Coolidge/Dawes '24
11-01-2011, 11:47 PM
An alternative perspective on "police brutality" at the Occupy Oakland protests. Article here (http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=47152). An excerpt:
What if the Tea Party had occupied a city park for weeks, defied lawful orders to leave from very deferential authorities, organized a violent resistance to the police that resulted in someone getting critically injured, and re-occupied the park while the submissive mayor declared her support for their goals? Honestly, what would you have said about it, and how do you think the media would have reported it? Are you embracing the notion that the police have no right to resist mob actions, and if so, are there any minimum size or ideological requirements a mob should have to qualify for immunity to civil law? Also, does the presence of a military veteran confer absolute moral authority and legal impunity upon any mob, or only leftist ones?
The individual officers who participated in last night’s police action will have to answer questions about their actions, as cops always do. If a fair investigation reveals some of them acted inappropriately, they should face appropriate consequences. While that’s going on, the organizers of Occupy Oakland should be facing charges for inciting the riot. Civilizations that will not defend themselves die beneath the heels of anti-civilization. It’s as true at both municipal and global levels.
I provide a libertarian defense of sensible rules on what one can say or do on taxpayer-funded government property here (http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?326046-OWS-protests-turn-violent-in-Oakland-CA.) (see the bottom post). In short, I don't think unrestricted freedom of speech and freedom of action (on publicly owned land, that is) is necessarily the default position for a libertarian to take on this issue. Some may see it as a twisted justification for some of the police action that has been taken at these events (though I don't excuse all of it), but carefully consider my argument before rushing to judgment.
I know a lot of the "cosmolibertarians" (i.e. libertines) think you should be able to do whatever the hell you want, say whatever the hell you want, and express yourself however the hell you want on public property, which all of us are forced to pay for at gunpoint. Now, in my ideal world, all property would be owned in private, by voluntarily financed organizations (businesses, corporations, religious groups, hospitals, charities, conservationists, zookeepers, etc.) and individuals. Nothing would be owned by the State, which relies on pure coercion, intimidation, threats, violence, etc. to gather funds, provide services, and keep itself going. But unfortunately we don't live in that world. It's a horizonal goal that we should all strive for (and the fight is a worthy one), but let's be realistic: it won't be achieved in our lifetimes. In the meantime, what is the proper role of government in regulating conduct on land "owned" and "financed" by the State? Again, the cosmolibertarians would say: let these public domains degenerate into dirty, God-forsaken cesspools. People should have unrestricted freedom of speech and freedom of action on taxpayer-funded property, they say, as long as no legs are broken or limbs blown off. In other words, there should be no rules of conduct on property owned and managed by the State. But take that argument to its logical extreme. The Gillepsies and the Welches of the world say they have the right to express themselves however they want and say whatever the hell they want on publicly owned property. But what about my right not to be exposed to filth, vulgarity, obscenity, nudity, and all that other yucky stuff we old-fashioned types don't want to put up with? I don't want to encounter naked people humping rabbits in front of my face on the sidewalk. I don't want to walk into a public library and deal with dirty, drunken bums swearing at my children, pissing in corners, and smearing crap all over the carpet. Yet the libertines want to force that on me, whether I like it or not, in the name of protecting my freedoms. Pshh.
I take a different approach: as long as the State is seizing my earnings to purchase and maintain the land "they" own, they should treat the land as if it were privately owned by a sensible person or corporation. Murray Rothbard took this position, as did Ayn Rand (for all you naysayers out there). It's not "unlibertarian" to expect adherence to civilizational norms, or manners, or decency on publicly owned property. As with private property, there should be rules of conduct on how it may be used. The State should be able to lay down some reasonable expectations: who may set foot on the premises, when one may set foot on the premises, how long one may set foot on the premises, what one may do or say on the premises, and so forth. These are the conditions upon which people may be permitted to enter. If those conditions are breached, then force or expulsion may be necessary. (This is why some libertarians are in favor of immigration controls, for instance.) So if you're caught taking a dump on the sidewalk, or urinating in an alleyway, or exposing your genitals to minors, or "occupying" a park at a certain time in a certain place without permission, don't expect me to cry you a river when you get arrested (or smacked, pummeled, maced, etc. for resisting arrest).
Here is what Ayn Rand had to say when some college-aged hoodlums decided to "occupy" the state-owned University of Berkeley, California. They repeatedly disobeyed administration orders to desist from their obscene behavior on the pretense that supressing their actions would be a violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of "expression."
The main issue was the attempt to make the country accept mass civil disobedience as a proper and valid tool of political action. This attempt has been made repeatedly in connection with the civil rights movement. But there the issue was confused by the fact that the Negroes were the victims of legalized injustice and, therefore, the matter of breaching legality did not become unequivocally clear. The country took it as a fight for justice, not as an assault on the law.
[T]here is no justification, in a civilized society, for the kind of mass civil disobdedience that involves the violation of the rights of others – regardless of whether the demonstrators' goal is good or evil. The end does not justify the means. No one's rights can be secured by the violation of the rights of others. Mass civil disobdience is an assault on the concept of rights: it is a mob's defiance of legality as such.
The forcible occupation of another man's property or the obstruction of a public thoroughfare is so blatant a violation of rights that an attempt to justify it becomes an abrogation of morality. An individual has no right to do a "sit-in" in the home or office of a person he disagrees with – and he does not acquire such a right by joining a gang. Rights are not a matter of numbers – and there can be no such thing, in law or in morality, as actions forbidden to an individual, but permitted to a mob.
The only power of a mob, as against an individual, is greater muscular strength – i.e. plain, brute physical force. The attempt to solve social problems by means of physical force is what a civilized society is established to prevent. The advocates of mass civil disobdience admit that their purpose is intimidation. A society that tolerates intimidation as a means of settling disputes – the physical intimidation of some men or groups by others – loses its moral right to exist as a social system, and its collapse does not take long to follow.
To facilitate the acceptance of force, the Berkeley rebels attempted to establish a special distinction between force and violence: force, they claimed explicitly, is a proper form of social action, but violence is not. Their definition of the terms was as follows: coercion by means of a literal physical contact is "violence" and is reprehensible; any other way of violating rights is merely "force" and is a legitimate, peaceful method of dealing with opponents.
For instance, if the rebels occupy the administration of a [state-owned] administration building, that is "force"; if policeman drag them out, that is "violence." If Savio seizes a microphone he has no right to use, that is "force"; if a policeman drags him away from it, that is "violence." Consider the implications of that distinction as a rule of social conduct: if you come home one evening, find a stranger occupying your house, and throw him out violently, he has merely committed a peaceful act of "force," but you are guilty of "violence," and you are to be punished.
The theoretical purpose of that grotesque absurdity is to establish a moral inversion: to make the initiation of force moral, and resistance to force immoral – and thus to obliterate the right of self-defense. The immediate practical purpose is to foster the activities of the lowest political breed: the provocateurs, who commit acts of force and place the blame on their vicitims.
An indication of such a motive was given by the rebels' demand for unrestricted freedom of speech on campus – with the consequent "Filthy Language Movement."
There can be no such thing as an unrestricted freedom of speech (or of action) on someone else's property. The fact that the University of Berkeley is owned by the state merely complicates the issue, but does not alter it. The owners of a state university are the voters and taxpayers of that state. The University administration, appointed (directly or indirectly) by an elected official, is, theoretically the agent of the owners – and has to act as such, so long as state universities exist. (Whether they should exist is a different question.)
In any undertaking or establishment involving more than one man, it is the onwer or owners who set the rules and terms of appropriate conduct; the rest of the participants are free to go elsewhere and seek different terms, if they do not agree. There be no such thing as the right to act on whim, to be exercised by some participants at the expense of others.
Students who attend a university have the right to expect that they will not be subjected to hearing the kind of obscenities for which the owner of a semi-decent barroom would bounce hoodlums out on the street. The right to determine what sort of language is permissible belongs to the administration of a university – fully as much as to the owner of a barroom.
The technique of the rebels, as of all statists, was to take advantage of the principles of a free society in order to undercut them by an alleged demonstration of their "impractability" – in this case, the "impracticability" of the right of free speech. But, in fact, what they have demonstrated is a point farthest removed from their goals: that no rights of any kind can be exercised without property rights.
It is only on the basis of property rights that the sphere and application of individual rights can be defined in any given social situation. Without property rights, there is no way to solve or to avoid a hopeless chaos of clashing views, interests, demands, desires, and whims.
As students, the rebels have no greater rights in state university than in a private one. As taxpayers, they have no greater rights than the millions of California taxpayers involved. If they object to the policies of the Board of Regents, they have no recourse except at the polls at the next election – if they can persuade a sufficient number of voters. This is a pretty slim chance – and this is a good argument against any type of "public property." But it is not an issue to be solved by physical force.
What is significant here is the fact that the rebels – who, to put it mildly, are not champions of private property – refused to abide by the kind of majority rule which is inherent in public ownership. That is what they were opposing when they complained of the "financial, industrial, and military establishment." It is the rights of these particular groups of taxpayers ... that they were seeking to abrogate.
What if the Tea Party had occupied a city park for weeks, defied lawful orders to leave from very deferential authorities, organized a violent resistance to the police that resulted in someone getting critically injured, and re-occupied the park while the submissive mayor declared her support for their goals? Honestly, what would you have said about it, and how do you think the media would have reported it? Are you embracing the notion that the police have no right to resist mob actions, and if so, are there any minimum size or ideological requirements a mob should have to qualify for immunity to civil law? Also, does the presence of a military veteran confer absolute moral authority and legal impunity upon any mob, or only leftist ones?
The individual officers who participated in last night’s police action will have to answer questions about their actions, as cops always do. If a fair investigation reveals some of them acted inappropriately, they should face appropriate consequences. While that’s going on, the organizers of Occupy Oakland should be facing charges for inciting the riot. Civilizations that will not defend themselves die beneath the heels of anti-civilization. It’s as true at both municipal and global levels.
I provide a libertarian defense of sensible rules on what one can say or do on taxpayer-funded government property here (http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?326046-OWS-protests-turn-violent-in-Oakland-CA.) (see the bottom post). In short, I don't think unrestricted freedom of speech and freedom of action (on publicly owned land, that is) is necessarily the default position for a libertarian to take on this issue. Some may see it as a twisted justification for some of the police action that has been taken at these events (though I don't excuse all of it), but carefully consider my argument before rushing to judgment.
I know a lot of the "cosmolibertarians" (i.e. libertines) think you should be able to do whatever the hell you want, say whatever the hell you want, and express yourself however the hell you want on public property, which all of us are forced to pay for at gunpoint. Now, in my ideal world, all property would be owned in private, by voluntarily financed organizations (businesses, corporations, religious groups, hospitals, charities, conservationists, zookeepers, etc.) and individuals. Nothing would be owned by the State, which relies on pure coercion, intimidation, threats, violence, etc. to gather funds, provide services, and keep itself going. But unfortunately we don't live in that world. It's a horizonal goal that we should all strive for (and the fight is a worthy one), but let's be realistic: it won't be achieved in our lifetimes. In the meantime, what is the proper role of government in regulating conduct on land "owned" and "financed" by the State? Again, the cosmolibertarians would say: let these public domains degenerate into dirty, God-forsaken cesspools. People should have unrestricted freedom of speech and freedom of action on taxpayer-funded property, they say, as long as no legs are broken or limbs blown off. In other words, there should be no rules of conduct on property owned and managed by the State. But take that argument to its logical extreme. The Gillepsies and the Welches of the world say they have the right to express themselves however they want and say whatever the hell they want on publicly owned property. But what about my right not to be exposed to filth, vulgarity, obscenity, nudity, and all that other yucky stuff we old-fashioned types don't want to put up with? I don't want to encounter naked people humping rabbits in front of my face on the sidewalk. I don't want to walk into a public library and deal with dirty, drunken bums swearing at my children, pissing in corners, and smearing crap all over the carpet. Yet the libertines want to force that on me, whether I like it or not, in the name of protecting my freedoms. Pshh.
I take a different approach: as long as the State is seizing my earnings to purchase and maintain the land "they" own, they should treat the land as if it were privately owned by a sensible person or corporation. Murray Rothbard took this position, as did Ayn Rand (for all you naysayers out there). It's not "unlibertarian" to expect adherence to civilizational norms, or manners, or decency on publicly owned property. As with private property, there should be rules of conduct on how it may be used. The State should be able to lay down some reasonable expectations: who may set foot on the premises, when one may set foot on the premises, how long one may set foot on the premises, what one may do or say on the premises, and so forth. These are the conditions upon which people may be permitted to enter. If those conditions are breached, then force or expulsion may be necessary. (This is why some libertarians are in favor of immigration controls, for instance.) So if you're caught taking a dump on the sidewalk, or urinating in an alleyway, or exposing your genitals to minors, or "occupying" a park at a certain time in a certain place without permission, don't expect me to cry you a river when you get arrested (or smacked, pummeled, maced, etc. for resisting arrest).
Here is what Ayn Rand had to say when some college-aged hoodlums decided to "occupy" the state-owned University of Berkeley, California. They repeatedly disobeyed administration orders to desist from their obscene behavior on the pretense that supressing their actions would be a violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of "expression."
The main issue was the attempt to make the country accept mass civil disobedience as a proper and valid tool of political action. This attempt has been made repeatedly in connection with the civil rights movement. But there the issue was confused by the fact that the Negroes were the victims of legalized injustice and, therefore, the matter of breaching legality did not become unequivocally clear. The country took it as a fight for justice, not as an assault on the law.
[T]here is no justification, in a civilized society, for the kind of mass civil disobdedience that involves the violation of the rights of others – regardless of whether the demonstrators' goal is good or evil. The end does not justify the means. No one's rights can be secured by the violation of the rights of others. Mass civil disobdience is an assault on the concept of rights: it is a mob's defiance of legality as such.
The forcible occupation of another man's property or the obstruction of a public thoroughfare is so blatant a violation of rights that an attempt to justify it becomes an abrogation of morality. An individual has no right to do a "sit-in" in the home or office of a person he disagrees with – and he does not acquire such a right by joining a gang. Rights are not a matter of numbers – and there can be no such thing, in law or in morality, as actions forbidden to an individual, but permitted to a mob.
The only power of a mob, as against an individual, is greater muscular strength – i.e. plain, brute physical force. The attempt to solve social problems by means of physical force is what a civilized society is established to prevent. The advocates of mass civil disobdience admit that their purpose is intimidation. A society that tolerates intimidation as a means of settling disputes – the physical intimidation of some men or groups by others – loses its moral right to exist as a social system, and its collapse does not take long to follow.
To facilitate the acceptance of force, the Berkeley rebels attempted to establish a special distinction between force and violence: force, they claimed explicitly, is a proper form of social action, but violence is not. Their definition of the terms was as follows: coercion by means of a literal physical contact is "violence" and is reprehensible; any other way of violating rights is merely "force" and is a legitimate, peaceful method of dealing with opponents.
For instance, if the rebels occupy the administration of a [state-owned] administration building, that is "force"; if policeman drag them out, that is "violence." If Savio seizes a microphone he has no right to use, that is "force"; if a policeman drags him away from it, that is "violence." Consider the implications of that distinction as a rule of social conduct: if you come home one evening, find a stranger occupying your house, and throw him out violently, he has merely committed a peaceful act of "force," but you are guilty of "violence," and you are to be punished.
The theoretical purpose of that grotesque absurdity is to establish a moral inversion: to make the initiation of force moral, and resistance to force immoral – and thus to obliterate the right of self-defense. The immediate practical purpose is to foster the activities of the lowest political breed: the provocateurs, who commit acts of force and place the blame on their vicitims.
An indication of such a motive was given by the rebels' demand for unrestricted freedom of speech on campus – with the consequent "Filthy Language Movement."
There can be no such thing as an unrestricted freedom of speech (or of action) on someone else's property. The fact that the University of Berkeley is owned by the state merely complicates the issue, but does not alter it. The owners of a state university are the voters and taxpayers of that state. The University administration, appointed (directly or indirectly) by an elected official, is, theoretically the agent of the owners – and has to act as such, so long as state universities exist. (Whether they should exist is a different question.)
In any undertaking or establishment involving more than one man, it is the onwer or owners who set the rules and terms of appropriate conduct; the rest of the participants are free to go elsewhere and seek different terms, if they do not agree. There be no such thing as the right to act on whim, to be exercised by some participants at the expense of others.
Students who attend a university have the right to expect that they will not be subjected to hearing the kind of obscenities for which the owner of a semi-decent barroom would bounce hoodlums out on the street. The right to determine what sort of language is permissible belongs to the administration of a university – fully as much as to the owner of a barroom.
The technique of the rebels, as of all statists, was to take advantage of the principles of a free society in order to undercut them by an alleged demonstration of their "impractability" – in this case, the "impracticability" of the right of free speech. But, in fact, what they have demonstrated is a point farthest removed from their goals: that no rights of any kind can be exercised without property rights.
It is only on the basis of property rights that the sphere and application of individual rights can be defined in any given social situation. Without property rights, there is no way to solve or to avoid a hopeless chaos of clashing views, interests, demands, desires, and whims.
As students, the rebels have no greater rights in state university than in a private one. As taxpayers, they have no greater rights than the millions of California taxpayers involved. If they object to the policies of the Board of Regents, they have no recourse except at the polls at the next election – if they can persuade a sufficient number of voters. This is a pretty slim chance – and this is a good argument against any type of "public property." But it is not an issue to be solved by physical force.
What is significant here is the fact that the rebels – who, to put it mildly, are not champions of private property – refused to abide by the kind of majority rule which is inherent in public ownership. That is what they were opposing when they complained of the "financial, industrial, and military establishment." It is the rights of these particular groups of taxpayers ... that they were seeking to abrogate.