WHAT WE'RE UP AGAINST IN THE GENERAL: My Argument with a Flock of Communists...

[AceNZ]

Either way, the takeaway should be, "the theory as currently formulated is imprecise and needs some adjustment, but then it'll be consistent with the evidence again."

I basically agree (I would phrase it slightly differently). Unfortunately, that's not what Popper and other adherents to skepticism say.

The viewpoint that "everything you know is wrong" isn't disprovable (you could technically be a brain in a vat or computer simulation, and jumping of a cliff could hypothetically make you bounce), but I find it an unreasonably pessimistic take on knowledge, and I consider its "correctness" as such a remote possibility that I'd like to put it aside or behind me.

I know you said you'd like to set it aside, but since you brought it up: saying that you could be a brain in a vat ("The Matrix") or a computer simulation assumes the existence of a vat, a computer, a programmer, scientists, surgeons, electrodes, someone to put you in the vat, etc, etc. It's an attempt to use knowledge to destroy its own roots. Advanced knowledge presupposes more basic knowledge. You cannot rationally assert the certainty of advanced knowledge if the more basic knowledge is put in doubt.

In addition, for something to be possible, there must be at least some evidence for it. There is no evidence here, so such a claim is totally arbitrary (which also means it's not possible).

In short, I view fallibilism as a way of saying that we can be conditionally certain of much of our knowledge, and the condition is that we take a few basic assumptions for granted.

You're giving the skeptics too much credit, IMO. We can be more than just conditionally certain. Do you really have any doubt at all that jumping off a cliff will hurt you?

I hold that objective morality may exist that transcends mere subjective opinion (and I even believe some standards can be demonstrated as...highly unlikely ), but I'm also open to the idea that there could be more than one right answer, and mine might not even be one of them...although I'd like to think it is.

If you're interested, there are some great books on objective morality that might help sway you (one way or the other). Tara Smith's work is very good, as well as The Virtue of Selfishness.

[Mini-Me]

I basically agree (I would phrase it slightly differently). Unfortunately, that's not what Popper and other adherents to skepticism say.

I'm not sure why you insist on saying Popper adheres to skepticism. Fallibilism is a pretty distinct position, after all, and I'd consider it more like "foundationalism with an asterisk" than "might as well be skepticism." It accepts the idea of objective truth; it simply concedes that it's only provable conditionally (i.e. unprovable axioms are true, and/or our sensory experience is true) if at all (here I'm just referring to Gödel, who is pretty agnostic about epistemology here). This is in fact why I brought up skepticism and fallibilism in the first place: soulcyon stated that morality is not strictly provable and therefore subjective, and I indicated the technical impossibility of absolute, unconditional proof of anything as a way of pointing out, "unprovable does not by itself imply subjective."

Either way, are you sure you didn't misunderstand Popper on falsifiability? It's a more scientific concept that's only tangentially related to fallibilism (let alone skepticism). It would be absolutely ridiculous to say, "This piece of evidence contradicts theory XYZ, therefore theory XYZ must be scrapped entirely and can never be permitted to be fixed to reflect the new evidence. Let no man ever speak of heretical theory XYZ again. Any new theories from here forward must bear absolutely no resemblance to theory XYZ, or Karl Popper will find out about your grave offense and throw you in a wood chipper and eat you." I get the feeling Popper didn't mean quite that.

I know you said you'd like to set it aside, but since you brought it up: saying that you could be a brain in a vat ("The Matrix") or a computer simulation assumes the existence of a vat, a computer, a programmer, scientists, surgeons, electrodes, someone to put you in the vat, etc, etc. It's an attempt to use knowledge to destroy its own roots. Advanced knowledge presupposes more basic knowledge. You cannot rationally assert the certainty of advanced knowledge if the more basic knowledge is put in doubt.

"Brain in a vat" is just an analogy used for illustration, and the abstract concept arose long before computers (Descartes's evil demon)! We base our knowledge of the universe on our experience within it, but if that very experience is a grand illusion, matter may not necessarily exist at all. Instead, a singular consciousness existing in a vacuum, comprising the whole universe (one with very different laws than the one we experience), might as well be dreaming all of this up. Whether or not this is actually possible depends greatly on the nature of the universe itself, which even according to our worldly understanding is a pretty deep mystery. (First cause is a paradoxical violation of causality, and so is a linear causal chain extending infinitely backwards. I suppose a circular timeline may be non-paradoxical...depending...) For that matter, we technically may not even know if a universe with our particular universe's laws is even the only kind that could support a literal computer simulation.

That's not to say that an illusory universe with a singular consciousness is a reasonable assumption...just a remote possibility. Whereas skepticism loses itself in a black hole of not knowing, fallibilism builds knowledge on a branching foundation. It's the if/else/then or switch/case statement of knowledge: If an illusory world is true, what do we know? "I think, therefore I exist," and little else. If our perception of our world and our formulation of axioms are accurate, what do we know? Lots! If we add a few other assumptions, what more do we know? Lots more!

In addition, for something to be possible, there must be at least some evidence for it. There is no evidence here, so such a claim is totally arbitrary (which also means it's not possible).

I'm not following you here, because you seem to have an unusually strict definition of what is possible. Where does it come from? I might argue that for something to be seriously considered true, there must be at least some evidence for it, or at the very least, it must be one of finite possible alternatives, each of which has an equivalent lack of evidence. However, the realm of mere possibility is vast.

You're giving the skeptics too much credit, IMO. We can be more than just conditionally certain. Do you really have any doubt at all that jumping off a cliff will hurt you?

If you abuse quantum physics a little (a LOT), practically anything can happen when you jump off the cliff. The probability of anything other than death upon impact (or severe mutilation?) is astronomically/negligibly small, but my hazy understanding is that the probability of you teleporting to China is technically not zero...and that's just working within known physical laws, ruling out actual skepticism.

If you're interested, there are some great books on objective morality that might help sway you (one way or the other). Tara Smith's work is very good, as well as The Virtue of Selfishness.

Hrm, maybe. The notion of objective truth appeals to me, and I DO believe in it. I just think you're being overconfident about the unconditional provability of many truths, because I see no honest way to move forward from the Münchhausen Trilemma without first conceding fallibilism. Self-certain foundationalism seems more to me like misunderstanding the nature of the trilemma entirely.


We're WAYYY off topic now though.

[soulcyon]

I probably can't prove it to a devout subjectivist, since our foundational views of consciousness and reality are completely different.

Devout subjectivist? lmao, I'm only talking about Morality, yet you think my whole line of thinking is of a subjectivist. Even with the "objectivist view" you described, you CHOOSE when to apply your morals in situations. The fact that your SUBJECTIVE opinion upon situations proves that even in your objective world, morality is purely subjective! Please stop beating around the bush.

That's not a valid application of induction, since you have failed to integrate your knowledge and observations, such as: people other than you hang pictures; you know of other ways to hang pictures, etc. A valid application of induction would be: all men are mortal. You have only seen a few men, but that statement integrates with and doesn't contradict other essentials you know: the aging process, the age of people you know, etc.

The example I gave is Weak induction, you give the example of strong induction. But my statement still stands because strong induction only needs to work if everything you perceived is truthy. "All men are mortal" is a conclusion statement, so what is your base statement? I can't imagine a base statement that induces to "All men are mortal" :\

[soulcyon]

Double post: I see where AceNZ is coming from, will start another thread debunking this article.

http://www.strongatheism.net/library...tive_morality/

[Occam's Banana]

We're WAYYY off topic now though.

But fascinatingly so. (I <3 epistemology. )

[AceNZ]

I'm not sure why you insist on saying Popper adheres to skepticism. Fallibilism is a pretty distinct position, after all, and I'd consider it more like "foundationalism with an asterisk" than "might as well be skepticism."

Popper has fooled you. He's one of the most notorious skeptics and positivists in 20th century philosophy.

[Mini-Me]

Popper has fooled you. He's one of the most notorious skeptics and positivists in 20th century philosophy.

I'll post more later.

Perhaps I misunderstand how much he leans toward skepticism? It ultimately doesn't matter though, since it's not like I worship at his temple or anything. Fallibilism itself still stands alone as something I can get behind, and I'm not especially concerned about the kind of guy who first discovered it. I certainly don't have to view it from the same perspective as him. As for positivism, I'm quite far from that position. You're no positivist either (given what I believe to be your views on logic and intuition), but even you seem to lean more toward that position than I do regarding empiricism, based on your statement about what things are possible.

[AceNZ]

Perhaps I misunderstand how much he leans toward skepticism? It ultimately doesn't matter though, since it's not like I worship at his temple or anything. Fallibilism itself still stands alone as something I can get behind, and I'm not especially concerned about the kind of guy who first discovered it. I certainly don't have to view it from the same perspective as him.

So you agree with the guy who "discovered" fallibilism, but you just don't agree with what he discovered or what he said about it?

As for positivism, I'm quite far from that position.

OK, but fallibilism is basically anchored in Positivism: they both claim that the senses and logic applied to them are the only source of knowledge; that concepts and the like are meaningless.

You're no positivist either (given what I believe to be your views on logic and intuition), but even you seem to lean more toward that position than I do regarding empiricism, based on your statement about what things are possible.

If anything, I'm an anti-Positivist. I strongly believe in concepts as being a source of knowledge. Knowledge is ultimately anchored in sensory experience, but that doesn't mean we can't create new knowledge based on those experiences (such as through induction).

My view is that what's possible must have some anchor in reality. Arbitrary statements don't have an anchor in reality, which means they should have no cognitive status. Where fallibilism says the arbitrary should be considered unless something can be presented to show that it's false, I would say the arbitrary should just be dismissed, with no consideration or discussion at all.

I could claim that I have an invisible pink elephant under my house. Are you honestly willing to consider such a thing as possible?

[AceNZ]

Either way, are you sure you didn't misunderstand Popper on falsifiability? It's a more scientific concept that's only tangentially related to fallibilism (let alone skepticism). It would be absolutely ridiculous to say, "This piece of evidence contradicts theory XYZ, therefore theory XYZ must be scrapped entirely and can never be permitted to be fixed to reflect the new evidence. Let no man ever speak of heretical theory XYZ again. Any new theories from here forward must bear absolutely no resemblance to theory XYZ, or Karl Popper will find out about your grave offense and throw you in a wood chipper and eat you." I get the feeling Popper didn't mean quite that.

Here's a quote from Popper:

natural law might be compared to 'proscriptions' or 'prohibition'. They do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it. They insist on the non-existence of certain things or states of affairs, proscribing or prohibiting, as it were, these states of affairs: they rule them out. If we accept as true one singular statement which, as it were, infringes the prohibition by asserting the existence of a thing (or the occurrence of an event) ruled out by the law, then the law is refuted.

In the terms of logic, he's saying that all S is P demands no S be non-P, so if non-P is found, S is refuted, not modified.

This also ties back to an earlier comment of mine, that Popper says axioms require justification, but scientific hypotheses do not. He wants scientific hypotheses to be tested, but he holds that:

1. His desire for testing is only a subjective preference
2. No test will ever prove any hypothesis nor even make it more probable
3. There are no requirements for launching a scientific hypothesis—arbitrary assertions are warmly welcomed—and the arbitrary is good until and unless falsified

"Brain in a vat" is just an analogy used for illustration, and the abstract concept arose long before computers (Descartes's evil demon)! We base our knowledge of the universe on our experience within it, but if that very experience is a grand illusion, matter may not necessarily exist at all. Instead, a singular consciousness existing in a vacuum, comprising the whole universe (one with very different laws than the one we experience), might as well be dreaming all of this up.

Experience can't be an illusion, for one simple reason: we're conscious. Matter does exist: just look and you can experience it yourself. There is no singular consciousness in a vacuum; such a claim is arbitrary, with no basis in reality.

To be conscious means to be conscious of something.

Whereas skepticism loses itself in a black hole of not knowing, fallibilism builds knowledge on a branching foundation. It's the if/else/then or switch/case statement of knowledge: If an illusory world is true, what do we know? "I think, therefore I exist," and little else. If our perception of our world and our formulation of axioms are accurate, what do we know? Lots! If we add a few other assumptions, what more do we know? Lots more!

Descartes got it backwards. "I think, therefore I exist" is wrong. The correct formulation is: "I exist, therefore I think". Existence is primary.

I'm probably sounding like a broken record, but we can be sure that axioms are correct; there's no need for uncertainty (skepticism).

If you abuse quantum physics a little (a LOT), practically anything can happen when you jump off the cliff. The probability of anything other than death upon impact (or severe mutilation?) is astronomically/negligibly small, but my hazy understanding is that the probability of you teleporting to China is technically not zero...and that's just working within known physical laws, ruling out actual skepticism.

The odd nature of things appearing and disappearing as shown in quantum physics only appears at the sub-molecular level. There is no evidence, or even a theoretical foundation, that any macro-sized object can suddenly teleport to another location. Again, that's an arbitrary assertion.

Hrm, maybe. The notion of objective truth appeals to me, and I DO believe in it. I just think you're being overconfident about the unconditional provability of many truths, because I see no honest way to move forward from the Münchhausen Trilemma without first conceding fallibilism. Self-certain foundationalism seems more to me like misunderstanding the nature of the trilemma entirely.

A detailed refutation of the trilemma would take some time. Just quickly, I can say that circular logic is not always the terrible thing it's made out to be. It is bad when you assert an arbitrary claim and use it to establish itself. However, in induction, the initial statement is not arbitrary, it's based on observation. The second step in induction is an actual integration: connecting what you observed to everything else you know, not to itself. It's really the mutual relationship of parts to the whole. After that, the right definitions become the peg for future definitions.