AuH20
02-18-2014, 11:09 PM
Fighting welterweights for decades will do that. Read this closely. 'Country club warfare' predicated on their time and their choosing with 24 hour air support. Not to mention they have dramatically lowered their standards of late, taking any warm bodies.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/seduced-by-success/
The level of difficulty and set of challenges the Army has faced since 1980 isn’t comparable to those faced by uniformed leaders during World War II, Korea, and even the initial stages of Vietnam. Our senior leaders have spent virtually their entire careers in environments where they were able to schedule “war” as if it were a training event. They had the luxury of establishing deployment schedules, often times years in advance. Next-to-deploy units had predictable flight schedules, shipping timetables, and arrived in the combat theater to mature infrastructure. Troops frequently had on-base shopping malls (post exchanges), restaurants, coffee shops, and all-you-can-eat military dining facilities (typically featuring weekly lobster and steak nights).
Throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, leaders at Regional Command and below have been able to conduct tactical engagements throughout their deployment window against Iraqi and Afghan insurgents with unprecedented certainty. Before the first boot hit the ground, leaders often knew exactly when their units would return. American troops were able to conduct tactical missions at a time, place, scope, and speed as they saw fit. If any conditions didn’t favor employment, U.S. leaders could choose to alter the fight timelines or cancel the mission altogether. The only time the enemy took the tactical initiative it was at something like platoon-level or below, and action of that nature was rare. Since the Vietnam War, no American combat leader above the position of company commander has faced a situation where his unit was at risk of defeat by an unexpected enemy attack.
Ever.
In fact, never since Vietnam has any enemy formation had any chance of inflicting a tactical defeat on U.S. forces. Not in Grenada, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, nor any phase of counterinsurgency operations since 9/11.
Not one of our combat opponents over the past four decades has had a capable air force, effective tank, artillery, or infantry force, helicopter fleet, missile force, anti-air capability, or an effective logistic and supply chain. Owing to the overwhelming capability we have in all those same categories, any operation we undertook – whether the tank fights in the deserts of northern Kuwait in 1991, the drive to Baghdad in 2003, or every COIN-related mission in Iraq and Afghanistan – could only result in a tactical success. Whether the plan was satisfactory, brilliant, or outright foolish, it didn’t matter (at least tactically). The U.S. was ordained to win.
As a result, we have convinced ourselves that all our plans, concepts, and methods of employment have been validated as effective. It is rare to consider how any given plan or action might have fared against a capable foe. The virtual absence of such critical thinking and the dearth of experience in true crises – those forced upon us by unexpected (and effective) enemy action — has created several levels of senior leaders of uncertain mental agility. Like the French and British in 1940, we may be mentally and physically unprepared for an enemy with tough and surprising tactics.
Imagine one of today’s division commanders finding himself at the line of departure against a capable enemy with combined-arms formation. He spent his time as a lieutenant in Bosnia conducting “presence patrols” and other peacekeeping activities. He may have commanded a company in a peacetime, garrison environment. Then he commanded a battalion in the early years of Afghanistan when little of tactical movement took place. He commanded a brigade in the later stages of Iraq, sending units on patrols, night raids, and cordon-and-search operations; and training Iraq policemen or soldiers.
Not once in his career did an enemy formation threaten his flank. He never, even in training, hunkered in a dugout while enemy artillery destroyed one-quarter of his combat vehicles, and emerged to execute a hasty defense against the enemy assault force pouring over the hill.
Perhaps our commander’s enemy similarly lacks combat experience. Or perhaps he has considerable combined arms field training. Either way, it’s the first time that U.S. leader has faced the profound stress of split-second life-and-death decisions.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/seduced-by-success/
The level of difficulty and set of challenges the Army has faced since 1980 isn’t comparable to those faced by uniformed leaders during World War II, Korea, and even the initial stages of Vietnam. Our senior leaders have spent virtually their entire careers in environments where they were able to schedule “war” as if it were a training event. They had the luxury of establishing deployment schedules, often times years in advance. Next-to-deploy units had predictable flight schedules, shipping timetables, and arrived in the combat theater to mature infrastructure. Troops frequently had on-base shopping malls (post exchanges), restaurants, coffee shops, and all-you-can-eat military dining facilities (typically featuring weekly lobster and steak nights).
Throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, leaders at Regional Command and below have been able to conduct tactical engagements throughout their deployment window against Iraqi and Afghan insurgents with unprecedented certainty. Before the first boot hit the ground, leaders often knew exactly when their units would return. American troops were able to conduct tactical missions at a time, place, scope, and speed as they saw fit. If any conditions didn’t favor employment, U.S. leaders could choose to alter the fight timelines or cancel the mission altogether. The only time the enemy took the tactical initiative it was at something like platoon-level or below, and action of that nature was rare. Since the Vietnam War, no American combat leader above the position of company commander has faced a situation where his unit was at risk of defeat by an unexpected enemy attack.
Ever.
In fact, never since Vietnam has any enemy formation had any chance of inflicting a tactical defeat on U.S. forces. Not in Grenada, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, nor any phase of counterinsurgency operations since 9/11.
Not one of our combat opponents over the past four decades has had a capable air force, effective tank, artillery, or infantry force, helicopter fleet, missile force, anti-air capability, or an effective logistic and supply chain. Owing to the overwhelming capability we have in all those same categories, any operation we undertook – whether the tank fights in the deserts of northern Kuwait in 1991, the drive to Baghdad in 2003, or every COIN-related mission in Iraq and Afghanistan – could only result in a tactical success. Whether the plan was satisfactory, brilliant, or outright foolish, it didn’t matter (at least tactically). The U.S. was ordained to win.
As a result, we have convinced ourselves that all our plans, concepts, and methods of employment have been validated as effective. It is rare to consider how any given plan or action might have fared against a capable foe. The virtual absence of such critical thinking and the dearth of experience in true crises – those forced upon us by unexpected (and effective) enemy action — has created several levels of senior leaders of uncertain mental agility. Like the French and British in 1940, we may be mentally and physically unprepared for an enemy with tough and surprising tactics.
Imagine one of today’s division commanders finding himself at the line of departure against a capable enemy with combined-arms formation. He spent his time as a lieutenant in Bosnia conducting “presence patrols” and other peacekeeping activities. He may have commanded a company in a peacetime, garrison environment. Then he commanded a battalion in the early years of Afghanistan when little of tactical movement took place. He commanded a brigade in the later stages of Iraq, sending units on patrols, night raids, and cordon-and-search operations; and training Iraq policemen or soldiers.
Not once in his career did an enemy formation threaten his flank. He never, even in training, hunkered in a dugout while enemy artillery destroyed one-quarter of his combat vehicles, and emerged to execute a hasty defense against the enemy assault force pouring over the hill.
Perhaps our commander’s enemy similarly lacks combat experience. Or perhaps he has considerable combined arms field training. Either way, it’s the first time that U.S. leader has faced the profound stress of split-second life-and-death decisions.