[Mod note: This thread was split from another thread.]
OK, it's early in the day and I am not quite prepared, but will start by suggesting an informal demonstration of the CP. I will leave a formal proof to the harder-core philosophers because such proofs tend to become very arduous and lengthy.
The CP states:
Let us begin with a definition of terms. While this may seem extraneous, I assure all that it is vitally important that we take this most basic step. Here, I am narrowly constricting the definitions for the purposes at hand that they may not be so readily interpreted at variance with the intended meanings.All men hold equal claims to life.
men: n., proper third-person plural pronoun of "man"
man: n., proper pronoun for "human being"
Therefore, here the use of "men" refers to all living human beings without respect to their sex.
hold: v., to validly possess
In this case, the holding is an innate, inherent condition of a man's living existence.
Where the notion of equality is concerned, I broaden a bit:
equal: adj.,
1. as great as; the same as
2. like or alike in quantity, degree, value, etc.
3. evenly proportioned or balanced
4. uniform in operation or effect
5. having adequate powers, ability, or means
While definition 1 is the more relevant, I include the others for the sake of emphasis of the nature of our equality along these lines: they are to be take as broadly as possible in their innateness of character.
claim: n., an assertion of entitlement; a right
life: n., the animate existence or period of animate existence of an individual man
To be more rigorously stout, we would include definitions of terms such as "animate", "individual", etc., but I will forgo this for the sake of brevity.
Given the above definitions, let us now reiterate the Cardinal Postulate:
What does it mean, a "claim to life"? It simply means the right to live. There is nothing more to it, though some might claim otherwise, such as the so-called "progressives" who, through innuendo and other tacit means, imply that equal rights to life means equal outcomes in the lives of all. This, of course, is pure absurdity, but it is not my purpose here to expose their fraud. Leave that for another day.All men hold equal claims to life.
The meaning of the Cardinal Postulate should be clear at this point. The CP says that as matters of the innate fabric of their living human existences, each man's right to live (his claim to his own life) is equal to that of every others; no more and no less.
Therefrom does the question of acceptance arise, and this is the central point of saliency. Do you accept the equality of claims, or do you reject it?
If you accept the CP as true, there is no further issue insofar as the Postulate itself is concerned. The matter is settled, closed, decided.
If, on the other hand, you reject it, not only does this beg justification, it also raises the question of what, then, is its truthful alternative?
Let us proceed with the case for rejection. If we reject it, there are but three possible outcomes. Either we encounter a contradiction, where the case for rejection is disproved; we establish an indisputable pattern of reason that demonstrates that rejection cannot be supported as a well reasoned position, or we discover an alternative basis of our fundamental system of beliefs regarding the nature of proper human relations. I will note here that the first two possibilities are but twists on the broader category of "establishing as false" the rejection of the CP. I make the distinction, however, because I feel it is important to do so, which I hope shall become clear later on.
Now, if we reject the Cardinal Postulate, we must then determine what such a rejection actually means.
[I will address this later as I have to go feed the goats and all that. More to come.]
Continuing...
If the claims to life between individuals is not equal, it can mean but three possible things:
- Claims differ in quantity
- Claims differ in quality (character)
- Claims differ in both quantity and quality
It is my opinion that options 2 and 3 may be immediately dismissed as meaningless. This is because I see no way by which the quality of one's claim to life may differ from that of another's. If I am wrong in this, please do illustrate that I may learn. As far as I can see, a claim to life stands more or less irreducible in semantic terms. I claim my right to live. How can this be reduced into other terms? Assuming for argument's sake that it cannot, then I must then conclude that the quality of my claim, as a claim, is no different from that of anyone else. Understand that there is the claim itself and the manner in which the claim is asserted - sort of the "what" and the "how". These are clearly not the same things and it is the former to which I address this exposition with complete disregard of the latter because it is irrelevant.
A silly, but perhaps useful example may be found in the sport of automobile racing. All drivers on the track are doing the precise same thing: they are racing their cars as rapidly about the circuit as possible. How they manage this is a matter of style and has very little to do with the what of it. In Formula 1, for example, some drivers were very hard on their cars. Jackie Stewart, on the other hand, was famous for his smooth and gentle style, which was credited with not only his record setting history of winning, but also the longevity of the cars he drove.
Having eliminated two of the three options, there remains but one reasonable possibility to describe the differences in claims to life: quantity. What, then, would a difference in the quantities of various claims to life actually mean? Let us first begin in the middle, so to speak, with the notion that if we grant that such claims indeed differ in quantity, then it is implied that some hold "more" claim to life than do others. That is, we might analogously say that some men hold claims to life that are superior to those of others. Hold on to this thought as I rewind to the beginning for a moment that I may expose what I believe to be an absurdity in the very premise of differing quantities of claims to life.
If we grant that claims to life may differ in quantity, which is to say that one man holds a numerically superior claim to life than do others, this immediately leads to the question of units and measurement. How is a claim to life itself measured? What are the units? How do we observe them? With what instruments are those claims metered? Cast about as I have to discover the answers to these three simple questions, I have been unable to arrive at anything even remotely resembling an answer. In fact, my strong intuition here is that the notion is in itself yet another absurdity, but I have not really proven this to myself and therefore remain, however thinly, skeptical on the matter. Once again, if anyone has any clever or otherwise interesting notions about answers to these questions, please speak up.
I do strongly suspect that the notion of numerically different claims to life is in its very fabric, ridiculous. But for the sake of completeness in terms of nailing shut the lid on the coffin on the argument in favor of rejecting the CP, let us return to the presumption that such numerical differences are at least possible. There remains, even in the face of this questionable assumption, further questions to which rejection of the CP leads. To reject the CP is to accept, at the very minimum, that there are superior and inferior claims to life extant between individuals. If Janey's claim to life is superior to Johnny, how is it so? A brief but by no means complete list of the questions that may be raised include:
- By what means do we determine the relative standings?
- What is the standard of judgment?
- How do we know the standard is correct?
- How do we know it is complete?
- Who has determined the standard?
- By what standard of judgment is that person deemed fit to determine the standard of judging relative merit?
- Who determines the standard for point 6?
- Whence the authority for determining who makes the determination in point 7?
- By what standard is the authority of point 8 established?
- Who determines the standard in point 9?
- And so on and so forth into eternity.
In computer science there is the concept of "recursion". A recursive function, for example, is one that calls itself. For example, the function for computing the factorial of a number may be written in pseudo-code as follows:
function factorial( number ):if number = 0return 1elseendif
RESULT = number * factorial ( number - 1)
return RESULT
The "if" conditional statement in this simple function is what is called the "loop invariant" or "recursive invariant". It is the "bedrock" of the function in that when the condition is true, the function no longer calls itself. Without this, the function would, in principle, call itself into eternity because there would be nothing to tell it to stop - no bedrock at the bottom of the recursive hole, so to speak, with which it would collide and come to a halt.
It is not my aim to give lessons in computer science here, but let us go through a very brief example usage of the above function, that the core principle may become clear, which I assure you will be relevant to this discussion by way of serving as a conceptual example analogously applicable to the questions at hand.
Factorial of n is defined as the product of all the integer numbers 1 through n, and is written n! So then, 3! - 3*2*1, which is 6. Furthermore, 0! is defined as being equal to 1. The function above would work as follows, for 3!:
Calling the function and passing '3' as the parameter, we check to see whether that parameter is equal to zero. It is not, therefore we call factorial of 2, which checks to see whether 2 = 0. It does not, and therefore calls 1! One is not equal to zero, therefore the function again calls itself with the parameter of zero. This time, zero does in fact equal zero and the "bottom-most" copy of factorial returns the value of '1', which is then multiplied by the parameter of the previous copy of the function, in this case '1'. 1 x 1 = 1, which is then returned to the next upward copy of the function, which multiplies that result by its own parameter, 2. 2 x 1 = 2, which is then returned to the calling copy of the function, which them multiplies by 3. 2 x 3 = 6, which is returned to whatever was the original calling entity. Therefore, 3! = 6.
We see a strongly analogous situation in the list, above, in that there is no apparent answer to the questions posed that would not lead to more questions of a perfectly similar nature. In other words, there is no invariant. Each question, regardless of the answer, leads to another similar question - that is, they recurse "downward" into eternity precisely because there is no absolutely, rock solid bottom upon which even ONE answer rests. Were a single such answer to be discovered, it would satisfy its "calling" question which in turn would become the answer to the question that called it, and so forth back up the chain of questions until we arrived back at the top of the list, having thereby answered the first question, "by what means do we determine the relative standings?"
Because we have established a regular, recursively regressive pattern that has no apparent invariant, we can comfortably conclude that there is no answer sufficient to the satisfaction of the basic questions regarding the notion of quantitatively unequal claims to life. I also strongly suspect that the impossibility of the existence of such an invariant is well provable, but my formal skills in mathematical and semantic proofs are VERY rusty... and I'm being lazy here, I confess.
My shameful lassitude aside, we may nonetheless and with equal confidence, dismiss the assertion of the existence of quantitatively unequal claims to life on this basis of a recursively endless regression of questions, each of which has no irreducible and non-arbitrary answer, as determined by the perfectly analogous nature (I would say semantically isomorphic) of the questions from one "level" in relation to that of any other. In other words, when endeavoring to answer those questions, you immediately embark upon a hamster's wheel, running for all you are worth and going absolutely nowhere.
I do believe, then, that we now hold in hand the sufficient and perhaps even complete means for dismissing the argument for rejecting the CP. Rejection places the ball in one's court to justify the action. The justifications lead to nothing but an infinite regress of analogous questions, thereby illustrating that satisfactory (non-arbitrary) answers do not, in fact exist and that, therefore, the position is bankrupt in terms of both reason, logic, and most importantly, truth.
We have, by this admittedly and somewhat formally loose means demonstrated that rejection of the CP is invalid and untruthful. But does that imply acceptance, OTOH, is perforce valid and truthful? At this moment I am not 100% certain. The only alternate position of which I can immediately conceive is one of the noncommittal skeptic, which while technically valid, brings us nowhere in practical terms. The eternal skeptic waits, well... into eternity for something that may not exist. One can readily see where that will take us.
Therefore, it appears with good confidence that acceptance of the CP is both logically valid and in keeping with what we may call "truth".
From this point it is then possible to begin the derivations of the various primary principles of proper human relations, and from there those of a secondary nature. Prior to proceeding there, however, I would like to hear what you all have to say about the issue addressed here.
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