilding in Afghanistan have drawn to a close since the invasion of their Soviet neighbor eight years ago. Carpet and jewelry makers have been killed, or driven from their homes and forced to defend their country from the Red Army. As a result, Afghan carpets and fine jewelry are becoming a lost craft.

The Soviet Union tries deliberately to undermine the Afghan people's cultural identity, and particularly their attachment to Islam, which provides the driving force behind their resistance to Communist rule. Of the pre-war population of 17 million, six million are now refugees and over one million are dead. Some have attempted to carry on their crafts in refugee camps, but the quality of their work has suffered. The materials they need are either not available in Pakistan or are of poorer quality.

At first glance, Afghanistan appears to be a backward country poor in resources and untamed in nature. Many Americans, shocked by the first news reports of the Soviet invasion, wondered nevertheless what great difference the absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet empire would make to the rest of the world. But a closer look reveals a devotedly religious, fiercely independent and wealthy people. This is a country where even the poorest wear gold and silver rings with rubies and deep blue lapis lazuli. Women and children are adorned daily with silver coins and finely tooled bracelets and earrings, and they wear velvet and silk dresses to attend to their work. Even horses and donkeys are lavished with expensive metal jewelry and the finest leather and woven materials simply for decoration. Men's turbans are made from the softest silk, and their traditional salwar long shirt and baggy pants can take up to a year to embroider by hand. The stitching is often so delicate that it takes a microscope to discern the pattern.

There are two groups of peoples that have mastered the arts of carpet and jewelry craftsmanship in Afghanistan: the Turkoman tribes of the northern provinces and the Balouch tribes of the western provinces of Herat and Parah bordering Iran. The history of these crafts predates 413 BC. These nomadic people live in elaborate tents made of woven kilim, which is easy to set up and dismantle, and easily transported. These dwellings have to protect them from the cold at night and the heat during the day, as well as from wind and rain. Carpets cover the floor and often serve as weather-resistant doors. They are easily folded and take up little space during migration. Woven kilims and carpets are preferred over bulkier animal skins.

Carpet weaving is the task of women and young girls, who are masters of their art. Because of pride and tradition, women are prohibited from working outside their homes. While their fathers and brothers attend to the fields, they run the household and create fabulous embroidery and woven carpets. As a rule, one lady weaves an entire carpet herself. Beginning at age seven or eight, young girls are allowed to work on the carpets with their mothers. They work on a horizontal loom, pegged to the ground and easy to dismantle. The women process sheep wool from their own flocks -- washing, spinning, and dyeing the material. Dyes are derived from indigenous plants and vegetables, such as beets. The techniques of carpet weaving are passed on unchanged from generation to generation. They vary from one village to another, affected only by the local environment, climate and flora, and modified by village tradition. Each village has its own unique design and combination of colors. Many characteristic motifs are symbols of their independence.

Turkoman carpets have been considered of superior quality to Balouch. The price usually reflects that quality by 40 percent. Turkoman rugs are usually more tightly woven, and the designs more intricate and synchronized. The best Turkoman carpets come from the northern provinces of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Badghis, Jozjan, Faryab, Maymana, Shiburan, and Daoulat-Abad, each having their own unique designs, yet faithful to the Turkoman tradition. Turkoman carpets also take longer to weave. Turkoman colors, which are made from vegetable dyes, range from deep red to black, brown, dark blue, and onion. They are thickly woven and can last for more than a hundred years with normal use, increasing greatly in value with age. Their designs are generally geometric and intricately patterned.

The majority of these carpets are made not for export but for the keeping of family tradition; about half are made specifically for use in prayer. These prayer rugs, called "jainamaz," are knelt upon during prayer at the Mosque. Muslims must pray five times a day, at designated times, facing toward the Islamic holy land of Mecca, covering the head, and kneeling on a cloth. Each jainamaz is patterned with a "mayharab," meaning "the pulpit," which is considered the front of the carpet and must point toward the Holy Ka'aba in Mecca. Jainamaz carpet weavers are forbidden to portray a man's figure, because such art is considered idolatrous. When the devotee has finished prayer, the carpet must be hung on the wall to keep it clean and must never be trod upon with shoes. Jainamaz carpets are made as gifts for friends, family and weddings, never for export.

Turkoman jewelry, like their fine carpets, displays superb craftsmanship. Made of silver and brass, each piece is embedded with stones such as red agate, cornelian, lapis lazuli, rubies, and green malachite -- all indigenous to Afghanistan. The quality of materials and delicacy of manufacture are unmatched. Armlets, earrings, necklaces, belts, and bridal crowns are engraved, stamped, and fire-gilded with brass or silver appliqué work, then set with stones. Jewelry is often made to decorate clothing or hair. Mothers might adorn their young sons with such jewelry, if they are particularly proud of them, although Afghan men seldom wear jewelry.

Kouchi jewelry, made by the gypsies of Afghanistan, combines fine metal pieces with rich embroidery and silk tassels. Silver appliqué work is set on leather and embroidery, lavished with tiny mirrors, colorful glass beads, or coins. Shirt and trouser cuffs are made of fine silk embroidery and are designed to be cut off and resewn to new clothes. Kouchi women embroider silk bibs for their children, and hats for boys and young men, later to be used under a turban.

The economic importance of Turkoman jewelry is immense. Women are said to be the bearers of the entire family's wealth. Young women of rich families wear so much jewelry that they can walk only with difficulty. Bridal jewelry alone can weigh as much as 17 kilograms (37.5 lbs). Many of these ornaments have been handed down for thousands of years. Some, found in graves, have been determined to be 2,400 years old. Now these priceless family heirlooms are being sold to keep families alive in refugee camps.

The majority of women have been taken from Afghanistan and moved to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, where they are left in the hands of an older male family member while their husbands and sons return to fight the Soviet occupation of their country. There are 25-30,000 widowed women in separate camps in Pakistan alone. Many of these women possess this much sought-after talent, but are unable to carry on their tradition without their flocks, dyes and tools. Those who do manage to produce some work find that the fine wool and silk of Afghanistan are unavailable in Pakistan and are forced to mix wool and synthetics, producing a less sturdy and vibrant carpet.

Turkoman ladies, because of their refined talent, have found themselves in a unique situation since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Traditionally, the cost of a Turkoman bride -- which is paid to the parents to offset the loss of a productive family member and to insure the good intentions of the groom -- was about 200,000 afghanis (equal to a $200,000 sacrifice for an American).

With their craft in danger of extinction, their work has become more prized than ever. If the same Turkoman lady moves to Pakistan, her bridal cost immediately rises to 800,000 afg. She will return her high cost by producing fine carpets that her husband can sell.

Persian carpets from Iran have also been highly prized in the United States by rug dealers, but the quality is inferior to that of Afghan carpets. Iranian carpets are woven with a combination of wool and cotton, while Afghan carpets wear longer and their colors do not run. In order to make a wool and silk carpet, silk is first stretched across the loom, vertically in tight rows, then wool and silk fibers are woven across the loom, thus leaving pure silk fringe. The colors are extremely vibrant and become more so as the rug ages and is trod upon. The pile feels smooth and cool when touched, similar to glass, and changes shade slightly, like velvet, when rubbed to and fro.

Pakistani carpets are made with a combination of wool, cotton, and synthetic, and often with synthetic dye. Most are made specifically for export, as are the Iranian. Despite the war in Iran, the quality and availability of Persian carpets have not been affected because of the conflict's confinement to specific lines. However, the conditions inside Afghanistan are much worse. The Soviets have waged a war of scorched earth and genocide against the entire Afghan nation, often bombing refugee camps across the border in Pakistan. Crops are burned and livestock are targeted from helicopters. This policy has destroyed the culture and priceless art of centuries. The Soviets have stolen the rest for their own museums, or to decorate the dachas of the Soviet nomenklatura.

Afghanistan was by no means a poor country prior to 1979: Food was rich, varied and plentiful, 80 percent of all children (male and female) attended grade school, literacy was rising, infant death was declining, and many diseases rampant in the rest of Asia had been nearly eradicated. But the international agreements signed between the Kabul government and Moscow slowly began absorbing all the talent and independence of the Afghan nation. The Afghans have had to pay dearly for Soviet "advisors" -- at first in natural gas, uranium, wheat, and wool and cotton, and finally in national and religious freedom. Afghanistan never possessed industrial or technological wealth, but it possessed riches much harder to come by, a vibrant culture and religious devotion. Now diseases such as tuberculosis, hepatitis, and polio run rampant throughout Afghanistan. Despite UNESCO's award for literacy progress to the Kabul regime, fewer than 10 percent of all Afghan children attend school, and malnutrition and infant death are among the highest in the world.

Before the invasion, each family had an average of 20 acres of private land. This land was often cultivated into beautiful gardens of fruit trees, flowers, and pools of water. Unlike most European countries, where people make use of all animal meat through necessity, Afghans enjoyed such plenty that their traditional foods were cooked from only the finest cuts of lamb and, occasionally, chicken. Only the very poor ate beef, and pork was strictly forbidden by Islam. The inner organs of animals were never eaten, though they were occasionally used to weave leather seats or ropes.

When the Soviets invaded, signs were erected proclaiming the redistribution of land and the availability of houses and food for anyone who joined the puppet regime's Army. But the majority of Afghans laughed openly at such a naive propaganda campaign, asking what the Soviets and their Communist propaganda could offer them that they did not already have. Those Mujahideen that fight today are fighting for their religion. Many who have seen the way of life in other countries often return to Afghanistan to fight even more vehemently, because they feel that Afghanistan was a paradise: a peaceful land of plentiful food and rich culture, devoutly religious, and, above all, free.