angelatc
11-07-2008, 03:09 PM
I started looking into opportunities to possibly challenge the high school graduation volunteer service requirements. It quickly led to this: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&case=/data2/circs/2nd/957237.html
where a New York family unsuccessfully challenged the requirement. The decision about the case in regard to the 13th Amendment reads partially as follows:
The Supreme Court has conceded that, "[w]hile the general spirit of the phrase ´involuntary servitude' is easily comprehended, the exact range of conditions it prohibits is harder to define." United States v. Kozminski , 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988). The Supreme Court has observed, however, that "the phrase ´involuntary servitude' was intended ´to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results.'" Id. (quoting Butler v. Perry , 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)); see also United States v. Shackney , 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964). We have added that the ban on involuntary servitude "was to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of slavery was legally enforced . . . ." Shackney , 333 F.2d at 485.
In application, courts have consistently found the involuntary servitude standard is not so rigorous as to prohibit all forms of labor that one person is compelled to perform for the benefit of another. The Thirteenth Amendment does not bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that choice are "exceedingly bad." Id. at 486; see also Watson v. Graves , 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990). For example, a state may require an attorney to work pro bono , United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land , 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (attorney may, in the alternative, choose not to practice law), or a doctor who has accepted scholarship funds to perform pro bono services, United States v. Redovan , 656 F. Supp. 121, 128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd , 826 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1987) (doctor may choose to pay damages for breach of contract). The government may also require the performance of "civic duties" such as military service, Selective Draft Law Cases , 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918), jury duty, see Hurtado v. United States , 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973), and upkeep of local public roads, Butler , 240 U.S. at 333 , without trenching upon the Thirteenth Amendment.
In Jobson v. Henne , 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966), we suggested that the constitutionality of forced labor turns, in large measure, on the nature and amount of the work demanded, and the purpose for which it is required. Thus, while the Thirteenth Amendment does not foreclose the ability of the state to require chores of its institutionalized mental patients, we have recognized that "there may be some mandatory programs so ruthless in the amount of work demanded, and in the conditions under which the work must be performed, and thus so devoid of therapeutic purpose, that a court justifiably could conclude that the [work constituted] . . . involuntary servitude." Id.
Like so many thorny legal distinctions, it is all a matter of degree. Guided by the Supreme Court in Butler and Kozminski , our own decisions in Shackney [1] and Jobson , and the import of the other cases mentioned above, we join the Third Circuit in finding that the appropriate analysis under the Thirteenth Amendment is a "contextual approach," Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School Dist. , 987 F.2d 989, 1000 (3d Cir. 1993), examining the challenged labor through a wider constitutional prism.
Plaintiffs urge us to ignore context and to focus instead upon the "plain meaning" of the amendment. They argue that, because the organization for which Daniel volunteers will receive a tangible benefit, his work is, almost by definition, "servitude." And they note that, because service is forced upon Daniel under the threat of withholding his high school diploma, the service is "involuntary." Therefore, the plaintiffs assert, the program falls within the plain meaning of "involuntary servitude."
Matters are rarely that simple. A search for the plain meaning of the constitutional text does not require -- and, indeed, often cannot support -- such clinical lexical dissection. Rather, the inquiry must be whether, "taking as a whole the set of conditions existing in the imposition of a mandatory community service program in a public high school, the students providing the services are in a condition of involuntary servitude," Steirer , 987 F.2d at 998, as that singular phrase is understood in its historical context.
Taking a contextual approach, we have no trouble concluding that the mandatory community service program does not amount to involuntary servitude in the constitutional sense. The work required is not severe: students must perform only forty hours of service in four years. Furthermore, the nature of the work required and conditions under which it must be performed are hardly onerous. Students may choose among a nearly infinite variety of organizations offering a kaleidoscope of service activities. They are free to arrange their own work schedules, and to work in the summers when other school-related duties are minimal.
It is important to note that the purpose of the program is not exploitative. Rather, it is educational, particularly when coupled with the related classroom discussions. Finally, the level of coercion is not so high as to compel a finding of involuntary servitude. Although students who forego their required service will not graduate, they may avoid the program and its penalties by attending private school, transferring to another public high school, or studying at home to achieve a high school equivalency certificate. While these choices may be economically or psychologically painful, choices they are, nonetheless. They might not render the program voluntary, but they contribute to the conclusion that it is not involuntary servitude.
Considering all these factors, we find that the program is not constitutionally infirm. That is not to say that any and every service program that a public school district may devise would survive constitutional scrutiny. If, for instance, the students were required to spend their Saturdays at the homes of their teachers, washing their cars, painting their houses, and weeding their gardens, the extent, nature, and conditions of "service," and the more obviously exploitative purpose of the program, might indeed warrant a finding of "involuntary servitude." But this is not our case.
Because we conclude that the mandatory community service program is not, on the whole, "compulsory labor" which, "in practical operation" produces "undesirable results" analogous to slavery, Kozminski , 487 U.S. at 942 , we hold that the District's mandatory community service program does not constitute impermissible involuntary servitude.
The bolding is mine. Sarcastic and cynical me wants to add that if they would simply do as the plaintiff requested, and simply read what the statute says, the need for lawyers wouldn't be nearly as great as it is.
I am really starting to hate this country.
where a New York family unsuccessfully challenged the requirement. The decision about the case in regard to the 13th Amendment reads partially as follows:
The Supreme Court has conceded that, "[w]hile the general spirit of the phrase ´involuntary servitude' is easily comprehended, the exact range of conditions it prohibits is harder to define." United States v. Kozminski , 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988). The Supreme Court has observed, however, that "the phrase ´involuntary servitude' was intended ´to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results.'" Id. (quoting Butler v. Perry , 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)); see also United States v. Shackney , 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964). We have added that the ban on involuntary servitude "was to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of slavery was legally enforced . . . ." Shackney , 333 F.2d at 485.
In application, courts have consistently found the involuntary servitude standard is not so rigorous as to prohibit all forms of labor that one person is compelled to perform for the benefit of another. The Thirteenth Amendment does not bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that choice are "exceedingly bad." Id. at 486; see also Watson v. Graves , 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990). For example, a state may require an attorney to work pro bono , United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land , 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (attorney may, in the alternative, choose not to practice law), or a doctor who has accepted scholarship funds to perform pro bono services, United States v. Redovan , 656 F. Supp. 121, 128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd , 826 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1987) (doctor may choose to pay damages for breach of contract). The government may also require the performance of "civic duties" such as military service, Selective Draft Law Cases , 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918), jury duty, see Hurtado v. United States , 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973), and upkeep of local public roads, Butler , 240 U.S. at 333 , without trenching upon the Thirteenth Amendment.
In Jobson v. Henne , 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966), we suggested that the constitutionality of forced labor turns, in large measure, on the nature and amount of the work demanded, and the purpose for which it is required. Thus, while the Thirteenth Amendment does not foreclose the ability of the state to require chores of its institutionalized mental patients, we have recognized that "there may be some mandatory programs so ruthless in the amount of work demanded, and in the conditions under which the work must be performed, and thus so devoid of therapeutic purpose, that a court justifiably could conclude that the [work constituted] . . . involuntary servitude." Id.
Like so many thorny legal distinctions, it is all a matter of degree. Guided by the Supreme Court in Butler and Kozminski , our own decisions in Shackney [1] and Jobson , and the import of the other cases mentioned above, we join the Third Circuit in finding that the appropriate analysis under the Thirteenth Amendment is a "contextual approach," Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School Dist. , 987 F.2d 989, 1000 (3d Cir. 1993), examining the challenged labor through a wider constitutional prism.
Plaintiffs urge us to ignore context and to focus instead upon the "plain meaning" of the amendment. They argue that, because the organization for which Daniel volunteers will receive a tangible benefit, his work is, almost by definition, "servitude." And they note that, because service is forced upon Daniel under the threat of withholding his high school diploma, the service is "involuntary." Therefore, the plaintiffs assert, the program falls within the plain meaning of "involuntary servitude."
Matters are rarely that simple. A search for the plain meaning of the constitutional text does not require -- and, indeed, often cannot support -- such clinical lexical dissection. Rather, the inquiry must be whether, "taking as a whole the set of conditions existing in the imposition of a mandatory community service program in a public high school, the students providing the services are in a condition of involuntary servitude," Steirer , 987 F.2d at 998, as that singular phrase is understood in its historical context.
Taking a contextual approach, we have no trouble concluding that the mandatory community service program does not amount to involuntary servitude in the constitutional sense. The work required is not severe: students must perform only forty hours of service in four years. Furthermore, the nature of the work required and conditions under which it must be performed are hardly onerous. Students may choose among a nearly infinite variety of organizations offering a kaleidoscope of service activities. They are free to arrange their own work schedules, and to work in the summers when other school-related duties are minimal.
It is important to note that the purpose of the program is not exploitative. Rather, it is educational, particularly when coupled with the related classroom discussions. Finally, the level of coercion is not so high as to compel a finding of involuntary servitude. Although students who forego their required service will not graduate, they may avoid the program and its penalties by attending private school, transferring to another public high school, or studying at home to achieve a high school equivalency certificate. While these choices may be economically or psychologically painful, choices they are, nonetheless. They might not render the program voluntary, but they contribute to the conclusion that it is not involuntary servitude.
Considering all these factors, we find that the program is not constitutionally infirm. That is not to say that any and every service program that a public school district may devise would survive constitutional scrutiny. If, for instance, the students were required to spend their Saturdays at the homes of their teachers, washing their cars, painting their houses, and weeding their gardens, the extent, nature, and conditions of "service," and the more obviously exploitative purpose of the program, might indeed warrant a finding of "involuntary servitude." But this is not our case.
Because we conclude that the mandatory community service program is not, on the whole, "compulsory labor" which, "in practical operation" produces "undesirable results" analogous to slavery, Kozminski , 487 U.S. at 942 , we hold that the District's mandatory community service program does not constitute impermissible involuntary servitude.
The bolding is mine. Sarcastic and cynical me wants to add that if they would simply do as the plaintiff requested, and simply read what the statute says, the need for lawyers wouldn't be nearly as great as it is.
I am really starting to hate this country.