Iran and the Revolution
An exposure of the American Plans
Part 1: Iran and the Revolution
"To break the deadlock over compensation to Anglo-Iranin, the US and Britain agreed to accept the principle of Iranian ownership of its oil resources. In return, Iran ceded production and marketing rights which were given a consortium, including 40 percent US participation, that formally ended Britain's oil monopoly in Iran. With the establishment of the Iranian consortium, the US was now the major player in the oil, and the volatile politics, of the Middle East."
The involvement of the colonial powers in the Middle East politically and culturally is evident. On the surface it may appear to some that the West interferes and manipulates the internal affairs of the third world countries to spread their "democratic" values, but the bottom line is imperialism.
As Muslims, it is our obligation to realize and understand howi nternatinal affairs are controlled and how countries such as the US, Britain, and France have a direct influence on our land. In this article we will examine US involvement in Iran, observing the vents such as the oil crises in the 50's, the Mussadiq affair, the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the current US policy towards Iran.
A Brief Historical Overview
Historically, US in the beginning had cultural ties with not just Iran, but with the entire Middle East. Until World War II the missionary efforts in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, extending back into the early years of the 1 9th Century. While, this served the only continuing American interest in the region. Missionaries had made few converts from amongst the Muslims. They did, however, establish schools and colleges to train leaders which served as their catalysts.
In the 1930's American oil companies entered Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During World War II, US did become involved politically, especially in Saudi Arabia. The meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake at Suez in February 1945 symbolized this concern.2
However, before World War II the relationship between the United States and Iran were cordial but distant. The United States had established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1856, but did not send a diplomat of ambassadorial rank until 1944. However, during the late 1 800s and early 1 900s, the US did have missionaries, teachers and archaeologists in Iran. With the World War II raging in Europe, Britain and the Soviet Union jointly invaded Iran in September 1941 to establish a supply route to the Soviet army. The invading forces quickly overpowered the Iranian army and forced Reza IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA
Shah out of power, who had established relations with the Germans. Reza Shah was replaced by the British by his twenty one year old son, Muhammad Reza Pahlvai, the late Shah.3 Following the US entry into the war, the United States sent troops to Iran in conjunction with the supply operation, initiating a period in which US-Iranian relations grew rapidly.
Roots of US - Iranian Relationship
In 1942, US established two military missions to balance the British and Russian presence. Of the two military missions, the US Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH) was by far more important than the US Mission to the Iranian Army (ARM1[SH). Under Article 20 of the agreement between Iran and the US in 1943, the head of GENMISH exercised executive control over the internal security force of 25,000 men. He reported directly to the minister of the interior in Tehran.4 Brigadier General Norman H. Norman Schwarzkopf, (father of the Gulf War general Schwarzkopf) was the head of GENMISH and the Gendarmerie. He was appointed to the post in Tehran by Roosevelt. Schwarzkopf virtually ruled the large Iranian force of internal security police (SAVAK). The Gendarmerie took part in the ere-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, which was under Soviet Union control.5 Schwarzkopf, to say the least, became a powerful man. In 1947, he confidently wrote that by the end of 1948 (when the Gendarmerie agreement was to expire) he expected to have the force sufficiently organized to make American command (military) unnecessary. During an audience with the Shah, Schwarzkopf insisted on the need to increase the Gendarmerie to 40,000 men, and when the monarch expressed fear that the force would become the private army of the prime minister, he replied that the nation required such a force because his men had to do much of the work of the army in Azerbaijan and among the tribes.6 The general even had control of the Iranian Majlis, by having 88 votes in it. He boasted this to Wiley, the US ambassador to Iran.7
In 1947 and 1948, the US embassy staff grew considerably in size, enhancing diplomatic, commercial and cultural interactions between the two nations. More importantly, the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CLN established a station in the Tehran's military attaches and embassy political officers. These covert operations included intelligence-gathering and propaganda operations aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies in Iran, cross-border espionage and subversion raids into Soviet territory, and efforts to map out escape and evasion routes and organize "stay-behind" guerrilla networks for use in the event of a Soviet invasion. Although these operations were all aimed ultimately at the Soviet Union, they did have the effect of straightening or weakening various Iranian political actors during this period8 Consequently, an increasing US involvement in the internal affairs of the country was becoming evident. This fact becomes evident in the Mussadiq affair, the revolution and in the general setup and direction of Iran.
Mussadiq, US, and UK
In the late 1940s, unrest began growing steadily among the politically active in Iran, but mainly by the help of the Americans. This was because of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British-owned firm which was earning large profits from its monopoly over Iran's oil industry. In October of 1949, a group of prominent political figures established an organization known as the National Front to press for political reforms and nationalization of the AlOC's assets in Iran. The National Front became extremely popular and managed to elect eight of its members to the Majlis in late 1949 which was greatly influenced by the American General Schwarzkopf. The National Front was led by Muhammad Mussadiq, a charismatic Majlis deputy from a wealthy land owning family who had established a reputation as an ardent nationalist and democrat. By all accounts, it seems that Mussadiq was brought into power with the American help. This is due to many reasons such as:
Britain had oil monopoly in Iran and Mussadiq called for the end to this by calling for nationalization of the oil industry.
Mussadiq was from a prominent land owning family from prominent tribes. As mentioned earlier, Schwrtzgopf had already been working with many of the tribes to prepare them to take a more active role in the Iranian government.
The US government during this period had renewed their global strategy of containing Soviet's influence. It concluded that a major effort had to be made in Iran to prevent Tudeh Party (communist) from coming to power and delivering Iran into the Soviet hands. The answer to communist was the nationalist Mussadiq.
Razmara, predecessor to Mussadiq was brought in by America's blessing and turned anti-American.9 Therefore, Razmara was assassinated. After the assassination, the Majlis nominated Mussadiq for the primership. As stated above, Schwarzkopf, the American General had said that he had considerable influence over the Majlis.
After Mussadiq assumed office, the Truman administration publicly expressed strong support for him. Recognizing that he could serve an effective alternative to the Tudeh Party. "Washington concluded that Iran must be kept in the Western camp at all costs because of its strategic location and that a protracted oil crisis might weaken the US economy and threaten US and Western security. Accordingly, for the remainder of Truman's term in office the administration pursued a policy of supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow him, and attempting to mediate an agreement that would satisfy both parties to the oil dispute and minimize disruption of the world oil market." 10
US brought Mussadiq to power, so that US would0btain their share of oil wealth from Iran. During the same period, the US had already reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia for sharing the oil resources based on a 50-50 plan. 1 l After coming to power, the first thing Mussadiq did was to nationalize the oil on April 29, 1951. Nationalization of the oil posed threat to Britains weak economy and dwindling prestige, so the nationalization decree initiated a confrontation between Britain and Iran. This lead Britain to start covert operations in Iran, none of which succeeded. Britain then persuaded major world oil companies to boycott Iranian oil exports. The British also imposed a series of bilateral economic sanctions on Iran and began an ominous military buildup in the region. In September 1951, British officials began implementing a plan to invade southwestern Iran and seize the oil fields. When US officials were told about this plan, President Truman notified British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that the US would not support an invasion and urged him to resume negotiations with Iran over the oil dispute. As a result, Attlee was force to abandon the invasion plan, telling his cabinet that "in view of the attitude of the United States government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to use force" in Iran. 12 Soon after the oil nationalization law was enacted, US officials began to implement a plan to ease the effect of the British oil blockade on the world oil market. Under this plan US oil companies were asked to provide oil to US allies that had been adversely affected by the blockade. Although this effort was intended to help stabilize the world oil market, it also reinforced the oil blockade and therefore inadvertently helped to weaken the Iranian economy and undermine Mussadiq's popular support. At the same time, US officials began a concerted effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the oil dispute. They advised the British to accept nationalization of the AIOC and agree to a 50/50 division of profits with Iran. However, the attempt failed.
US Strengthens its foothold in Iran
A few months latter, US was able to strike a secret deal with Shah's sister, Princess Ashraf.
In the deal, Iran conceded production and marketing rights which were given to a consortium, including 40% US participation. This formally ended the British oil monopoly in Iran.13After the deal was reached by the Americans, the CIA officers in Tehran began to turn some of their anti-Soviet covert operations in directions that undermined Mussadiqis base of support. Under a propaganda operation code-named BEDAMN, they distributed newspaper articles and cartoons that depicted Mussadiq as corrupt and immoral and portrayed him as exploiting Aytullah Kashani. They provided financial assistance to certain clergymen to drive them away from Mussadiq. CIA officers had long-standing ties to the Pan-Iranist Party and the Toiler's Party (both had strongly supported Mussadiq) made efforts to turn these organizations against Mussadiq. In a particular noteworthy case, two CIA officers in the fall of 1952 approached Baqai, who had headed the Toiler' Party, encouraging him to break with IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA Page 6 of 7
Mussadiq and giving him money. Similar approaches may have been made to Kashani, Makki. and other prominent figures."l4 By November 1952 both the Pan-Iranists and Toilersi Party had split into pro and anti-Mussadiq factions; Kashani, Makki, Baqai, and other National Front leaders had openly turned against Mussadiq, thanks to the heavy covert efforts by the CIA. Hand in hand with the CIA, the British were carrying out very similar, but more extensive covert activities against Mussadiq. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, who had been heading British intelligence operation in Iran, was sent to Washington in November to present US officials with a plan to oust Mussadiq.15 The plan called for a coordinated uprising to be engineered by the Rashidians and certain Bakhtiari tribal elements, with or without the Shahis approval. On February 3, 1953, two weeks after the Eisenhower inauguration, top US and British officials met in Washington and made a decision to develop and carry out a plan to work together in order to over throw Mussadiq. By using the BEDAMN network, CIA carried out extensive propaganda barrage against Mussadiq and organized antigovernment and anti-Tudeh demonstrations, adding considerably to the turmoil that was engulfing Tehran. They sought the support of top military officers, arranging to have certain army units participated in the coup.
Finally, Mussadiq fell in August of 1953. With Mussadiq out of the way, the Eisenhower administration rushed to support General Zahedi, who had already been chosen to replace Mussadiq as the prime minister. The US provided Iran with $68 million, mounting to roughly one third of the total revenue Iran had lost as a result of the British oil embargo. Over $300 million in additional US economic aid was given to Iran during the next ten years. The United States also began a major effort to strengthen Shah's security forces soon after the coup, reorganizing and training his domestic intelligence apparatus and giving him almost $600 million in military assistance during the next decade. l6 As a result, Iran's economy grew rapidly. With the more effective security apparatus in place, Shah consolidated his grip on power in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By late 1963, this process had been completed: Shah presided over an authoritarian, repressive regime under which organized opposition to his authority was not tolerated, and there seemed little chance that he would fall from power.
For twenty six years, Iran was a virtual colony of the US corporations and the Pentagon. During these years, the process of Iran's integration into the global capitalist market dominated by the US was consolidated. Iran's role, along with other countries in the region was to deliver cheap oil and receive mostly finished consumer commodities.
Part 2: Iran and the Revolution
Why the need for the Revolution?
Since Shah was serving America's interest so well, the question comes to mind is why he was removed from power. Was there a sincere and honest to goodness revolution which brought Khomeni to power? In this section we will demonstrate that it was the United States who used Khomeini and his colleagues to oust the Shah.
The American administration, under President Carter, charged that the CIA had failed in its mission to protect the Shah. However, such a claim must be completely rejected because, as mentioned in the previous sections that there were more than 40,000 American military advisors in Iran who worked in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as in the security offices (SAVAK), and the oil companies. These advisors had the most sophisticated spying devices and were free to move within Iran as well as in the Gulf region. They also constituted one seventh of the Iranian army. For every F-14 and F-15, there was an American advisor. Then, how can anyone believe that what happened in Iran was a surprise to the CIA? A more convincing theory is that the CIA wanted to remove Shah from power. There are several reasons that support this claim:
Shah wanted to build an empire that he claimed would be the sixth greatest power in the world. To make his dream a reality, he wanted to buy the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the world. To accomplish this, the Shah spent more than $20 billion in the military field. This was a great concern for the U.S. because this would create an imbalance between Iran and its neighbors. Such a point was mentioned in the documents seized from the Embassy, right after the revolution. One of these documents stated that the Iranian military buildup would have serious consequences on the future cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. at that time was supporting. 17 This relationship was strategically important in securing the Gulf region. In addition, the Iranian arms buildup might have forced Iraq to move closer to the Soviet Union for protection and armaments, which consequently could have increased the rise in armaments in the region, jeopardizing U.S. efforts to have a friendly relationship with Baghdad. 18
Shah visited the USSR and met with some of leaders by his initiative, which angered the U. S. America's patience ran out when Shah began dealing with the Americans as an independent partner. In an interview with U.S. News & World Report, Shah said that if the U.S. would take an unfriendly attitude towards Iran, then Iran "can hurt you (U.S.) as badly, if not more so, than you can hurt us (Iran). Not just through oil, we can create trouble for you in the region. If you force us to change our friendly attitude, the repercussions will be immeasurable."19
Concern over Shah's attitude towards the oil policies, which differed from America's point of view. This was another point mentioned in the seized documents from the American Embassy in Tehran.
Therefore, how would US remain silent when a third world leader was revolting? In an interview with Muhammed Hasanayn Heikal, the Egyptian Journalist, Shah said, "Some people accuse me of being an American puppet, but give me one reason why I should accept such a role You have no idea the number of clashes I have had with the Americans. The last of these was over OPEC. The Americans wanted to break it up from the inside and tried to do so. The Saudis were terrified. It was I who had to bear the brunt of the confrontation. I can exercise power on my own. Why should I want to exercise power on behalf of somebody else?"20 The CIA, as it is well known, had brought Shah back to power, after Mussadiq, and protected him for twenty-seven years. The entire American presence in Iran was in danger and for U.S. this was a life-and-death issue.
Shah was quiet aware of the CIA's involvement in his country. He said, in a private conversation with some American visitors, that he received some reports that the Americans were involved with a few oil companies during some of the most recent riots in the country. Shah said in an interview with Dean Brellis and Parvis Raeim from Time Magazine that the CIA began making contact within dissident ranks fifteen years ago so that the U.S. would have influence with anyone who might manage to overthrow him.2 1 Also, he said that "if he left the throne, thousands would die in the ensuing fight," and if that happened, he feels that "Communist forces would take control of what would then be a bankrupt and fragmented country.~22 When Shah became sixty years old, he did not have a strong party to inherit his policies. The people wanted him out because of corruption, though many had valued the things he did. They wanted somebody else to lead them. The strongest alternative to Shah was Khomeini, especially during a time when Islam became a hot topic in the region. Shah accused the CIA of being behind the plot to get rid of him and of having strong relations with his opposition. While, Khomeini was the head of that opposition.
Khomeni's Role in the Revolution
Can it be right what Shah said? How can anybody believe this accusation and at the same time believe in the asceticism which surrounded Khomeini? First, we would like to mention Khomeini ideological understanding. He says about Tuqi'a (dissimulation),
which means "legitimacy to lie if it is beneficial." Additionally, Khomeini said: "If the circumstances of Tuqi'a forces anyone of us to enter the Sultan's doors, we should not do it even if it causes murder, unless his seeming treachery causes a real victory for Islam and the Muslims like the treachery of Ali bin Yekteen and Nasir ad-Deen Tusi."23 Thus, Khomeini took Tusi as the ideal figure to follow. Tusi, as every Muslim should know, was the Vizir of the Criminal Holakou. Tusi guided Holakou to the Baghdad massacres some seven hundred years ago. If Khoemin considered Tusi as a role model then what's the big deal for him to have a relationship with US?
Khomeini added: "...it is natural that Islam permit us to enter the Tyrant's establishments if the real aim is to stop oppression or to make a coup de'tat. Against the people in power, this "treachery" will be mandatory, and there is no doubt about it."24 It is obvious that Khomeini saw the deal and cooperation with the enemies of the Muslims as mandatory if it benefited his sector. As a result, Khomeini claimed that it was permissible for Tusi to serve the Tartar invaders and used it to justify his cooperation between him and the CIA on the notion that it was beneficial for him and his country.
Some would still find it hard to believe that Khomeini had a relationship with the Americans while attacking the US at the same time? In this regard, we should remind ourselves of Abdul Nasser who used to badmouth U.S. in the media and U.S. would do the same. However, Nasser was a US puppet. Miles Copeland, the CIA operative in the region, used to write his speech in which he heavily criticizes the U.S. along with making the announcement to buy arms from Czechoslovakia.25From this, we can see how a leader from the Third World can appear to be an enemy of the U.S. but in reality is a puppet. Consequently, American agents can wear several masks and we have to be aware of this.
The US - Khomeni Relationship
There are tremendous amounts of information which link Khoemin with the Americans. He served their agenda and purpose regardless of his intention. The American influence in the region was deeply rooted and remains until today. US-Khomeni relationship is obvious based upon the following evidences:
Intro. To the following meeting especially the Bruce
1. By the late 1978, many in the Embassy and in the State Department were convinced that the Shah could not last and were in contact with secular and religious figures that might enter a governmental position26. Shah sent a leek to the Iraqi government accusing the CIA of what happened in Iran, telling Iraq that the U.S. was trying to change the political systems in the region by using religion and that Baghdad's turn would be next. The Shah asked Iraq to watch Khomeini more closely because he had connections with the CIA. Some news from the Iranian Palace accused the former Information Minister, Dayrysh Homayun, of publishing an article in Ettala'at violently attacking Khomeini and of having a connection with the CIA, which ordered the distribution of this article and initiated the riots against the Shah as a result.27 All of this gave Khomeni great amount of publicity.
Note: give background info of what the dialogue really means do not leave it up to the reader to assumed that his is an agent. Also mention the dialogue was continuos not just once or twice.
On January 21, 1979, the former Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, arrived in Paris from Tehran. He held some talks with the opposition leader Khomeini and told him Carter's opinions of the recent events. As the news agencies reported, when Clark left Khomeini, he said, "I have a great hope that this revolution will bring social justice to Iranian people." 28
An interview with the Sudanese leader, Sadeq Al-Mehdi, in Al-Mostaqbal magazine, convinces us that the American administration used him as a mediator in the hostage crisis by visiting Khomeini. He added that this was not the first time he mediated between the American administration and Khomeini.29
Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, said in a conversation with the Iranian newspaper, Iyianadjan, which Reuter broadcasted on August 7, 1979, that Carter warned Khomeini to be careful, if Bakhtiar did not support the Revolution. This warning was in a letter which two French presidential envoys carried to Khomeini in exile on Neauphle Le Chateau in France. What is important here is the letter and the warning which Carter gave to Khomeni.
NBC news reported that Sheikh Al-Islam Reza Al-Shirazy, one of the religious figures in Iran, had secret medical treatment for four months in Minnesota. The network reported that Al-Shirazy was wounded in an assassination attempt in July 1979. A speaker of the State Department said that there is no relation between Al-Shirazy and the Revolutionary Council in Iran, but he is a friend of Khomeini. However, the network did not report whether Shirazy left the U.S. at that time.30 Why was the U.S. so loyal to Khomeini while he held some American hostages? And how did the Americans know the names of the Revolutionary Council while we know the names were secret?
5. The Meeting between Bruce Laingen and Khomeini Laingen, the American Charge D' Affairs in Tehran, held three meetings with Khomeini in Qom in mid-August, 1979. He also held a fourth meeting with him in Tehran while Khomeini was making a short visit there. Right after the meeting, the riots took place in Ahwas that reduced the oil supply, and the result was a shortage in the gasoline supply. The U.S. then supplied the needs of Iran, and Congress, at that time, uncovered the secret deal.
At the same time, the Kurdish revolt occurred, which made Tehran import the spare parts and equipment from the U.S. to operate their fighter planes and troop carriers. Al-Watan Al-Arabia magazine from Paris stated that the first meeting between Laingen and Khomeini took place in Qom, accompanied by revolutionary guards, and that Laingen was carrying a file about the Kurdish revolt and the financial support of the Kurds by Russia. The magazine added that the Iranian cargo planes used Madrid as a refueling station on the trip between the U.S. and Iran to carry the spare parts, after an eight-month cut in the supply.3 1
Furthermore, Yazdi confirmed in an interview with the Associated Press, that there were talks with the American government about sending spare parts for at least part of the military equipment, as he stated, which Iran had, and these parts did arrive in Iran.32 On August 11, 1979, The Daily Telegraph said that there was a termination of the U.S. arms deals except those for spare parts.
There is no doubt that there was mediation between the U.S. and Khomeini via Al-Mehdi and Clark, or via the French envoys from the presidential office of the French Republic. From this news, there is clear evidence about the connections between Carter the "Satan" and Khomeini the "Angel." At this point, we would like to cite three pertinent sources:
Some declarations from the Shah; Khomeini's partners who disagreed with him after the Revolution succeeded; the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Watan.