Republicae
12-15-2008, 07:03 PM
It is interesting that the goal of tyranny is clearly stated in an early 1880 news editorial that relates to the election of Garfield. In it you will notice the last word in all caps: REX.!
The Sentinel said it best: "Garfield's rule will be the transitory period between State Sovereignty and National Sovereignty. The United States Senate will give way to a National Senate. State Constitutions and the United States Senate are relics of State Sovereignty and implements of treason. Garfield's Presidency will be the Regency of Stalwartism; after that: REX."
As is evident in this paragraph, the need to affect a National Senate was seen as essential in the conquest of State Sovereignty and reigning in what can only be considered as a Monarchist government, or a Monarchist Oligarchy. Indeed, James Garfield himself said it very clear when he proclaimed the following words:
"The influence of Jefferson's Democratic principles is rapidly waning, while the principles of Hamilton are rapidly increasing. Power has been gravitating toward the Central Government." -James Garfield, July 3rd, 1881.
The full effect of this vile desire and criminal act was not realized until a little over 30 years later in 1913 when three major pieces of legislations were passed; those being the 16th, 17th Amendments and the Federal Reserve Act. In that year, the realization of the Nationalized Senate, indeed the Nationalized Central Government was all but completed by the actions of traitors to the Republic.
The Exemplary Mr. Madison stated: "If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated [not absorbed] into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic."
Mr. Madison is very clear, that there is an extremely important reason behind placing layers of separation within the structure of a government that is bound by a "simple league", Sovereign and Independent States, each sharing in the common council of both through their individual Senators appointed by the States to serve, not the nation, but the respective States.
Mr. Madison goes on to say: "Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
Mr. Madison clearly states that the structural requirement of Senators who are answerable to their respective States is imperative to the maintenance of both checks and balances within the structure as a whole and to protect the Will of the People through the ancillary Sovereignty of the States. Additionally, this structure was also an essential element in preventing potential excesses in legislation.
Mr. Madison then gives a more thorough explanation of the reasons behind the particular Constitutional Structure of the Republic:
"First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance, which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.
You will notice Mr. Madison states, in no uncertain terms, that by requiring two separate and distinct bodies, as in the House of Representatives and the Senate, that such a structure not only provides a vital check on government in general, but it also doubles the security of the People themselves by requiring concurrence of those bodies. Such concurrence would provide a necessary check to potential ambitions, usurpations and corruption that could easily occur if there was but one body or if the two mirrored one another.
With the passage of the 17th Amendment, that is exactly what happened. The Senate was taken out of the hands of the State Legislatures, in a way it was transformed not only into a democratized unit, but it was also nationalized making it little more then a de facto branch within the centralized government. By placing the Senate on the open market of direct elections, the Senate no longer was an institution that could and did counter-balance the House of Representatives, but it was no longer a check on the general federal governments ability define its own sovereignty over the State Republics and thus the People themselves.
More importantly, the more damaging effect was that the Senate was no longer answerable to the State Legislatures. This one act of nationalization of the Senate allowed for the neutralization of all claims, and thus powers, by the States to their former Sovereignty and their ability to uphold that key component of the delegation from the States of a portion of their Sovereignty to the federal government. Since a Senator was now only answerable to the People in direct election, he or she could not easily be chastised, recalled or impeached by the State Legislature. This was an essential power of the individual State legislatures and indeed of the People themselves. As it is, the States have no real representation within Congress itself, because like the House of Representatives, the Senate is now only answerable to the People by the electoral process and are, in a very real sense, on the open market of influences.
Under such a system, there is particularly one type of influence upon the Senate that exceeds all others and that influence is of the federal government. The Senate has, in essence, become nothing more than an arm of the federal government and is far more likely to be in agreement with the desires of the general government instead of the People or the States.
As it is, the Senate is an isolated power that does little but assist in the concentrate the power of the federal government, centralizing its authority and expanding its ability to usurp any power it deems fit and necessary in order to advance its own will without the Consent of the People even though it was the People themselves that elected the Senate.
At present, the States must compete along with other Lobbyist and Special Interests for the ear of the Senate. The Repeal of the 17th Amendment would be an effective measure to decentralize the power of the federal government and would, in a very powerful measure, establish a direct line between the Sovereign State Republics and the general federal government. The States currently must direct their request and concerns to numerous agencies, stepping through a labyrinth of bureaucracies in order to attain an audience. The State Republics have little of the Constitutional Authority or Power as provided and enumerated within the Constitution. In a very real sense, the States have been relegated to sub-components of the general government and thereby answerable to the entire power-structure of the general federal government.
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
In the above statement, Mr. Madison makes it perfectly clear that along with the other essential workings of the Senate, that by providing for an indirect election by the People through the State Legislatures the Senate would be yet another check on the potential for radical, wasteful and useless legislation. As we have seen over the decades, the Senate has been a virtual Petri Dish of all manner of novel ideas and legislations, most of which have proved not in the best interest of this Country or its People. By placing the responsibility of the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, such illegitimate and unwise legislative excesses can be avoided, or at least diverted by the power of the State Legislatures to recall their Senator to explain such excesses in the Senate.
In the following, Mr. Madison gave the reason for government, good government: "A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first."
As seen the reason for good government is fidelity to the object of government and that is the Happiness of the People. Additionally, the only way to attain that object is by having the knowledge and thereby the tools to attain it. Those tools were given to us through that incredible document the Constitution and the original structure is contains.
Now, concerning the Sovereignty and Authority of the States, we must look to an ancillary enumeration of power found in the 9th and 10th Amendments. It should be evident that our Founders feared the concentration and centralization of power into the federal government and the potential reach such a system that would supercede the authority delegated by the State Republics in an unrestrained grasp of power. The Founders established a system that would assist in the prevention of any one branch of government being the sole judge of its own power or the scope of its own authority. That process cannot be and was never intended to be left to the unrestrained discretion of any single branch of government, nor was it intended to give all three branches of the federal government such discretion without the ability to recall such decisions and judgments. The Sovereign Power and Authority of the individual State Republics was equally essential to the process of checks and balances as the Separation of Powers between the Three Branches of the general government.
At present, the Sovereign Position of the States is totally dependent upon the transitory nature of Congress in conjunction with various Judiciary decisions made through the years that effectively neutralize the Sovereign Position of the State Republics. In the Constitution, the States are, by compact between them as Sovereign States, guaranteed Republican forms of government. Due to the various novel legislations by Congress, such as the 17th Amendment, and the numerous Judicial reviews and opinions, such a guarantee has been severely compromised to the point that the Sovereign State Republics have been essentially decommissioned to a relegated position within the national government.
It is not difficult to see that the once Sovereign Position of the States has been effectively weakened and that the entire domain of the States has been rendered vulnerable to any federal decision or to the ability of the federal government to apply undue pressure on the States to achieve a particular end. The States have been forced to resign their authority to the federal instead of enforcing the delegation of authority to the federal government.
The Framers of the Constitution provided a very clear mechanism, actually two, to define a specific balance within the political process in this country. One primary mechanism was the enumeration and delineation of a division of authority between the State Republics and the reflective federal government. That mechanism was the 10th Amendment. The Second, as has been discussed, was the mechanism the appointment of each State Senator by the State Legislature. These two mechanisms provided for a very specific division and administration of powers. The passage of the 17th Amendment effectively eviscerated both mechanisms.
Finally, in the 9th Amendment these words were penned:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
This all-encompassing Amendment enumerates that ultimately it is the People, not Congress, not the Executive, not the Judicial and not even the States that retain the premier power in this country; that Honor and Responsibility belong to the People alone. It is their Sovereignty that is the Exemplary Authority and without which there can be no other powers or authority delegated. We must never lose sight of such a responsibility.
In Liberty,
Republicae-Seditionist
The Sentinel said it best: "Garfield's rule will be the transitory period between State Sovereignty and National Sovereignty. The United States Senate will give way to a National Senate. State Constitutions and the United States Senate are relics of State Sovereignty and implements of treason. Garfield's Presidency will be the Regency of Stalwartism; after that: REX."
As is evident in this paragraph, the need to affect a National Senate was seen as essential in the conquest of State Sovereignty and reigning in what can only be considered as a Monarchist government, or a Monarchist Oligarchy. Indeed, James Garfield himself said it very clear when he proclaimed the following words:
"The influence of Jefferson's Democratic principles is rapidly waning, while the principles of Hamilton are rapidly increasing. Power has been gravitating toward the Central Government." -James Garfield, July 3rd, 1881.
The full effect of this vile desire and criminal act was not realized until a little over 30 years later in 1913 when three major pieces of legislations were passed; those being the 16th, 17th Amendments and the Federal Reserve Act. In that year, the realization of the Nationalized Senate, indeed the Nationalized Central Government was all but completed by the actions of traitors to the Republic.
The Exemplary Mr. Madison stated: "If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated [not absorbed] into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic."
Mr. Madison is very clear, that there is an extremely important reason behind placing layers of separation within the structure of a government that is bound by a "simple league", Sovereign and Independent States, each sharing in the common council of both through their individual Senators appointed by the States to serve, not the nation, but the respective States.
Mr. Madison goes on to say: "Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
Mr. Madison clearly states that the structural requirement of Senators who are answerable to their respective States is imperative to the maintenance of both checks and balances within the structure as a whole and to protect the Will of the People through the ancillary Sovereignty of the States. Additionally, this structure was also an essential element in preventing potential excesses in legislation.
Mr. Madison then gives a more thorough explanation of the reasons behind the particular Constitutional Structure of the Republic:
"First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance, which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.
You will notice Mr. Madison states, in no uncertain terms, that by requiring two separate and distinct bodies, as in the House of Representatives and the Senate, that such a structure not only provides a vital check on government in general, but it also doubles the security of the People themselves by requiring concurrence of those bodies. Such concurrence would provide a necessary check to potential ambitions, usurpations and corruption that could easily occur if there was but one body or if the two mirrored one another.
With the passage of the 17th Amendment, that is exactly what happened. The Senate was taken out of the hands of the State Legislatures, in a way it was transformed not only into a democratized unit, but it was also nationalized making it little more then a de facto branch within the centralized government. By placing the Senate on the open market of direct elections, the Senate no longer was an institution that could and did counter-balance the House of Representatives, but it was no longer a check on the general federal governments ability define its own sovereignty over the State Republics and thus the People themselves.
More importantly, the more damaging effect was that the Senate was no longer answerable to the State Legislatures. This one act of nationalization of the Senate allowed for the neutralization of all claims, and thus powers, by the States to their former Sovereignty and their ability to uphold that key component of the delegation from the States of a portion of their Sovereignty to the federal government. Since a Senator was now only answerable to the People in direct election, he or she could not easily be chastised, recalled or impeached by the State Legislature. This was an essential power of the individual State legislatures and indeed of the People themselves. As it is, the States have no real representation within Congress itself, because like the House of Representatives, the Senate is now only answerable to the People by the electoral process and are, in a very real sense, on the open market of influences.
Under such a system, there is particularly one type of influence upon the Senate that exceeds all others and that influence is of the federal government. The Senate has, in essence, become nothing more than an arm of the federal government and is far more likely to be in agreement with the desires of the general government instead of the People or the States.
As it is, the Senate is an isolated power that does little but assist in the concentrate the power of the federal government, centralizing its authority and expanding its ability to usurp any power it deems fit and necessary in order to advance its own will without the Consent of the People even though it was the People themselves that elected the Senate.
At present, the States must compete along with other Lobbyist and Special Interests for the ear of the Senate. The Repeal of the 17th Amendment would be an effective measure to decentralize the power of the federal government and would, in a very powerful measure, establish a direct line between the Sovereign State Republics and the general federal government. The States currently must direct their request and concerns to numerous agencies, stepping through a labyrinth of bureaucracies in order to attain an audience. The State Republics have little of the Constitutional Authority or Power as provided and enumerated within the Constitution. In a very real sense, the States have been relegated to sub-components of the general government and thereby answerable to the entire power-structure of the general federal government.
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
In the above statement, Mr. Madison makes it perfectly clear that along with the other essential workings of the Senate, that by providing for an indirect election by the People through the State Legislatures the Senate would be yet another check on the potential for radical, wasteful and useless legislation. As we have seen over the decades, the Senate has been a virtual Petri Dish of all manner of novel ideas and legislations, most of which have proved not in the best interest of this Country or its People. By placing the responsibility of the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, such illegitimate and unwise legislative excesses can be avoided, or at least diverted by the power of the State Legislatures to recall their Senator to explain such excesses in the Senate.
In the following, Mr. Madison gave the reason for government, good government: "A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first."
As seen the reason for good government is fidelity to the object of government and that is the Happiness of the People. Additionally, the only way to attain that object is by having the knowledge and thereby the tools to attain it. Those tools were given to us through that incredible document the Constitution and the original structure is contains.
Now, concerning the Sovereignty and Authority of the States, we must look to an ancillary enumeration of power found in the 9th and 10th Amendments. It should be evident that our Founders feared the concentration and centralization of power into the federal government and the potential reach such a system that would supercede the authority delegated by the State Republics in an unrestrained grasp of power. The Founders established a system that would assist in the prevention of any one branch of government being the sole judge of its own power or the scope of its own authority. That process cannot be and was never intended to be left to the unrestrained discretion of any single branch of government, nor was it intended to give all three branches of the federal government such discretion without the ability to recall such decisions and judgments. The Sovereign Power and Authority of the individual State Republics was equally essential to the process of checks and balances as the Separation of Powers between the Three Branches of the general government.
At present, the Sovereign Position of the States is totally dependent upon the transitory nature of Congress in conjunction with various Judiciary decisions made through the years that effectively neutralize the Sovereign Position of the State Republics. In the Constitution, the States are, by compact between them as Sovereign States, guaranteed Republican forms of government. Due to the various novel legislations by Congress, such as the 17th Amendment, and the numerous Judicial reviews and opinions, such a guarantee has been severely compromised to the point that the Sovereign State Republics have been essentially decommissioned to a relegated position within the national government.
It is not difficult to see that the once Sovereign Position of the States has been effectively weakened and that the entire domain of the States has been rendered vulnerable to any federal decision or to the ability of the federal government to apply undue pressure on the States to achieve a particular end. The States have been forced to resign their authority to the federal instead of enforcing the delegation of authority to the federal government.
The Framers of the Constitution provided a very clear mechanism, actually two, to define a specific balance within the political process in this country. One primary mechanism was the enumeration and delineation of a division of authority between the State Republics and the reflective federal government. That mechanism was the 10th Amendment. The Second, as has been discussed, was the mechanism the appointment of each State Senator by the State Legislature. These two mechanisms provided for a very specific division and administration of powers. The passage of the 17th Amendment effectively eviscerated both mechanisms.
Finally, in the 9th Amendment these words were penned:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
This all-encompassing Amendment enumerates that ultimately it is the People, not Congress, not the Executive, not the Judicial and not even the States that retain the premier power in this country; that Honor and Responsibility belong to the People alone. It is their Sovereignty that is the Exemplary Authority and without which there can be no other powers or authority delegated. We must never lose sight of such a responsibility.
In Liberty,
Republicae-Seditionist