stu2002
05-10-2012, 10:29 AM
Daniel McCarthy May 10th, 2012
This morning I was on Mike Church’s Sirius XM radio show to talk about my post on “Buying Off the Ron Paul Vote.” Going over my notes about how Pat Buchanan’s delegates were treated at the 1996 Republican convention in San Diego reminded me of just how thoroughly the GOP can frustrate a sizable block of delegates. Buchanan went to the convention with some 200 delegates out of 1,990 — so a bit better than 10 percent. (Supporters’ estimates for Paul’s delegate numbers this year range from 104 to 201 so far.) In 1992, with far fewer delegates, Buchanan had received a prime-time speaking slot. What did he get in 1996? Nothing, because he refused to settle for what the establishment was offering: as the New York Times reported, “A Republican official familiar with the offer said Buchanan would have made a 15-second appearance in a 7-to-8-minute presentation on values.” A pre-taped presentation on values, at that.
Nor did the party bosses feel the slightest need to satisfy the 200 Buchanan delegates at the convention itself. As Wikipedia notes, “Nearly all floor speeches were delivered by moderate or liberal Republicans, including the keynote address by New York Congresswoman Susan Molinari,” an outspoken supporter of abortion rights. That prompted Buchanan delegates to threaten a walkout during her speech (and in fact, some did leave), though PJB urged his supporters not to do it.
Buchanan’s showing in the 1996 primaries was an indication of where the activist energy lay in the GOP: with social conservatives and the confrontational right. Dole didn’t want any of that; he was content to run as Bill Clinton’s elderly uncle. That the election in November didn’t give Clinton an outright popular-vote majority is testament to the fact that a stronger candidate would have given the incumbent a run for his money. As it was, Dole gave conservatives in general and Buchanan supporters in particular no reason to get out and vote. By 2000, the right was so desperate to put a Republican back in the White House that it mounted no serious opposition to the nomination of George W. Bush — John McCain certainly wasn’t bidding for conservatives’ votes — but again the nominee’s watery ideology led to something less than a popular-vote majority. Indeed, it led to a popular-vote plurality for Al Gore. By 2004, the likes of Karl Rove had learned their lesson from Buchanan and went hard after the “values voters,” who that year gave Bush the first GOP popular-vote majority since 1988.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/blog/2012/05/10/what-ron-paul-delegates-can-expect/
This morning I was on Mike Church’s Sirius XM radio show to talk about my post on “Buying Off the Ron Paul Vote.” Going over my notes about how Pat Buchanan’s delegates were treated at the 1996 Republican convention in San Diego reminded me of just how thoroughly the GOP can frustrate a sizable block of delegates. Buchanan went to the convention with some 200 delegates out of 1,990 — so a bit better than 10 percent. (Supporters’ estimates for Paul’s delegate numbers this year range from 104 to 201 so far.) In 1992, with far fewer delegates, Buchanan had received a prime-time speaking slot. What did he get in 1996? Nothing, because he refused to settle for what the establishment was offering: as the New York Times reported, “A Republican official familiar with the offer said Buchanan would have made a 15-second appearance in a 7-to-8-minute presentation on values.” A pre-taped presentation on values, at that.
Nor did the party bosses feel the slightest need to satisfy the 200 Buchanan delegates at the convention itself. As Wikipedia notes, “Nearly all floor speeches were delivered by moderate or liberal Republicans, including the keynote address by New York Congresswoman Susan Molinari,” an outspoken supporter of abortion rights. That prompted Buchanan delegates to threaten a walkout during her speech (and in fact, some did leave), though PJB urged his supporters not to do it.
Buchanan’s showing in the 1996 primaries was an indication of where the activist energy lay in the GOP: with social conservatives and the confrontational right. Dole didn’t want any of that; he was content to run as Bill Clinton’s elderly uncle. That the election in November didn’t give Clinton an outright popular-vote majority is testament to the fact that a stronger candidate would have given the incumbent a run for his money. As it was, Dole gave conservatives in general and Buchanan supporters in particular no reason to get out and vote. By 2000, the right was so desperate to put a Republican back in the White House that it mounted no serious opposition to the nomination of George W. Bush — John McCain certainly wasn’t bidding for conservatives’ votes — but again the nominee’s watery ideology led to something less than a popular-vote majority. Indeed, it led to a popular-vote plurality for Al Gore. By 2004, the likes of Karl Rove had learned their lesson from Buchanan and went hard after the “values voters,” who that year gave Bush the first GOP popular-vote majority since 1988.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/blog/2012/05/10/what-ron-paul-delegates-can-expect/