tangent4ronpaul
07-26-2013, 04:49 PM
Not mine. Forwaeded from a frien of mines,
Dear Mr. XXXXXX:
Thank you for contacting me to express your opposition to the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs. I appreciate hearing from you.
We must protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. I share your concerns about the scope and nature of a variety of activities undertaken pursuant to the so-called PATRIOT Act. And, like you, I am very troubled by the lack of transparency contained in the conduct of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which interprets the provisions of the so-called PATRIOT Act to authorize these programs. In my view, the overly broad language of the PATRIOT Act can result in the abuse of our privacy rights. I raised my concerns about this broad language and the ramifications of enactment during each reauthorization of the so-called PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act. In fact, I have consistently voted against the long-term extension of these controversial sections (Section 215: "business records" and Section 702: "PRISM").
We must ensure that our nation has the necessary and appropriate tools to protect our country from those who would seek to do us harm. However, in the process of protecting ourselves, we must determine whether the tools we use would undermine the very rights that we seek to protect. That is the test we should apply to various surveillance tools and authorities. Applying that test, I oppose a number of the provisions in Section 215. I believe the authority in Section 215 to compel business records of any "tangible item," from anyone who is shown to be reasonably "relevant" to an investigation is overly broad and subject to abuse. Additionally, I oppose the provision that requires recipients of Section 215 orders to wait a year before challenging a nondisclosure order, and the fact that the government can use secret evidence to oppose judicial challenges to a Section 215 order. Finally, when Congress reauthorized this section in 2005, it made permanent the authorization for the use of National Security Letters (NSLs), which are surveillance tools used to obtain certain types of communications and financial records. I opposed this measure, and have advocated for amendments that would reintroduce sunsets (i.e. established dates upon which these authorities expire so we can hold agencies accountable) for NSLs and require Inspector General audits on the use of NSLs and other "tangible item" orders. The use of these orders should also be publically reported to increase transparency and oversight.
I will continue to work with my colleagues to find a sensible solution that ensures that these surveillance authorities are founded upon the principles of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, judicial review, and the protection of Constitutional rights. That is why I am a co-sponsor of the Ending Secret Law Act (H.R. 2475) and the Presidential Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act (H.R. 2671). These bills would make important reforms to the FISA Court by shining a light on the secretive rulings it issues that significantly construct or interpret the law, along with ensuring that the judges who sit on that court are appointed by the President and subject to a public confirmation process in the Senate (currently, they are only chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court). There should be no institution in our country with the power to create secret laws.
While I opposed the reauthorization of Section 215 and Section 702 and believe they must be revised, there has been much misinformation regarding the specific aspects of some parts of the programs disclosed by Edward Snowden. My biggest concern since the disclosure of these programs has been with respect to the standards in place that control how and when the government can request access to the content of Americans' communications. I asked pointed questions on this issue at intelligence briefings on these programs and I am confident that any access to the content of communications within a program authorized under Section 215 does require an individualized warrant from a judge. These warrants are not issued unless the government has shown probable cause that the identified individual is an agent of a foreign power or a potential terrorist.
Finally, I am pleased that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board finally has a confirmed Chairman (David Medine) and has announced plans to release a report on the legality of these surveillance programs and their impact on civil liberties. We pushed for the creation of this Board to serve as a crucial check to the government's authority with respect to these surveillance activities. I had been discouraged by the lack of operational progress of this Board since its establishment by Congress in 2004, and it is my hope that this Board will begin to more forcefully exercise its oversight role (through its access to classified documents and FISA Court opinions).
Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever I may be of service.
Sincerely,
Chris Van Hollen
Member of Congress
P.S. Please visit my website at www.house.gov/vanhollen. While there, you can sign up for my e-mail newsletter, view press releases and statements, see what legislation I have sponsored or co-sponsored and receive information on the various constituent services provided by my office.
Dear Mr. XXXXXX:
Thank you for contacting me to express your opposition to the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs. I appreciate hearing from you.
We must protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. I share your concerns about the scope and nature of a variety of activities undertaken pursuant to the so-called PATRIOT Act. And, like you, I am very troubled by the lack of transparency contained in the conduct of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which interprets the provisions of the so-called PATRIOT Act to authorize these programs. In my view, the overly broad language of the PATRIOT Act can result in the abuse of our privacy rights. I raised my concerns about this broad language and the ramifications of enactment during each reauthorization of the so-called PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act. In fact, I have consistently voted against the long-term extension of these controversial sections (Section 215: "business records" and Section 702: "PRISM").
We must ensure that our nation has the necessary and appropriate tools to protect our country from those who would seek to do us harm. However, in the process of protecting ourselves, we must determine whether the tools we use would undermine the very rights that we seek to protect. That is the test we should apply to various surveillance tools and authorities. Applying that test, I oppose a number of the provisions in Section 215. I believe the authority in Section 215 to compel business records of any "tangible item," from anyone who is shown to be reasonably "relevant" to an investigation is overly broad and subject to abuse. Additionally, I oppose the provision that requires recipients of Section 215 orders to wait a year before challenging a nondisclosure order, and the fact that the government can use secret evidence to oppose judicial challenges to a Section 215 order. Finally, when Congress reauthorized this section in 2005, it made permanent the authorization for the use of National Security Letters (NSLs), which are surveillance tools used to obtain certain types of communications and financial records. I opposed this measure, and have advocated for amendments that would reintroduce sunsets (i.e. established dates upon which these authorities expire so we can hold agencies accountable) for NSLs and require Inspector General audits on the use of NSLs and other "tangible item" orders. The use of these orders should also be publically reported to increase transparency and oversight.
I will continue to work with my colleagues to find a sensible solution that ensures that these surveillance authorities are founded upon the principles of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, judicial review, and the protection of Constitutional rights. That is why I am a co-sponsor of the Ending Secret Law Act (H.R. 2475) and the Presidential Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act (H.R. 2671). These bills would make important reforms to the FISA Court by shining a light on the secretive rulings it issues that significantly construct or interpret the law, along with ensuring that the judges who sit on that court are appointed by the President and subject to a public confirmation process in the Senate (currently, they are only chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court). There should be no institution in our country with the power to create secret laws.
While I opposed the reauthorization of Section 215 and Section 702 and believe they must be revised, there has been much misinformation regarding the specific aspects of some parts of the programs disclosed by Edward Snowden. My biggest concern since the disclosure of these programs has been with respect to the standards in place that control how and when the government can request access to the content of Americans' communications. I asked pointed questions on this issue at intelligence briefings on these programs and I am confident that any access to the content of communications within a program authorized under Section 215 does require an individualized warrant from a judge. These warrants are not issued unless the government has shown probable cause that the identified individual is an agent of a foreign power or a potential terrorist.
Finally, I am pleased that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board finally has a confirmed Chairman (David Medine) and has announced plans to release a report on the legality of these surveillance programs and their impact on civil liberties. We pushed for the creation of this Board to serve as a crucial check to the government's authority with respect to these surveillance activities. I had been discouraged by the lack of operational progress of this Board since its establishment by Congress in 2004, and it is my hope that this Board will begin to more forcefully exercise its oversight role (through its access to classified documents and FISA Court opinions).
Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever I may be of service.
Sincerely,
Chris Van Hollen
Member of Congress
P.S. Please visit my website at www.house.gov/vanhollen. While there, you can sign up for my e-mail newsletter, view press releases and statements, see what legislation I have sponsored or co-sponsored and receive information on the various constituent services provided by my office.