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Conza88
01-23-2009, 12:15 AM
Human Action

3. Might (http://mises.org/humanaction/chap9sec3.asp)

Society is a product of human action. Human action is directed by ideologies. Thus society and any concrete order of social affairs are an outcome of ideologies; ideologies are not, as Marxism asserts, a product of a certain state of social affairs. To be sure, human thoughts and ideas are not the achievement of isolated individuals. Thinking too succeeds only through the cooperation of the thinkers. No individual would make headway in his reasoning if he were under the necessity of starting from the beginning. A man can advance in thinking only because his efforts are aided by those of older generations who have formed the tools of thinking, the concepts and terminologies, and have raised the problems.

Any given social order was thought out and designed before it could be realized. This temporal and logical precedence of the ideological factor does not imply the proposition that people draft a complete plan of a social system as the utopians do. What is and must be thought out in advance is not the concerting of individual actions into an integrated system of social organization, but the actions of individuals with regard to their fellow men and of already formed groups of individuals with regard to other groups. Before a man aids his fellow in cutting a tree, such cooperation must be thought out. Before an act of barter takes place, the idea of mutual exchange of goods and services must be conceived. It is not necessary that the individuals concerned become aware of the fact that such mutuality results in the establishment of social bonds and in the emergence of a social system. The individual does not plan and execute actions intended to construct society. His conduct and the corresponding conduct of others generate social bodies.

Any existing state of social affairs is the product of ideologies previously thought out. Within society new ideologies may emerge and may supersede older ideologies and thus transform the social system. However, society is always the creation of ideologies temporally and logically anterior. Action is always directed by ideas; it realizes what previous thinking has designed.

If we hypostatize or anthropomorphize the notion of ideology, we may say that ideologies have might over men. Might is the faculty or power of directing actions. As a rule one says only of a man or of groups of men that they are mighty. Then the definition of might is: might is the power to direct other people’s actions.

He who is mighty, owes his might to an ideology. Only ideologies can convey to a man the power to influence other people’s choices and conduct. One can become a leader only if one is supported by an ideology which makes other people tractable and accommodating. Might is thus not a physical and tangible thing, but a moral and spiritual phenomenon. A king’s might rests upon the recognition of the monarchical ideology on the part of his subjects.

He who uses his might to run the state, i.e., the social apparatus of coercion and compulsion, rules. Rule is the exercise of might in the political body. Rule is always based upon might, i.e., the power to direct other people’s actions.

Of course, it is possible to establish a government upon the violent oppression of reluctant people. It is the characteristic mark of state and government that they apply violent coercion or the threat of it against those not prepared to yield voluntarily. Yet such violent oppression is no less founded upon ideological might. He who wants to apply violence needs the voluntary cooperation of some people. An individual entirely dependent on himself can never rule by means of physical violence only.[4] He needs the ideological support of a group in order to subdue other groups. The tyrant must have a retinue of partisans who obey his orders of their own accord. Their spontaneous obedience provides him with the apparatus he needs for the conquest of other people. Whether or not he succeeds in making his sway last depends on the numerical relation of the two groups, those who support him voluntarily and those whom he beats into submission. Though a tyrant may temporarily rule through a minority if this minority is armed and the majority is not, in the long run a minority cannot keep the majority in subservience. The oppressed will rise in rebellion and cast off the yoke of tyranny.

A durable system of government must rest upon an ideology acknowledged by the majority. The “real” factor, the “real forces” that are the foundation of government and convey to the rulers the power to use violence against renitent minority groups are essentially ideological, moral, and spiritual. Rulers who failed to recognize this first principle of government and, relying upon the alleged irresistibility of their armed troops, disdained the spirit and ideas have finally been overthrown by the assault of their adversaries. The interpretation of might as a “real” factor not dependent upon ideologies, quite common to many political and historical books, is erroneous.

The term Realpolitik makes sense only if used to signify a policy taking account of generally accepted ideologies as contrasted with a policy based upon ideologies not sufficiently acknowledged and therefore unfit to support a durable system of government.

He who interprets might as physical or “real” power to carry on and considers violent action as the very foundation of government, sees conditions from the narrow point of view of subordinate officers in charge of sections of an army or police force. To these subordinates a definite task within the framework of the ruling ideology is assigned. Their chiefs commit to their care troops which are not only equipped, armed, and organized for combat, but no less imbued with the spirit which makes them obey the orders issued. The commanders of such subdivisions consider this moral factor a matter of course because they themselves are animated by the same spirit and cannot even imagine a different ideology. The power of an ideology consists precisely in the fact that people submit to it without any wavering and scruples.

However, things are different for the head of the government. He must aim at preservation of the morale of the armed forces and of the loyalty of the rest of the population. For these moral factors are the only “real” elements upon which continuance of his mastery rests. His power dwindles if the ideology that supports it loses force.

Minorities too can sometimes conquer by means of superior military skill and can thus establish minority rule. But such an order of things cannot endure. If the victorious conquerors do not succeed in subsequently converting the system of rule by violence into a system of rule by ideological consent on the part of those ruled, they will succumb in new struggles. All victorious minorities who have established a lasting system of government have made their sway durable by means of a belated ideological ascendancy. They have legitimized their own supremacy either by submitting to the ideologies of the defeated or by transforming them. Where neither of these two things took place, the oppressed many dispossessed the oppressing few either by open rebellion or through the silent but steadfast operation of ideological forces.

Many of the great historical conquests were able to endure because the invaders entered into alliance with those classes of the defeated nation which were supported by the ruling ideology and were thus considered legitimate rulers. This was the system adopted by the Tartars in Russia, by the Turks in the Danube principalities and by and large in Hungary and Transylvania, and by the British and the Dutch in the Indies. A comparatively insignificant number of Britons could rule many hundred millions of Indians because the Indian princes and aristocratic landowners looked upon British rule as a means for the preservation of their privileges and supplied it with the support which the generally acknowledged ideology of India gave to their own supremacy. England’s Indian empire was firm as long as public opinion approved of the traditional social order. The Pax Britannica safeguarded the princes’ and the landlords’ privileges and protected the masses against the agonies of wars between the principalities and of succession wars within them. In our day the infiltration of subversive ideas from abroad has ended British rule and threatens the preservation of the country’s age-old social order.

Victorious minorities sometimes owe their success to their technological superiority. This does not alter the case. In the long run it is impossible to withhold the better arms from the members of the majority. Not the equipment of their armed forces, but ideological factors safeguarded the British in India.

A country’s public opinion may be ideologically divided in such a way that no group is strong enough to establish a durable government. Then anarchy emerges. Revolutions and civil strife become permanent. *(See first paragraphs point, then go read some Rothbard)

Traditionalism as an Ideology

Traditionalism is an ideology which considers loyalty to valuations, customs, and methods of procedure handed down or allegedly handed down from ancestors both right and expedient. It is not an essential mark of traditionalism that these forefathers were the ancestors in the biological meaning of the term or can be fairly considered such; they were sometimes only the previous inhabitants of the country concerned or supporters of the same religious creed or only precursors in the exercise of some special task. Who is to be considered an ancestor and what is the content of the body of tradition handed down are determined by the concrete teachings of each variety of traditionalism. The ideology brings into prominence some of the ancestors and relegates others to oblivion; it sometimes calls ancestors people who had nothing to do with the alleged posterity. It often constructs a “traditional” doctrine which is of recent origin and is at variance with the ideologies really held by the ancestors.

Traditionalism tries to justify its tenets by citing the success they secured in the past. Whether this assertion conforms with the facts, is another question. Research could sometimes unmask errors in the historical statements of a traditional belief. However, this did not always explode the traditional doctrine. For the core of traditionalism is not real historical facts, but an opinion about them, however mistaken, and a will to believe things to which the authority of ancient origin is attributed.

4. A gangster may overpower a weaker or unarmed fellow. However, this has nothing to do with life in society. It is an isolated antisocial occurrence.

In conclusion, Might doesn't make right. :cool:

Conza88
02-28-2009, 03:00 AM
Bump :)

idiom
02-28-2009, 03:04 AM
And thus the Confederates crushed the union armies with their superior Ideology.

Conza88
02-28-2009, 09:01 AM
And thus the Confederates crushed the union armies with their superior Ideology.

State gets replaced with state. :rolleyes:

Truth Warrior
02-28-2009, 09:31 AM
The Illegality, Immorality, and Violence of All Political Action
http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showpost.php?p=1537946&postcount=109 (http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showpost.php?p=1537946&postcount=109)

pcosmar
02-28-2009, 09:55 AM
The Illegality, Immorality, and Violence of All Political Action
http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showpost.php?p=1537946&postcount=109 (http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showpost.php?p=1537946&postcount=109)

I disagree with Robert LeFevre and reject his thoughts on the subject.
I am NOT a pacifist. Never have been. I do have a mildly aggressive nature that is endeavor to keep under control. That is my nature.
And though I am not (as a rule) predatory I do recognize that there are many with a predatory nature.
They will neither be stopped in their predations by kind word nor inaction.
Hence, I will use violence in defense both of myself and of others. :cool:

Truth Warrior
02-28-2009, 09:56 AM
I disagree with Robert LeFevre and reject his thoughts on the subject.
I am NOT a pacifist. Never have been. I do have a mildly aggressive nature that is endeavor to keep under control. That is my nature.
And though I am not (as a rule) predatory I do recognize that there are many with a predatory nature.
They will neither be stopped in their predations by kind word nor inaction.
Hence, I will use violence in defense both of myself and of others. :cool:

Noted! Granted, he's not for everybody. LRC and Mises, etc. likes him. ;) I liked him even before there was an LRC or Mises, etc. :D

Thanks! :)

pcosmar
02-28-2009, 10:05 AM
Noted! LRC and Mises, etc. likes him. ;)

Thanks! :)

He does have some good points and I could agree with him on much.
I disagree on this point. I just am not a pacifist.
I am seldom passive about anything.

It takes self control to keep the aggressive side in check. Though I am imperfect I do try to maintain self control.
I have known many that do not.

Truth Warrior
02-28-2009, 10:10 AM
He does have some good points and I could agree with him on much.
I disagree on this point. I just an not a pacifist.
I am seldom passive about anything. :cool: Becoming part of his following is not required. That's part of the beauty of being libertarian, "NO SHEPHERDS". :D


Thanks! ;)

Conza88
03-23-2009, 07:59 AM
Bump

Conza88
04-22-2009, 02:30 AM
Bump for BVK = Josh_LA.

Might does NOT make right.

If you are going to respond: respond to Mises not me.

Conza88
04-23-2009, 09:14 PM
bump for intellectual honesty.

Conza88
07-07-2009, 01:18 PM
Might makes Right = fail.

Conza88
07-07-2009, 09:36 PM
This one is for Optatron and all the other libertine scum.



Then you have no understanding of power. Ideas are the ultimate power. Power is not being able to kill someone. Power is being able to kill someone and then convince everyone that it was OK. Power is not about being able to steal from someone, but about stealing from someone and then convincing everyone that it was OK. Government is one big sales pitch. It is all about confusion and disinformation. Governments can only do as much as the general populace will allow it to do. It is all about ideas.

idiom
07-07-2009, 09:47 PM
This one is for Optatron and all the other libertine scum.

How can ideas be power if ideas are not scarce? Wouldn't everyone be equally powerful?

Kotin
07-07-2009, 09:52 PM
bump :D

Conza88
07-07-2009, 10:18 PM
How can ideas be power if ideas are not scarce? Wouldn't everyone be equally powerful?

Here is the proper context: http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/8926/229751.aspx#229751

What he means is ideology. Now howsabout you read the text written by Ludwig Von Mises and find your answer. :rolleyes:

Conza88
07-21-2009, 12:17 AM
Bump for optatron's ignorance.

Conza88
07-22-2009, 10:02 PM
;)

Conza88
07-28-2009, 09:08 PM
bump. Might doesn't make right.

Conza88
07-29-2009, 11:38 PM
A recent variation on the natural-rights-don't-protect argument is Rich Hammer's article "Might Makes Right: An Observation and a Tool," (Formulations, Vol. III, No. 1 (Autumn 1995)). Rich argues that the rights we have are the ones we are able to secure by force:

"As we humans live, we constantly propose new rights and test old rights. What determines which rights survive this continual struggle? Force. Those rights that survive are those backed up by the greatest force — by which I mean both ability and willingness to police. ... In the long run, the amount of force which people can bring to bear to defend any right depends upon how much that right helps those people survive in their environment. This limits the extent to which humans can invent rights to serve their whims."

("Might Makes Right," p. 14.)
When I read a passage like this, my first question is whether the rights being talked about are normative rights, legal rights, or de facto rights. If Rich is talking about de facto rights only, then I don't think I have any disagreement with what Rich says, at least if "force" is defined broadly enough (e.g., does the ability to motivate people through persuasive argument to respect certain rights count as effective policing of those rights?).

Most of the arguments Rich goes on to give do seem to be intended to apply specifically to de facto rights (and also, to some extent, to legal rights). For example, Rich offers the following challenge to his readers:

"Here I ask you to refute the thesis with a counterexample. If the thesis is wrong, then you can show me an example of a right which has survived even though a contrary claim was supported by greater willingness and ability to use force."

("Might Makes Right," p. 15.)
This request for a counterexample seems to presuppose that it is descriptive rights that are in question. For of course no natural-rights libertarian will have any trouble coming up with examples of normative rights that we still retain despite the ability to back them up by force — because normative rights are rights that we retain even when we're deprived of whatever it is the rights are rights to. Indeed, that's the crucial difference between normative rights and de facto rights. If you steal my jacket, I lose my de facto right to my jacket, because my claim to that jacket has not been respected; but I retain my normative right to the jacket, so long as it remains true that my claim to the jacket ought to be respected. So when Rich assumes it will be tough to come up with examples of rights we retain despite a contrary claim's being supported by greater force, it seems he must be thinking about de facto rights, not normative rights.

But this can't be the whole story. For Rich thinks his position is going to be a controversial and unwelcome one:

"I fear that the thesis, which can be paraphrased 'might makes right,' will upset some fellow libertarians who believe that rights come from other sources.

Let me make it clear that I am not saying that I want might to make right. In many instances this thesis runs contrary to the values by which I live. But I observe that the thesis makes sense, like it or not."

("Might Makes Right," p. 14.)
Who are these libertarians who are going to be upset by Rich's thesis? Libertarians who believe that de facto rights come from sources other than superior might? I'm not sure there are any such libertarians. And I strongly suspect that Rich instead has in mind libertarians who believe in normative rights that they regard as deriving from sources other than superior might — sources like Natural Law, for example. But why would such libertarians be upset by Rich's thesis, if it is only a thesis about the source of de facto rights? Clearly, Rich thinks his thesis has implications — unfavorable implications — for the theories of natural-rights libertarians. And that means that Rich's thesis is more than just a thesis about de facto rights; it has something to say about normative rights as well.

But what? There seem to be two salient possibilities. Either a) Rich is saying that superior might is the source not only of de facto rights but also of normative rights; or else b) Rich is saying that there are no normative rights, that de facto rights are the only rights there are.

I'm inclined to doubt that (a) is what Rich means. If (a) were Rich's thesis, then he would be committed to endorsing and approving of whatever de facto rights actually end up getting favored by superior might. Now, to be sure, Rich does argue that the results of superior might will generally tend to be beneficent, at least in the long run; but he also says that there are cases in which the might-makes-right thesis "runs counter to the values by which I live"; by saying this, Rich seems to be denying that in every case he will automatically regard as valuable whatever set of arrangements wins out.4

Thus I think the most likely interpretation is (b): Rich believes that there simply are no rights over and above de facto rights — that his occasional aversion to the results of force is simply a matter of personal preference.

This interpretation is reinforced by the following passage:

"... be on the lookout for the distinction between rights which are merely claimed and rights which are backed by force.

Through tricks of language, wishes often advance in status to rights. But one point of my writing this paper is to help us see the difference between wishes and rights. ... In the country in which I live, most members of the population seem to believe that they have a right to share in the fruits of other people's labor, just so long as that sharing is passed by the legislature. And ... they do in fact have that right, since it is backed with willingness and ability to prevail in use of force. Of course I favor the alternate claim, to keep all the fruits of my own labor, but this claim diminishes to the status of a wish; it lacks force."

("Might Makes Right," p. 14.)
If I understand him properly, Rich seems to be saying that any claim that is not backed up by sufficient force — that is, any claim that fails to be a de facto right — is nothing more than a wish, a subjective preference. And that in turn would seem to mean that there are no objective grounds for preferring one claim over another, no such things as claims that ought to be respected and claims that ought to be denied. In other words, there are no normative rights, and there is no Natural Law.

Now of course this sort of moral skepticism might be true. But I can't see that Rich's article gives us reason to think it is true. I find quite convincing Rich's arguments for the claim that de facto rights are made by might; but those arguments do not seem to rule out the possibility of normative rights that do not depend on might for their validity.

Conza88
07-31-2009, 05:50 AM
4. A gangster may overpower a weaker or unarmed fellow. However, this has nothing to do with life in society. It is an isolated antisocial occurrence.


:p

Conza88
07-31-2009, 08:30 PM
bump for IGNORANTS: optatron, teacherone, and all the other libertineards.

Optatron
08-01-2009, 01:20 AM
If I understand him properly, Rich seems to be saying that any claim that is not backed up by sufficient force — that is, any claim that fails to be a de facto right — is nothing more than a wish, a subjective preference.


Yes Mr. Block & Conza, what's your answer to that?



And that in turn would seem to mean that there are no objective grounds for preferring one claim over another, no such things as claims that ought to be respected and claims that ought to be denied. In other words, there are no normative rights, and there is no Natural Law.


Or natural law and normative rights are merely wishes if they're not enforced and exercised, how do you disagree with that?




Now of course this sort of moral skepticism might be true. But I can't see that Rich's article gives us reason to think it is true.


What would be a good reason to think it's true?
Remember, what's preferable and comfortable is not automatically TRUE.



I find quite convincing Rich's arguments for the claim that de facto rights are made by might; but those arguments do not seem to rule out the possibility of normative rights that do not depend on might for their validity.[/FONT][/SIZE]

What's a normative right that doesn't depend on might?
Would this right be taken away if somebody wanted to, by force?
If so, wouldn't we then again need force to protect and enforce it?

Optatron
08-01-2009, 01:21 AM
4. A gangster may overpower a weaker or unarmed fellow. However, this has nothing to do with life in society. It is an isolated antisocial occurrence.


:p

post your personal information and we'll see how many isolated incidents there are, how about it?

hotbrownsauce
08-01-2009, 01:28 AM
"Human Action" can be found on audio.

Conza88
08-02-2009, 12:29 AM
"Human Action" can be found on audio.

Free pdf's at Mises.org and Liberalism is on audio as well.

:)

Optatron
08-04-2009, 03:21 AM
planning on answering my questions?

Conza88
08-04-2009, 04:21 AM
They are already answered:
http://libertariannation.org/a/f42l1.html