DisillusionedPatriot
07-29-2010, 06:28 PM
Introduction and Summary: When leaders of a nation decide to go to war, they have at their disposal three means by which to raise an army: they may appeal to patriotism or moral fortitude and ask for volunteers, offer incentives or bribes to join up, or they may turn to coercion. Conscription, known informally in America as “the draft,” is an instance of the last. Though conscription can be critiqued on a number of levels, this paper will focus on its degenerate ethical basis. In it, I address the primary moral failings of conscription: it necessitates the removal of rights worth dying for, it devalues human life, and it directly increases the potential for harm.
From its inception, the United States has led the world in advancing the ideals of human freedom and dignity. The Declaration of Independence assigns to all men certain intrinsic rights, including those of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. Put simply, conscription is unjust because it violates each of these most treasured rights. Drafted men are forced to put their lives in great risk, through measures ranging from fines or imprisonment in the more lenient of cases, to threat of death, torture, or retaliation on family in the worst. It is unjust that a man be forced to choose between such poor options, given that he has not by his own doing or through misfortune of fate encountered the decision in the course of his life. It is thrust upon him by a state enforcing its own goals. In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer recognizes the individual’s inherent right not to be attacked, but focuses largely on the right as applied to noncombatants, of whom he says, “no one can be forced to fight or to risk his life, no one can be threatened with war or warred against, unless through some act of his own he has surrendered or lost his rights” (1).
Walzer argues that all soldiers have lost these rights because they are in fact, soldiers. They are the combatants in the war being fought – willingly or not, it is their official position to be of mortal danger to the enemy. This makes them liable to attack. He gives only a brief nod to the injustice of conscription itself and mostly sidesteps the issue. Walzer should apply his own standard more universally. If non-combatants cannot be warred against because they have done nothing to lose their immunity, then the same edict decrees that no one can be forced to fight unless “through some act of his own he has … lost his rights” (2). When a drafted man who fought only in personal self-defense dies, his death is as unjust as any civilian casualty.
There is rough moral equivalency between a state that uses its own civilians as hostages to deter against attacks and one that conscripts unwilling citizens into the front lines. In both instances, the state commandeers the lives of the individuals in question and sacrifices their rights and safety to achieve some military objective. That soldiers are given a means of self-protection and the imperative to kill, while the hostages are utterly helpless, does not change the fundamental situation of either. Conscription thus threatens the fundamental right to life. To force men to fight in war is, in a certain percentage of cases, to force a man to die. When it does not entirely remove, it always endangers and cheapens his right to continue living. The effects of conscription on man’s right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness are equally devastating.
A man’s liberty is infringed when he is compelled to do that which he does not want to do. While serving in a war, men suffer loss of liberty at all levels of their lives. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The breaking men to military discipline is breaking their spirits to principles of passive obedience" (3). Neither large nor small-scale decisions are the soldier’s prerogative. He is not able to prioritize his goals and activities or act according to his own preferences. Armies run on discipline, obedience and regulation, all of which run counter to individual liberty. Nor are men allowed to pursue their own happiness in war. There are of course those few who relish war, but still they could not be called free. Their optimal happiness merely happens to coincide with what they are already being commanded to do. For the vast majority of men, the pursuit of happiness would take them far, far from the battlefield, and quickly. Aside from these three supreme rights enumerated by America’s Founders, many others are also abridged, including the rights to property, privacy, association, and freedom of speech. That men be forcibly deprived of these rights, deemed so valuable that others have died for them, merely to serve as pawns in a game between states, is nothing short of grave and cruel injustice.
This is a second great moral failure of conscription: aside from violating cherished rights and unjustly causing men to die, it also promotes a general devaluation of human life. To force a man to fight and risk his life in war is to treat that man solely as the means to an end. It is in direct violation of what Immanuel Kant proposed as the practical version of his moral imperative: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (4). To treat a person as a means only is to deny them the same level of dignity and worth that one assigns oneself.
One might argue that all soldiers in battle are of course instruments working towards a goal they do not set. However, it is much harder to use professional soldiers as a mere means to an end. They have chosen, and are compensated for, their work. Like any other service, both parties are free and both benefit from the exchange. It is the removal of man’s free will that allows him to be treated as merely a means. When states make conscription official policy they create two very distinct classes of persons: those who decide the policy matters, and those whose lives may be sacrificed as a means to pursue them. Public endorsement and acceptance of those classes means that the overall values of life and liberty are debased.
This devaluation of life makes conscription particularly threatening because of its propensity to increase the magnitude of potential destruction. Most obviously, conscription can increase the degree of violence and total number of deaths. The higher the number of men fighting, the longer, costlier, and bloodier wars can be. Since each side in the conflict now has vastly more men to kill in order to produce an effect on his opponent, this corresponds to a ratcheting up in terms of acceptable weaponry and tactics. With more men to kill, it is simply more efficient to kill many men at once. Conscription also opens the door for further moral decay since, as more men die, it is becomes easier to accept the loss of an individual.
Conscription’s primary moral failings then, are three: it necessitates the removal of rights worth dying for, it devalues human life, and it directly increases the potential for harm. It is a form of indentured servitude at the worst, and in those cases where men die, it is murder. Aside from committing an injustice to the men themselves, conscription cheapens the nature of cherished rights that must not be forsaken lightly.
Because it violates these basic moral principles, the ban against conscription is almost completely universal. A state could never be justified in drafting men for an aggressive war. Nor should the mere fact that a war is just be deemed sufficient cause for conscription. A man must never be asked to die in defending or advancing another man’s cause. No appeal can be made to the worth of the cause itself because a worthy end cannot excuse unjust means. Innocent men cannot be used as collateral damage for any cause, no matter how just. Liberties must not be severely infringed in the name of advancing liberty.
There is only one possible exception to the otherwise absolute ban against conscription – a man may be compelled to defend his nation against an invasion. Nations should avoid unjust wars, and just ones if necessary may be fought among professional soldiers and volunteers. Sometimes, however, a nation has no choice but to fight for its very survival. In this instance, the country should utilize all available resources in attempting to repel the attacks. If they cannot, and the country remains in danger, conscription may be used as a final resort. This is not due to a breakdown of Just War Theory. Rather, justice itself permits leaders to require that a state’s citizens come to its defense in a time when its very survival is at stake.
As stated above, a man cannot be justly made to fight or die for a cause. He may however, in this instance, be ordered to fight for his country. The difference is that he is not being forced to defend an ideal or a cause that he may not share; rather he is being called upon in a time of desperate need to help preserve the very society that sustains him. An implicit understanding exists between a state and its citizens – that men have both rights and obligations as regards their country. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill aptly paraphrases this relationship: "Everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit" (5). In return for the security and benefits received from the state (as a bare minimum, all countries aim to protect their citizens from outside threats), citizens bind themselves to abide by its laws and fulfill other requirements of their citizenship or pay the consequences.
If a man refuses, out of cowardice or selfishness, to come to the final aid of the country that has provided every liberty and security he has enjoyed thus far, he fails in his moral obligations to society. He is asking to stand back while other men die to protect the common security. He is merely a parasite, willing to accept whatever benefits he can reap from society and his government without contributing in return. It would certainly be wrong to kill such a man, but a state would be entirely justified in imprisoning him. If he refuses out of unequivocal moral aversion to killing, as in the case of conscientious objectors, it is just to force the man to serve in a support position. If a man refuses to serve because of an ethical objection not to war in general, but to his state itself, he may have the moral high ground. He has still failed in his obligations to that state, however, so consequently they may fairly imprison him. A man may still be just in his refusal to fight, but in times of ultimate duress, it is not unjust that states make the demand.
Conscription is at its heart an ethical issue. Proponents of the draft try to link it to positive virtues such as patriotism, but words cannot conceal the moral bankruptcy of the practice. Conscription deprives individual men of their most cherished rights and sometimes their lives. In doing so, and by using men as means rather than an end in themselves, it strongly undercuts the sanctity and power of these rights. Because of its dangerous effects on both men and valued principles, conscription must fall into the category of morally inexcusable activities.
From its inception, the United States has led the world in advancing the ideals of human freedom and dignity. The Declaration of Independence assigns to all men certain intrinsic rights, including those of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. Put simply, conscription is unjust because it violates each of these most treasured rights. Drafted men are forced to put their lives in great risk, through measures ranging from fines or imprisonment in the more lenient of cases, to threat of death, torture, or retaliation on family in the worst. It is unjust that a man be forced to choose between such poor options, given that he has not by his own doing or through misfortune of fate encountered the decision in the course of his life. It is thrust upon him by a state enforcing its own goals. In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer recognizes the individual’s inherent right not to be attacked, but focuses largely on the right as applied to noncombatants, of whom he says, “no one can be forced to fight or to risk his life, no one can be threatened with war or warred against, unless through some act of his own he has surrendered or lost his rights” (1).
Walzer argues that all soldiers have lost these rights because they are in fact, soldiers. They are the combatants in the war being fought – willingly or not, it is their official position to be of mortal danger to the enemy. This makes them liable to attack. He gives only a brief nod to the injustice of conscription itself and mostly sidesteps the issue. Walzer should apply his own standard more universally. If non-combatants cannot be warred against because they have done nothing to lose their immunity, then the same edict decrees that no one can be forced to fight unless “through some act of his own he has … lost his rights” (2). When a drafted man who fought only in personal self-defense dies, his death is as unjust as any civilian casualty.
There is rough moral equivalency between a state that uses its own civilians as hostages to deter against attacks and one that conscripts unwilling citizens into the front lines. In both instances, the state commandeers the lives of the individuals in question and sacrifices their rights and safety to achieve some military objective. That soldiers are given a means of self-protection and the imperative to kill, while the hostages are utterly helpless, does not change the fundamental situation of either. Conscription thus threatens the fundamental right to life. To force men to fight in war is, in a certain percentage of cases, to force a man to die. When it does not entirely remove, it always endangers and cheapens his right to continue living. The effects of conscription on man’s right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness are equally devastating.
A man’s liberty is infringed when he is compelled to do that which he does not want to do. While serving in a war, men suffer loss of liberty at all levels of their lives. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The breaking men to military discipline is breaking their spirits to principles of passive obedience" (3). Neither large nor small-scale decisions are the soldier’s prerogative. He is not able to prioritize his goals and activities or act according to his own preferences. Armies run on discipline, obedience and regulation, all of which run counter to individual liberty. Nor are men allowed to pursue their own happiness in war. There are of course those few who relish war, but still they could not be called free. Their optimal happiness merely happens to coincide with what they are already being commanded to do. For the vast majority of men, the pursuit of happiness would take them far, far from the battlefield, and quickly. Aside from these three supreme rights enumerated by America’s Founders, many others are also abridged, including the rights to property, privacy, association, and freedom of speech. That men be forcibly deprived of these rights, deemed so valuable that others have died for them, merely to serve as pawns in a game between states, is nothing short of grave and cruel injustice.
This is a second great moral failure of conscription: aside from violating cherished rights and unjustly causing men to die, it also promotes a general devaluation of human life. To force a man to fight and risk his life in war is to treat that man solely as the means to an end. It is in direct violation of what Immanuel Kant proposed as the practical version of his moral imperative: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (4). To treat a person as a means only is to deny them the same level of dignity and worth that one assigns oneself.
One might argue that all soldiers in battle are of course instruments working towards a goal they do not set. However, it is much harder to use professional soldiers as a mere means to an end. They have chosen, and are compensated for, their work. Like any other service, both parties are free and both benefit from the exchange. It is the removal of man’s free will that allows him to be treated as merely a means. When states make conscription official policy they create two very distinct classes of persons: those who decide the policy matters, and those whose lives may be sacrificed as a means to pursue them. Public endorsement and acceptance of those classes means that the overall values of life and liberty are debased.
This devaluation of life makes conscription particularly threatening because of its propensity to increase the magnitude of potential destruction. Most obviously, conscription can increase the degree of violence and total number of deaths. The higher the number of men fighting, the longer, costlier, and bloodier wars can be. Since each side in the conflict now has vastly more men to kill in order to produce an effect on his opponent, this corresponds to a ratcheting up in terms of acceptable weaponry and tactics. With more men to kill, it is simply more efficient to kill many men at once. Conscription also opens the door for further moral decay since, as more men die, it is becomes easier to accept the loss of an individual.
Conscription’s primary moral failings then, are three: it necessitates the removal of rights worth dying for, it devalues human life, and it directly increases the potential for harm. It is a form of indentured servitude at the worst, and in those cases where men die, it is murder. Aside from committing an injustice to the men themselves, conscription cheapens the nature of cherished rights that must not be forsaken lightly.
Because it violates these basic moral principles, the ban against conscription is almost completely universal. A state could never be justified in drafting men for an aggressive war. Nor should the mere fact that a war is just be deemed sufficient cause for conscription. A man must never be asked to die in defending or advancing another man’s cause. No appeal can be made to the worth of the cause itself because a worthy end cannot excuse unjust means. Innocent men cannot be used as collateral damage for any cause, no matter how just. Liberties must not be severely infringed in the name of advancing liberty.
There is only one possible exception to the otherwise absolute ban against conscription – a man may be compelled to defend his nation against an invasion. Nations should avoid unjust wars, and just ones if necessary may be fought among professional soldiers and volunteers. Sometimes, however, a nation has no choice but to fight for its very survival. In this instance, the country should utilize all available resources in attempting to repel the attacks. If they cannot, and the country remains in danger, conscription may be used as a final resort. This is not due to a breakdown of Just War Theory. Rather, justice itself permits leaders to require that a state’s citizens come to its defense in a time when its very survival is at stake.
As stated above, a man cannot be justly made to fight or die for a cause. He may however, in this instance, be ordered to fight for his country. The difference is that he is not being forced to defend an ideal or a cause that he may not share; rather he is being called upon in a time of desperate need to help preserve the very society that sustains him. An implicit understanding exists between a state and its citizens – that men have both rights and obligations as regards their country. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill aptly paraphrases this relationship: "Everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit" (5). In return for the security and benefits received from the state (as a bare minimum, all countries aim to protect their citizens from outside threats), citizens bind themselves to abide by its laws and fulfill other requirements of their citizenship or pay the consequences.
If a man refuses, out of cowardice or selfishness, to come to the final aid of the country that has provided every liberty and security he has enjoyed thus far, he fails in his moral obligations to society. He is asking to stand back while other men die to protect the common security. He is merely a parasite, willing to accept whatever benefits he can reap from society and his government without contributing in return. It would certainly be wrong to kill such a man, but a state would be entirely justified in imprisoning him. If he refuses out of unequivocal moral aversion to killing, as in the case of conscientious objectors, it is just to force the man to serve in a support position. If a man refuses to serve because of an ethical objection not to war in general, but to his state itself, he may have the moral high ground. He has still failed in his obligations to that state, however, so consequently they may fairly imprison him. A man may still be just in his refusal to fight, but in times of ultimate duress, it is not unjust that states make the demand.
Conscription is at its heart an ethical issue. Proponents of the draft try to link it to positive virtues such as patriotism, but words cannot conceal the moral bankruptcy of the practice. Conscription deprives individual men of their most cherished rights and sometimes their lives. In doing so, and by using men as means rather than an end in themselves, it strongly undercuts the sanctity and power of these rights. Because of its dangerous effects on both men and valued principles, conscription must fall into the category of morally inexcusable activities.